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“Fits of Vulgar Joy”: Play Anxiety in the Romantic Poets 
by  
Alison W. Powell  
!
Advisor: Nancy Yousef 
“Fits of Vulgar Joy”: Play Anxiety in the Romantic Poets considers the crucial but neglected 
role of play as a component of the imaginative faculty and as related to the development of 
moral sensibility in the Romantic era. It examines the Spieltrieb (“play drive”) in the works of  
Coleridge, Rousseau, Wordsworth, Shelley, and John Clare to explore the tension between what 
is explicitly stated about the relationship between play, intersubjectivity, and aesthetics, and 
how play is actually depicted in the poetry and essays of the Romantic era. It works to identify 
how and with what objective the Romantics differentiated so minutely between play, fancy, 
imagination, and art, investigating the gravity with which the authors worked to parse these 
variances. Although the Romantics generally emphasized the influence of childhood on the 
development of poetic sensibility and heralded the role of “free play” in the imagination, I 
demonstrate that representations of ludic activity in Wordsworth’s Prelude (1805), for example, 
indicates a deep ambivalence about the spontaneous, chaotic creative impulse typically called 
“play.”   
 The approach I use is fundamentally interdisciplinary and utilizes play theory, object 
relations, and the work of Kant, Gadamer, Plato, and Schiller. I also draw from a myriad of 
primary texts: in addition to readings of The Prelude (1805) and Shelley’s “Julian and Maddalo: 
A Conversation,” for example, I examine Rousseau’s Emile, in which the destructive potential of 
play originates in childish vanity— a paradigm which eerily parallels the English response to  
Rousseau’s infamous reputation. Child’s play within nature is acted out in John Clare’s “The  
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Progress of Ryhme” and Wordsworth’s Boy of Winander through the mimicry of nightingale 
song and owls’ hoots, respectively. Wordsworth uses the eventual death of the boy to mark the 
end of play and the beginning of poetry. In Clare’s work, the poet is paralyzed in grief over his 
inability to retain that undirected creativity, that harmonious existence within the Helpston 
fields which marked his childhood. Finally, Shelley’s “Julian and Maddalo: A Conversation” 
offers a departure from these more perplexed examples. Maddalo’s daughter reveals the 
profundity of silent play, but to the comparative denigration of poetics.  
 The Romantic paradox of play reveals itself in patterns in which effortless frivolity gives 
way to something more subversive or melancholy. Most often the ludic is inextricably tied to the 
adult poet’s acknowledgement of his exile from nature and his own former, creative, aimless 
self. These changes are depicted as necessarily accompanying maturation, making possible one’s 
entrance into society and the development of responsible citizenship. The Romantic texts which 
preoccupy this project collapse those elements which are determined antithetical to the process 
of maturation — that which is hedonistic, chaotic, selfish, myopic, excessive— and deliver it to 
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Playing Romantically: Mimicry, Thievery, Destruction 
!
Thus, often in those fits of vulgar joy 
Which, through all seasons, on a child’s pursuits 
Are prompt attendants, ‘mid that giddy bliss 
Which, like a tempest, works along the blood 
And is forgotten; even then I felt 
Gleams like the flashing of a shield; the earth 
And common face of Nature . . . .  1!
  
What does it mean to play Romantically? How does play manifest in Romantic poetry, and what 
might we learn about its appearance in eighteenth century writing on the imagination? How 
might we understand the tension between what is explicitly stated about the relationship 
between play, morality and aesthetics, and how play is actually used or depicted in the poetry 
and essays of the era? For despite their heralding of the importance of childhood in the 
development of the poetic imagination, when the Romantic poets actually represent play in 
markedly ambivalent terms. This project explores the significance of that paradox—an explicit 
heralding of the potential of “free play” troubled by ambivalent representations of it—by 
examining patterns of peripherality and exile where play is often only momentarily engaged 
before being circumvented, qualified, or mourned. It also considers the role of play as related to 
the management of the child’s imagination and development of poetic sensibility in works by 
Wordsworth, Coleridge, Shelley, Keats, and John Clare, and in Rousseau’s educational novel 
Emile. Searching for the Spieltrieb ("the play drive") in the works of these authors in order to 
unearth the relationship between play and the cultivation of sympathy especially, I identify a 
recurrent anxiety about the subversive potential of play. 
 In other words, below its surface frivolity play is frequently, if tacitly, represented as an 
irritant in the Romantic trajectory of the aesthetic experience as developing moral sensibility. A 
primary aim Romantic criticism has been to trace the ways that German philosophers of the 
post-Enlightenment influenced the British Romantic poets, especially in their articulation that 
"1
 William Wordsworth, The Prelude (1805). 1: 613-619. 1
art and poetry is integral to the development of moral sensibility; for Kant, as for Schiller, the 
imaginative faculty also helps balance reason and emotion. Recent theorists have focused on 
seeming contradictions in Romantic adherence to the imagination: for there are tremendous 
anxieties in major Romantic writings about the effects of the imagination on the mind. After all, 
a world which posits imagination as central to ethics is a world which invites illusion into 
morality, a troubling provocation to the Enlightenment’s establishment of reason as the antidote 
to the anarchic powers of the imagination. As Alexander Schlutz argues, though Kant believed 
the imagination was crucial to “secure the unity of the transcendental system, ultimately, for 
him as for Coleridge, ‘Imagination is inseparable... from the threat of madness and the 
irrational’” (81). Expanding upon such recent criticism, I examine the related but discrete 
aspects of play in Romantic texts, incorporating contemporary play theory to trouble the 
traditional configuration of play as an expression of freedom and sociability.  The incriminating 
underbelly of play—that which is unpredictable, spontaneous, violent, or trivial— is largely 
suppressed as antithetical to a larger aesthetic project which prioritizes the ordered and poetic, 
and claims poetry for moral edification.   
 Despite the unique ability of play to proclaim itself free of consequence, serious attempts 
to theorize the overlap of ethics and aesthetics typically include a concerted effort to distinguish 
play from art. One such example is Schiller’s Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man (1794),  
one of the first major works to focus entirely on the relationship between play, reason, emotion, 
and moral action, and to do so with an overwhelmingly affirmative perspective. His Spieltrieb or 
playdrive, in which the first signs of the free, active, and real determinacy of man makes itself 
known, is in part a way of transforming conflict into works of art and anticipates the 
psychoanalytic use of play.  Yet despite the widespread reception of Schiller’s work and the 2
increasing sentimentalization of childhood, Romantic poets express trepidation about play in 
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 Schiller, Friedrich. On the Aesthetic Education of Man. Trans. Elizabeth M. Wilkinson and L.A. 2
Willoughby. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 2005. Schiller was prompted to write his Letters both by 
Rousseau’s Emile and Kant’s comment that art itself may be considered as a form of play, at 
least when compared to labor. His play impulse is an elaboration of Kant’s ideas in the Critique 
of Judgement.
their formal articulations of aesthetic positions and in the relative timidity with which they 
experimented with language and poetic form. As Donald Wesling points out, Wordsworth’s 
influential Preface to the Lyrical Ballads questioned whether one must distinguish between 
poetry and prose at all —a radical claim at the time— and he and Coleridge experimented with 
verse: the prose poem, free verse, and sprung rhythm, for example. Still “neither ultimately 
spelled out a poetics of the attempt to be unprecedented. A more radical theory of prosody was 
to be worked out fully by later generations of the avant garde” (33). Coleridge’s thoughts on play 
were ambivalent, and autobiographical writings and poems reveal his fear that playfulness leads 
to moral slippage (Coleridge’s Play of Mind 6). The poet’s experience of the imagination’s 
unfettered power was far from wholly delightful: though he spent his days articulating how the 
imagination brings us closer to the divine, but by night his imagination turned on him: he was 
plagued by terrifying nightmares (Schlutz 5). Playfulness in poetry— whether defined as word 
play, spontaneity in form, absurd imagistic leaps, puns, riddles or the like— most often struck 
Wordsworth as unbecoming, indulging those elements of the human imagination which are 
frivolous or worse: alienating, perverse, or morally stunted. Much of this (as Wesling argues) 
relates to the Romantic desire to expunge Augustan aesthetic values, especially ornamentation 
in language, from their poetry. For example, that assertion that the best poetry need not differ 
from the best prose circumscribes an infinite variety of language play, puns, and verbal 
paradoxes used not just by the Augustan poets but medieval, Metaphysical, and contemporary 
poets as well.  
 Poetic play is one thing, but what about more literal depictions of play— games, child’s 
play, dress-up, Emile’s cake race? As in life, play and games in Romantic poetry are frequently 
inscribed with meanings which undermine their frivolity, and if the passage begins in levity it is 
unlikely to end that way. The boy’s playful mimicry of hooting owls in Wordsworth’s Boy of 
Winander are later shadowed by his death, and the game of billiard balls at the center of 
Shelley’s “Julian and Maddalo: A Conversation” (pub. 1824) is ultimately a metaphorical apex 
that bears the weight of the poem’s philosophic crisis. The management of children’s games in 
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Emile reveals the governor to be conniving and self-interested, an adult whose rhetoric belies his 
manipulations. In Blake and beyond, songs of innocence are modified in meaning by subsequent 
songs of experience. While this recalls the trope of man’s exile from the Garden of Eden it also 
indicates what Derrida called the “Platonic repression of play”—that play is something to be 
“supervised and contained within the safeguards of ethics and politics” (Dissemination 156).  
Even when these boundaries are implicitly critiqued as corrupt—as in, for example, many of the 
Songs of Experience—Romantic playfulness is often negated by the subsequent conditions 
within which it is managed.  
 One must acknowledge a fundamental difficulty in a project such as this: how do we 
define “play”? The attempt to define it at all tells us about our need to identify behaviors which 
are “free,” “spontaneous,” “pleasurable,” or “aimless” (adjectives which in and of themselves 
elide precise definitions). Gregory Bateson once remarked, “When people talk about play, they 
tend to say what it is not—‘it is not real’ or ‘it is not serious’— and then the rest of the sentence 
gets rather vague when the speaker realizes that play is serious. The word ‘not’ is somehow very 
important in this”(146). He was likely thinking of Freud, who some fifty years before argued that 
the opposite of play is not what is serious but what is real (“Creative Writers and Day 
Dreaming,” 436). Derrida sees the difficulty in defining play as being due to that which is 
unpredictable and untamed about play: “As soon as it comes into being and into language, play 
erases itself as such. Just as writing must erase itself as such before truth” (Dissemination 
156-67). To observe an anxiety about defining play is not to say that play is absent, however. 
Despite evidence in Romantic poetry of a desire to identify and exile those forms of creativity 
seen as frivolous, peripheral, or counter-productive to man’s apprehension of the sublime, their 
emphasis on play arguably dignified it for the first time in Western aesthetic and philosophical 
criticism.  
 To complicate matters even the most superficial and cursory attempt to define play must 
engage an interdisciplinary approach; yet each discipline implicitly contains its own ideological 
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rhetoric.  Two disciplines beyond literary criticism are central to my discussion of play: 3
philosophy and object relations. Gadamer’s Truth and Method (1960), Plato’s Republic (c. 380 
BC), and Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798). Each of these texts 
assists me as I explore of the intersection of supposedly spontaneous, undirected creative 
activity and ethics, and to consider what is historically contingent about the Romantic view of 
play. I also turn to object relations, in which I draw most on the work of D.W. Winnicott and 
Christopher Bollas to theorize the relationship between child’s play and destruction. At the same 
time, any exploration of play must reply upon play theory and its  manifestations in 
anthropology, psychology, and philosophy. Within art theory the so-called “play theory of art” 
posits that animal and child’s play should be understood as a primitive form of art making and 
that the work of the artist is a natural outgrowth of that play. It identifies shared qualities in art 
and play: for example, both behaviors involve degrees of novelty, are pleasure-oriented and / or 
largely metaphorical. While the accuracy of these supposed similarities and differences is worthy 
of debate, in them we find articulations of widespread Western beliefs regarding the relationship 
between creative expression and ethics. For example, the play theory of art often stipulates that 
because both art and play happen after basic human needs such as shelter, food, and safety are 
met, the justification for the activity in both cases is found in the activity itself. If we accept the 
idea that play is (in part) a spontaneous expression of freedom from physical need, we approach 
it as a creative articulation of excess; to do so is to uncover an unstated relationship between 
play and ethics.  
 At the same time, the play theory of art is also invested in identifying differences between 
them. Play behavior is often viewed by play theorists, psychologists, anthropologists, and others 
as having a paideic function—as expressing the development of physical, cognitive, and/or 
emotional skills. In this way, they argue, play differs from art. But few of the Romantics would 
have viewed educational functionality as rendering play incongruous with art, invested as they 
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 See Brian Sutton-Smith for an excellent discussion of the problems and advantages of this 3
reality: The Ambiguity of Play (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001) vii.
were in the idea that the creative experience cultivated one’s ethical and aesthetic sensibilities.  
Two of the most commonly stated variances between art and play, however, are especially useful 
for this project. Creative play, unlike art, is typically viewed as unscripted or spontaneous, with 
some element of unpredictability; it is also seen as relational, often involving more than one 
participant (Nahm 150). That one way of defining play against art is to claim its nature is 
uniquely spontaneous or unpredictable is reflected in Schiller’s belief that the play impulse is 
actually a stage in the imagination in which material is formed and made aesthetic: in his work 
we see a foundational example of the attempt to ascertain how spontaneous play may be 
modified, ordered and controlled in order to be useful to the imagination. Schiller thus presents 
a sequence which is commonplace in the play theory of art: play comes first, imagination 
second. This principle facilitates the simultaneous embrace and release of play into its proper 
material, which is the work of art.  
 That the nature of play is supposedly spontaneous has implications for any study of 
poetry which considers form, for moments of primary play in a poem—spontaneous and 
unpredictable ruptures in the form—would potentially be viewed as are viewed as regressive 
eruptions in the developmental progress of the imagination towards art, and perhaps for the 
Romantics, towards its ethical utility.  Spontaneity as a defining element also reminds one of the 
poststructural emphasis that play maintains its subversive status through that very 
unpredictability, as a rupture in time which cannot be anticipated and therefore “taken 
seriously” as an event. This paradox may be considered against Wordsworth’s assertion that 
poetry should come from the transposition of  the “spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings” 
into writing, once those feelings have been “recollected in tranquility” (Lyrical Ballads 82). The 
famous statement paradoxically posits that the success of the poem—and how Wordsworth 
defines “success” is, of course, complexly predicated on its ability to elicit the reader’s moral 
sympathy—depends on the author’s ability to recreate those feelings which have been separated 
from their original and unexpected state. If the import of the Romantic poem’s imaginative act is 
fundamentally tied to its ability to navigate the time lapse between inspiration and recollection, 
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then we must make sense of the relationship between play and spontaneity to understand the 
Romantic view of the function of the imagination. Paradoxes of creativity and temporality—how 
to transform the spontaneous seizure of emotion and imagination in the moment, through 
careful  and deliberate description— is at the heart of the Romantic project. 
 The assertion common among play theorists that play is uniquely relational overlaps 
with the psychoanalytic approach to play developed especially by Christopher Bollas and D.W. 
Winnicott, which focuses nearly exclusively on children and has come to be known as object 
relations theory. These psychoanalysts accept— even expect—that the relationality of play is 
typically metaphorical or allegorical, with a symbolic correspondence between the action or 
object in play and a dominant, usually parental, figure in the child’s actual life. Psychoanalytic 
interpretations of child’s play tend to read it as paideic and progress-oriented, an opportunity 
for ego integration which facilitates imaginative flexibility and the development of cognitive and 
emotional skills. Object relations can be used to interpret metaphorical relational play through 
the very structure of Romantic poems, where patterns of tension and release with the other are 
depicted via the speaker’s interaction with figures within the poem, the reader, manifestations of 
the self or various and shifting combinations of the three. Bollas’s work on creativity encourages 
us to consider the co-creational architecture of the analytic space; by doing so, we are able to re-
envision Romantic poems which emphasize solitude as an early, poetic variation of the analytic 
space: a place where the poet and reader alternately take on the position of analysand and 
analyst, creating together the poem’s narrative. Reading Coleridge’s conversation poems this 
way, for example, highlights the paradox of aloneness and sociability within their narratives. By 
focusing on play, we see poetic narratives as fluid and unfixed, with the form, speaker, surrogate 
figures, and reader as co-creators in the ongoing process of lyric making. 
 In asking where we see play in Romantic poetry, and whether (and in what ways) 
playfulness is antithetical to their conceptualization of the imagination, I rely neither solely on 
the traditional definition of play as a precursor to art, nor on the psychoanalytic view of play as 
working through conflict with the other, nor on a Derridian view of play as paradox or 
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disruption of presence. The difficulty with the play theory of art lies in its breadth and 
tautological tendency to define what play as what comes first, and art as what comes next. 
Psychoanalytic perspectives focus nearly exclusively on play in children, and in assigning an 
allegorical function to play (play functions metaphorically to make conflict apparent), it 
sidesteps those aspects of play which are integral to its definition in other contexts, such as 
nonsense, spontaneity, reverse logic, or play for pleasure’s sake. A poststructuralist approach to 
play highlights those very qualities, but is more elusive about our culture’s tendency to associate 
play with art, and/or as that produced best (if not only) by children—an emerging conviction of 
the Romantics.  
 In his influential book The Ambiguity of Play, Brian Sutton-Smith develops seven 
rhetorics of play to help unify the interdisciplinary field of play studies: play as progress, fate, 
power, identity, the imaginary, the self, and/or frivolity (vii). Though he intended his rhetorics 
to span from the Greeks to present day, Matthew Kaiser recently demonstrated in his recent 
book The World in Play: Portraits of a Victorian Concept how useful it can be to tailor them to 
a specific era. Kaiser categorizes Victorian rhetorics of play in the following ways: as 
competition, drawing on the effect Darwin’s work had on how the Victorians viewed sports and 
games; as self-creation, in which play is self-directed and interior; as subversion, seen in satire, 
perversion, idleness and parody; as paideia, where playful activities teach various physical, 
cognitive or emotional skills; as imaginary, in which play is freeing and illusory; as identity, 
linked with theater and pageantry; and finally, as fate. I am indebted to Sutton-Smith and 
Kaiser’s models, and in attempting to determine the boundaries of Romantic poetic play I have 
followed the latter’s example, focusing on the following seven rhetorics: play as idleness; 
illusion; impulsivity; spontaneous natural play; public spectacle; personal spectacle; and 
speaker / audience play. I also consider examples of play through the literary criticism about 
such texts: “‘Incessantly Beneath (our) Gaze”: The Spectacle of Vain Rousseau” explores English 
public perception of Rousseau at the time of Emile’s publication. Both the text and the 
reputation of its creator reveal important contradictions, especially when each works to 
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articulate the ideal relationship between imagination, maturity, impulsivity, and ethics. 
Criticism of Shelley’s “Julian and Maddalo: A Conversation” similarly offers a framework 
through which to read its content: the critical response further multiplies the figures in the 
poem, ironically adding voices to a text which is about the importance of silent receptivity. 
 The first chapter examines the well known passages of child’s play in the early books of 
The Prelude (1805) and distinguishes between play and fancy, while articulating the links 
between them in the Romantic mind. The woodcock, raven’s nest, ice skating, and boat stealing 
passages are especially indicative of Wordsworth’s ambivalent stance on play, and my focus is 
on three rhetorics which are especially integral to the Prelude: idleness, illusion, and 
impulsivity. While the play of other children is depicted as gentle, innocuous, humble, and light-
hearted, the narrator’s description of his own boyhood play is that of mischief, a“trouble” to the 
peaceful nature around him. These actions yield a way toward the sublime experience, but the 
earliest versions of the boy’s scenes of play are equivocal about the harmoniousness of the boy’s 
actions within nature. As Wordsworth revises the text the boy’s play increasingly becomes a 
symbol of man’s chaotic, indulgent tendencies, a state in which the individual vacillates between 
public and private modes of being. The adult poet’s representation of his childhood play is 
fraught by his desire to incorporate the scenes into an overall account of the development of 
poetic sensibility. In my reading, Wordsworth’s complex depiction of his own play is burdened 
by a wistfulness and guilt because the poet recognizes that his depiction of these scenes of play 
dilutes their ludic spirit and eliminates that spontaneous, transgressive quality which is so 
integral to child’s play. These evocative scenes are ultimately epitaphic— with the wise 
temperance of adulthood comes a reduced ecstasy.  
 My second chapter builds on this analysis of The Prelude (1805), offering a comparative 
analysis of birdsong mimicry in Wordsworth’s famous “Boy of Winander” and John Clare’s 
poem “The Progress of Ryhme” (the latter poem is in part a retelling of the former). Gadamer’s 
understanding of art as a “constantly renewing” dialogic play between the work and its receptive 
audience is central to my theorizing of the relationship between repetition and spontaneous play 
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in these two poems. Drawing on his work and that of Bakhtin, I distinguish between mimesis 
and aesthetic or dialogical mimesis, reading Wordsworth’s poem as an example of the latter and 
Clare’s as a tragic example of the former. In both poems the repetition of the birdsong is 
unmistakably a form of creative play, but only when it is voiced by children: in Clare’s poem the 
first mimicry is mourned as not replicable, whereas in Wordsworth it is indicative of the 
imagination in an undeveloped state, before it has progressed to the aesthetic. The second 
mimicry offered within each poem is the epiphanic revelation of the utility of play, and play’s 
relationship to time. It is compromised in Clare’s case by the hazards of memory, the limitations 
of translation, and the poet’s need to assess or create a meaning for that play. In Wordsworth’s 
text, the poet’s voice emerges triumphant from the interplay between sensual and formal, having 
gained in the recounting of a child’s mimicry the reassertion of his originality, artistic vitality, 
strong intellect and rational mind: the death of the boy is requisite for Wordsworth’s cool 
triumph.  
 These examples of mimicry, spontaneity, impulse, illusion, and the like, demonstrate the 
uneasy position of play within the Romantic sensibility. This uneasiness results in its most 
literal depictions— in games, sports, mimicry, or a child’s imaginative play, for example— being 
obviously managed by the narrator. What happens when play “grows up” — how does it manifest 
in the adult world? And what happens when play is writ large, integrated into the narrative voice 
itself? In my reading of Rousseau’s Emile, for example, I identify the public spectacle as a 
morally ambiguous, adult iteration of play which appears in the guise of May Day festivals, fairs, 
markets, and the like, and through games orchestrated by the governor for the Emile’s benefit.  
Literal play and games typically have an obvious paideic function and highlight the oft-remarked 
upon contradiction in the text between the governor who purports to be following the child’s 
natural trajectory, and yet carefully manipulates him into the conclusions he desires to impart. 
A more subtle form of adult play, the private spectacle, is constructed by the narrative voice: 
play with the speaker’s voice, playful addresses and interrogations of the reader, the taking on of 
various identities, calling attention to the construction of the tale, etc.—are techniques which 
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appear frequently in Rousseau’s work. Emile shows this latter version most in the play with the 
speaker’s voice and addresses to the reader. But play is also manifest in the pure enjoyment the 
narrator appears to experience in calling attention to the construction of the work. Rousseau’s 
narrator alternates between being antagonistic, defensive, and inviting to his audience, creating 
within that push-and-pull more room for play. For the Rousseau of Emile, imaginative play 
always carries with it the pitfall of indulgent vanity: the narrator warns is that the untutored 
child whose imagination is given free reign will indubitably be selfish, unreasonable, ill 
tempered, flighty, and full of temptations. When a child’s imagination is managed, however, he 
will be careful, temperate, and able to turn pity into pleasure. The combination of the narration, 
which frequently comments on the role an individual ego has or should have in creative action, 
and the governor’s actions, which consistently undermine the narrator’s assertions, overlap in 
fascinating ways with the opinions which the English public held about Rousseau himself, who  
was derided as impulsive, dangerous, performative, and vain. 
 Language— and not just poetic language— is an adult phenomenon in most Romantic 
depictions of play. In my fourth and final chapter, I consider the significance of Maddalo’s 
daughter’s silent play in Shelley’s Julian and Maddalo: A Conversation. The complex work 
depicts how the exhausting need to be understood, to speak, to communicate, and write, renders 
one oblivious to the passing of time and subjectivity of another. The child in the poem is 
especially attuned to those around her because in her play she demonstrates an ability to exist 
properly within time: a reality which is essentially tied to her status as pre-language and her 
later reticence to speak. The poem offers the reader two modes of creative expression to 
compare: the loquacious expression of the adults and the idle, silent play of a child, and what we 
discover is that poetic expression does not further sympathy and connection. Rather, it gets in 
the way. The poetry symbolized in the exchange between Julian and Maddalo, and the sheer 
poetry of the Maniac, actually confound the three men’s ability to understand and make sense of 
each other and even of their place within time. They are out of sync, temporally and 
intersubjectively. By contrast, the quiet, directionless play of Maddalo’s daughter—who Julian 
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plays with at the metaphorical apex of the poem’s philosophical crisis — shows an individual 
naturally integrated in her temporal experience. Her play with Julian marks not only a welcome 
suspension in speech but a concomitant slowing of the experience of time. This final chapter 
also demonstrates how very often— in Plato, Kant, and the Romantics— play and madness are 

























“Fits of Vulgar Joy”: Impulse, Illusion and Idleness  
in the Early Books of The Prelude (1805) !!
                 The child is a philosopher because we are to learn...from the fact  
                 that we are the bearers of our childhood...by recollecting and  
                 participating in our own childhoods. These will be philosophical  
                 ways of letting childhood go, of bearing childhood as gone, as  
                 having become what we are, sharing our fate. Putting aside  
                 childish things becomes the achievement of intellect.   4!
The term “play” is infamous for its ambiguity and attempts to settle on constraints tend to 
broaden it so much as to be ultimately meaningless. Much of the difficulty in pinning down 
exactly what play is is tied to preoccupations about its role in society: is it sportsmanship? 
Paideia? An early gesture toward art making? A delusive passion? Is play idleness— a form of 
creative receptivity—or just plain laziness? Is it fancy? Then there is the matter of the vast 
diversity of actions culturally attributed to “play”— after all, the intent and experience of 
donning a mask is fundamentally different than a game of catch— and the disciplinary 
orientation of the person constructing the definition has its influence as well. In The World in 
Play: Portraits of a Victorian Concept, Matthew Kaiser asserts that our approach to play is 
fundamentally—methodologically, historically, and ideologically—flawed, because we approach 
it in quantitative rather than qualitative terms, measuring it against work, suffering, and reality 
in a “quixotic effort to determine who possesses the most play, or enough play (which is very 
Victorian of us, actually)” (107). In reality everything is potentially intrinsic to the concept of 
play, and we do better to ask what kind of “playful” were the Victorians. And so Kaiser considers 
what rhetorics or logics of play are apparent and how they merge with, downplay, or dissolve 
one another. In adapting these questions to the Romantic era I acknowledge and celebrate the 
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 Stanley Cavell, “Texts of Recovery,” In Quest of the Ordinary: Lines of Skepticism and 4
Romanticism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994: 73 - 74. In this passage, he addresses 
Coleridge’s refusal to “try to determine why Wordsworth calls the child a philosopher,” quoting 
Wordsworth: “Though best Philosopher, who yet dost keep / Thy heritage, ... Haunted for ever 
by the eternal mind.” He continues, “later the child’s play is described as constituting ‘some 
fragment form his dream of human life.’ Hence in this respect to participate in the child’s work, 
in his inspiration toward life, is to recollect the dream of life, as from fragments….”
idiosyncratic, multifaceted nature of each poet’s aesthetic, as it manifests in their depiction and 
use of play— after all, the virtues and anxieties attributed to play in The Prelude are quite 
different that what we see in Shelley or Keats. For as each poet’s aesthetic shifts over time so 
may their use of the ludic: play is quite different in Wordsworth’s later sonnets, for example, 
than in the Lyrical Ballads.   These realities also account for my desire to keep the definitional 5
boundaries of “play” flexible. For example, many scenes of childhood mischief are woven 
throughout the early books of The Prelude, of course, but play is also present on a narratological 
level: we might remember Wordsworth’s assertion that throughout his account of the 
development of his poetic mind, he has “played with times / ... / And accidents as children do 
with cards” (6. 296-301). Scenes of childhood play thus depict Wordsworth’s initial, troubled 
identification within the natural world, the immorality and impulsiveness of his boyhood as 
refracted through the lens of the now socialized, mature poet. The passages often describe theft 
and destruction, entwining mischief and morality such that one can scarcely be noted without 
the echo of the next. One might approach the text from a materialist, metaphysical, or 
psychoanalytic lens, or focus on the autonomy of the creative mind, the Oedipal underpinnings 
and absence of a love object, or the dynamic relationship between child and pastoral in the face 
of the industrial revolution. Regardless of the approach, a close reading makes apparent the 
ways in which the poem overlaps natural and aesthetic screens even as it appears to reify that 
very division (Yousef 118).  
 Criticism which focuses on play in the early books of The Prelude often uses the raven’s 
nest, ice skating, and woodcock scenes as peripheral support for an interpretation which focuses 
on the stolen boat scene. Most commonly the interpretation concludes with some variation on 
the theme of the boy’s epiphanic realization of the power of nature to inspire moral conscience 
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 For more on play in the Lyrical Ballads see John Turner: Wordsworth: Play and Politics: A 5
Study of Wordsworth’s Poetry, 1787-1800. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986.
despite, or in response to, his dislodging of one of its harbored objects.   That the critical 6
treatment rarely attempts to read Book One solely for its messages about play is 
understandable: the stolen boat passage alone has generated an excess of riches in biographical, 
materialist, psychoanalytic, and poststructuralist criticism. To consider play as a whole in the 
early books one must make peace with each passage receiving less time than is its due, while 
acknowledging the perhaps inevitable redundancies in yet another close reading of these 
passages. Still, by attending to three specific  characteristics of play—impulse, illusion, and 
idleness— I believe we may better understand not only the nature of play as it relates to 
Wordsworth’s poetic imagination, but also the ambivalent relationship between the poet’s 
memory and his later composition. Play is often described as a vacillation between two defined 
concepts (art versus survival; child versus adult; fantasy versus reality), which is especially 
helpful for our purposes. In these accounts play is a movement in the space between either ends 
of an aesthetic, temporal, psychological, and / or metaphysical scale. A game might be described 
as “a state of incessant movement between fearing and hoping,” or the theater as alluring 
because of the play of contradictory feelings which it stirs up in the silent  spectator (Kant 127). 
In D.W. Winnicott’s view play is a motor-based, sensory, formless manifestation of creative 
impulse. Within the space of play, upon which “is built the whole of man’s experiential 
existence,” we are neither introvert or extrovert, subjective or objective, lodged within an inner 
reality or a shared, external world; rather, we exist wholly in intermediate, “transitional 
phenomena” (Playing and Reality, 86). This emphasis on movement within play, both literally 
(as in sport) and as metaphor for its variability, is integral to the Romantic view of play. For the 
Romantics characterized play as distinct from art: specifically as an interchange of ideas and 
semblances not yet shaped in form nor processed by the rational mind. Indeed, in Friedrich 
Schiller’s On the Aesthetic Education of Man Schiller distinguishes play and art specifically as 
freedom versus form, while incorporating a parallel dialectic of sensuality versus rationality. Yet 
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 The famous boy of Winander passage is the central subject of another chapter; for this reason, 6
and because my primary focus is Book 1 of the 1805 edition, my treatment of it here will be far 
more sparse than the passage demands. 
for him the association of play with the sensual and free does not relegate play to a secondary 
status, as we might expect. Rather, play fuels aesthetic education, which will in turn offer 
humanity an example of the ideal balance between the rational and sensual, demonstrating that 
sensuous play is as important as form. Its integrity must be intact: “To watch over these, and 
secure for each of these two drives its proper frontiers, is the task of culture.... not simply to 
maintain the rational against the sensuous, but the sensuous against the rational too” (87).  
 Nearly all play theorists view play as the origin of culture: Huizinga’s famous conclusion 
in Homo Ludens is that “In the twin union of play and culture, play is primary” (46). As a result, 
any examination of play must include that which is historically contingent: in the Victorian era, 
for example, the increasing popularity of competitive games can be tied to the publication of The 
Origin of the Species and the boom of consumer culture (Kaiser 111). Yet regardless of era, 
continuities in Western definitions of play are apparent: they nearly always include, for 
example, some nod to biology and anthropology, in which animals and children are perceived as 
uniquely attuned to the play impulse. The anthropological influence on the aesthetic and 
philosophical interpretations of the role of play in humanity is significant, though not always in 
predictable ways: for Schiller it is what distinguishes the human being from his animal nature, 
transforming what is physical necessity into the “work of free choice.... into moral 
necessity” (11). Huizinga emphasizes the inherent voluntariness and freedom of play, but roots 
this aspect in it as the first expression of the non-natural: it is what occurs after primal needs 
(food, shelter, reproduction) are met (9).  At the same time play involves nature because it is 7
there that we most easily find tools for expression. An example often used in object relations is 
the child who play-acts hunting, a display which psychoanalysts read as playful aggression. We 
see this in The Prelude, when the boys who are ice skating are described as “imitative of the 
chase” (1.435), their mirth located in the gesture of hunting for the kill. In these renderings play 
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is sensuous, free, and formless, a dynamic flux between subjective and objective experience, 
hallucination, and shared reality. It is just beyond the natural but before culture; it is both a 
trespass and the first glimpse of moral order.  
 The famous scenes of mischief in the early books of The Prelude show a boy 
demonstrating a feeling of sensuous, boundless freedom, which in turn acts as catalyst for his 
awareness of responsibility to nature and his fellow man. The woodcock, raven’s nest, and boat 
stealing passages correspondingly posit him as either the disturbance of a staid domestic scene 
or a stowaway within the transportation of the sublime. The poem is known for its various 
depictions of passive idleness broken up by the unconstrained impulse. In these scenes, a feeling 
of grandiosity and solitude actually yields to a sensation of overwhelming insignificance and a 
social mode of being. If at times play is a metaphor for what is sinister and chaotic about man, at 
other moments it is an articulation of carefreeness and unbridled creativity. These passages 
ultimately prefigure, I argue, the later creative work which preoccupies the adult poet. While the 
children observed at a distance are welcomed by, and easily integrated within nature, 
Wordsworth’s memories of his own childish diversions are notably more burdened by nostalgia, 
melancholy, and guilt over his deleterious impulses. Having returned to his home from London 
he watches the mirthful children on a field at the Grasmere Fair: “How little they, they and their 
doings, seem,” he remarks, “and yet how great / For all things serve them: them the morning 
light / Loves....” (8: 51-56). The reciprocal love between the children, the morning light, and the 
rocks upon which that light glistens belie how slight, how “pitiably dear” their acts are. The 
children are without presumption: small in body, ego, and action, yet all their needs met by the 
world around them. The speaker then recounts his own feelings as a young man observing this 
scene. His diction becomes more elevated and heroic, revealing the feeling of power which he 
believes nature translated into him: in the city of London he felt passionately the debt that he 
owed to Nature, his “High thoughts of God and man” which are victorious over “all those 
loathsome sights / Of wretchedness and vice....” (65-67). Thus what is initially a description of 
childlike humility and harmoniousness becomes an occasion for judgment, a direct 
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contradiction to his later assertion that the power of nature was for him the precursor to 
charitable sympathy.  
  So fraught are the actual scenes of play in Book One, so ambiguously haunted by the 
animating power of nature and its shadowy reprimand, that we are tempted to ask if they are 
indeed supposed to be fun at all.  Yet Wordsworth’s intent to establish a ludic atmosphere is 
clear. One scene of play leads seamlessly into another, eliciting in the reader the intoxicating and 
cumulative feeling of youth at liberty in nature. The years “summon” him to “exercise and 
play” (1: 503-04), a time which is “happy... of rapture,” his play with his schoolmates a mimicry 
of “woodland pleasures” (455-63). They are a rambunctious and excitable crowd: not a voice is 
“idle” and with their noise the landscape “tinkle(s) like iron” (469). A disjunctive 
otherworldliness between physical and psychic experience along with the iconic motif of cliffs, 
hills, and mountain slopes, unites these passages: he hangs from an icy crag seemingly 
“suspended” by the wind; he hears what is a paradoxically “undistinguishable” motion, with 
“low breathings coming” after him; the cliff in the boat stealing passage is a “spectacle.” These 
sensations reach a feverish pitch in the description of the boy “stopping short” while ice skating, 
which creates the illusion that he is witnessing in the “solitary cliffs” the earth’s own “diurnal 
round” (486). When the “nurse’s song” emphasizes the innocent vulnerability of childhood, an 
ensuing description makes the boy into a “naked savage” (303-05); the echo of the boys’ shouts 
while ice skating is met with another “alien sound / Of melancholy” while “the orange sky of 
evening die(s) away” (469 - 73). Yet often enough the reverse is true: the misdeeds of the young 
are described in terms which undermine their severity: the river tempers the child’s “human 
waywardness” but does so by shaping his thoughts to have more purpose than their own 
inherent “infant softness” (284-85). Of stealing woodcocks, he tells his reader sheepishly “twas 
(his) joy / To wander” among the cliffs and woods. “I was a fell destroyer” (321), he adds, and 
this combined with the later “Was I a plunderer then” (339) have the tongue-in-cheek feel of 
affectionate, if self-deprecating, ribs. When he steals the shepherd’s boat his youth and the 
object of his theft are described in trivializing ways: he is a “schoolboy traveller at the holidays” 
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who “rambled,” the ”little boat” is a “small skiff” (381-91). Even the identity of the boat’s owner 
undermines the boy’s wrongdoing: for through the rest of the text the poet will emphasize his 
early kinship and admiration of  shepherds [“And Shepherds were the men who pleased me 
first”(8: 128)]. For every innocent child’s playful act Wordsworth offers the reader a counter-
meditation—an after-thought from nature or from within the poet, which focuses our attention 
on what is chaotic or morally ambiguous about the pleasure to be found in play. Still, every 
reprimand is offered with a gentle hand. 
 The revisions of the text increasingly shift play into a transgressive position. Though the 
overt spirit of frivolity and youthful abandon in the scenes is sustained, Wordsworth 
progressively edges it from being primarily an expression of freedom which occurs in symbiotic 
harmony with nature, into a dialectical one in which nature’s response to the boy’s larks furthers 
the development of his moral conscience. To be sure, “Wordsworth is never quite easy about the 
glad animal movements of his little pagan selves” (Fry 73). Nature’s ministry in the 1799 text is 
employed “by the agency of boyish sports” (1799, 1: 192, emphasis mine); by 1805 “agency” is 
omitted and the line has been changed to read “when Ye through many a year / Haunting me 
thus among my boyish sports” (1: 494-95). In the earliest version of the woodcock scene this 
address to nature undermines his “fell” destruction: “Gentle powers, / Who give us happiness 
and call it peace” (1799, 35-36), yet this is absent from the 1805 edition. Similarly the revisions 
of the woodcock stealing scene emphasize the triumph of desire over reason in addition to over 
the bird, in both phrase and line break: “a strong desire / O’erpowered my better reason, and the 
bird” (325-26). In the earlier text, the boy’s inability to resist his own desire is formulated such 
that he too becomes its victim: “Sometimes strong desire / Resistless overpowered me, and the 
bird” (1799, 43-44). While the 1799 version of the passage underlines the boy’s own nervousness 
and panting heart (1799, 42-43); the later version eliminates this and adds the incriminating 
lines “I was alone, / And seemed to be a trouble to the peace / That was among them” (323-24). 
In the later version of the raven’s nest scene “plunderer” replaces the more innocuous “rover,” 
and the addition of the “mother-bird” gives a sympathetic face to his victim (339). In the boat 
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stealing scene the addition of specific location and identification of himself as a “Stranger,” a 
“Traveller, at the Holidays” (376-78) is a sharpened contrast to the boat’s “usual home,” 
emphasizing his roguery. The addition of “lustily” as an adjective to describe his rowing (401) 
prepares the reader to see him as seduced by an illusion of mastery over the object, and view his 
subsequent shame as an appropriate response to what might otherwise seem a rather light-
hearted adventure. These shifts elucidate the contrast between his play and the ministry of 
nature: it is the child’s projection of nature’s disapproving eye that causes his misgiving, a 
symbol of his internal negotiation between solitude and society and internal and external reality.  
 Mischief so regularly and totally yields to nature’s reprimand in the book. When read 
alongside the poem’s emphasis on childhood joy as a precursor to the poetic temperament, we 
begin to apprehend the complexity of Wordsworthian play. Huizinga challenges the possibility 
of a paideic play, asserting that “play to order is no longer play” (7) The notion of paideic play 
merges with the aesthetic, however, in the Romantic exaltation of childhood as a state to which 
the poet must return, in order to make that art which contributes to the moral good 
(interestingly, this later appears in the Victorian era as a mode for educating children and the 
working class). At the same time as Wordsworth uses these scenes of play to lay the groundwork 
for the development of poetic sensibility, he relies on a parallel but essentially antithetical 
tradition which sees play as an expression of fate. In this paradigm, we don’t play; rather, we are 
toyed with, typically by nature or a deity. In this mythic version of play we are humbled, 
exhilarated, and terrified by it, forced to reckon with the instability and fragmentation of our 
knowledge and power in the face of the universe (Kaiser 116-22). The paideic and fate models of 
play undermine each other even as the status of these events as morally educational undermine 
their status as play, period. But this may not be so: if the universe is ethical or an extension of a 
divine vision, then if the universe toys with us it may be to teach us a lesson. Here I think of 
Lear, for example, raging in the storm over a fate which probably was catalyzed by an act of 
pride.  
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 What does it mean for the poet to depict himself in his early days in a destructive act 
against his purported muse? And then to describe his projection and/or reception of the muse’s 
reprimand? Finally, how can we understand his reincorporation of that destruction and 
moralizing as itself a new muse? For the modes of play as paideic and fateful in The Prelude are 
compromised most by our understanding of these scenes as carefully crafted by the poet, as 
means toward an end: to provide a lucid, coherent view of the development of the creative mind 
and lyric skill. While these passages function within the intermediate area typically occupied by 
play, vacillating between (for example) internal and external, they also concretize the 
intermediacy of memory as part memoir and part fiction. The lack of endings in these scenes 
fixes their status as creative beginnings to be put in cumulative service of the overall lyric end; 
they are not narratives in and of themselves. We never find out what happens after the 
woodcock stealing or mischief with the raven’s nest; we never see the shepherd, and the 
playmates the boy skates with give their bodies “to the wind,” as ethereal and temporary as the 
spinning itself. As is so often the case in Wordsworth, the perceptual exchanges occur within the 
guise of memory; rather than the poet depicting his interaction with the muse, the poet 
remembers himself in a previous incarnation interacting with the muse purportedly as it then 
presented itself, but inevitably as the event was subsequently shaped by his internalization of it. 
The stealing of the boat, for example, is akin to his illusion of mastery over his memories as he 
uses them for poetic gain. Crucially, he adds to these memories his adult intellect and a rational 
perspective, important qualities typically used to distinguish mere frivolity from art.  
 But acts such as these are a sacrificial offering from the privacy of the self. They are an 
admittance of the failure of inspiration in the present, too. I read these scenes of play as the 
child’s incorporation and destruction of the transitional object, in which nature’s felt response 
mirrors the adult’s trepidation over his use, and the destructive effect, of the memory for poetic 
purposes. The memory is the inspiration which later becomes the form, as the poet reconstitutes 
it by retrospection. For Wordsworth, the repetition of the memory necessarily contributes to its 
dissipation or its transformation into the epitaph of metaphor, and is an implicit 
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acknowledgement of what is explicit in the text: a mourning of reduced pleasure and of what is 
nonrenewable in the child’s ecstatic discovery of the world. Wordsworth admits as much when 
he says that as an adult he loves the sun as a metaphor or symbol of the constancy of life, but 
that as a child he loved it entirely because it gave him pleasure (Spiegelman 45). The paradox is 
this: in the quest to articulate the self through the use of personal memory the individual 
threatens to erase memories of events which comprised himself. Alan Liu argues that the 
skirmish between self and nature so often depicted in Wordsworth’s poetry is in fact always 
peripheral to the real battle between history and the self. Though the poet’s intent is to depict a 
real event which also demonstrates his recognition of his insufficiency, he discovers in the 
construction of this narrative, which is actually an erasure, a subsequent and equally 
compromising incompleteness (538-40). The very process of detailing scenes of youthful play in 
The Prelude is an ironic acknowledgment of the impossibility of spontaneous creativity in the 
written word; and as every discovery is undercut by the overarching emphasis on the “tour” or 
self-discovery of an entire chronology of events, so these moments of play are undone by the 
poet’s emphasis on their narrative incorporation (506).  
 The woodcock stealing passage is incorporated into “Lines written a few miles above 
Tintern Abbey” in the “Poems of the Imagination” section of Poetical Works, and the eerie lines 
of having been in nature “more like a man / Flying from something that he dreads” than one 
chasing the object of love follows lines describing the “coarser pleasures of (his) boyish days, / 
And their glad animal movements all gone by” (l. 70-74). In that poem, too, the poet’s use of the 
memory for aesthetic ends is what compromises its integrity as a discrete event; it is also what 
energizes nature to respond. One might say that it is precisely because his sister does not 
embody the role of poet that her memory can be “as a dwelling-place” (l. 141) for the music of 
nature, the “healing thoughts / Of tender joy” (l. 144-45) with which she will remember the poet 
after he has gone. By refraining (or being unable) to make use of the memory, she is free to 
harbor both the experience and her companion’s later articulation of it safely within her 
consciousness, “a mansion for all lovely forms” (l. 140). The productive tension in “Tintern 
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Abbey” comes from the reckoning of a past self with a present self; its preterition—the present-
day mourning of a moment not fully experienced, a moment from the past (this feeling is 
complicated by the sensation of pleasure and ecstasy that was the speaker’s previous experience 
of the Abbey); and Wordsworth’s description of solitude as needing the company of another in 
order for that “aloneness” to translate into a meaningful experience of the self. This theme is 
subtly woven into the poem in the guise of the experience of wild ecstasy versus the experience 
of the sublime, as symbolized by himself and his sister’s respective experiences of the place.  
While in “Tintern Abbey” the epiphany accompanying his adult reminiscence is recompense for 
the childhood joy that has passed (Pack 85), the depictions of play in Book One present 
something far more ambiguous. 
 A few thoughts before taking a closer look at The Prelude. To the extent that Wordsworth 
uses play to show transgressions corrected by an internal conscience projected in the natural 
world, we must consider whether or to what extent it is linked to fancy as a form of the 
imaginative faculty. What does Wordsworth gain by relegating these scenes to the imaginative 
realm of fancy, or by keeping them separate? I also want to briefly discuss two essential lenses 
which I draw upon in this essay. My use of key concepts in object relations—play as an 
expression of intermediacy, and the transitional and transformational objects— is a natural 
extension of my appreciation for the success and contribution of readings of The Prelude which 
use a psychoanalytic model, and what  the centrality of play in object relations offers the theorist 
working to understand play in creativity generally, and poetry specifically. That the boy’s actions 
in these scenes is concomitantly titillating and disquieting brings it well in line with an object 
relational view of play in which it is satisfying and productive even when it leads to tremendous 
anxiety (Winnicott 70). That these changes emphasize the boy’s psyche as shifting within an 
intermediate state of internal and external reality, reiterated by the hallucinations which trouble 
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the scenes, is also in keeping with object relations.   The heart of play from a psychoanalytic 8
perspective lies in its articulations of the movement between subjective and objective, self and 
world, other, and object. While I draw freely from those concepts which are useful for 
understanding the text, I fear that I fail to offer a psychoanalytically consistent interpretation of 
the speaker of these poems and his relationship to himself or his metaphorical parent figures. I 
hope my reader will forgive moments of incompleteness or fragmentation in the 
interdisciplinary spirit of play which inspires me.  
 Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View is an equally important theoretical 
framework for this essay and an excellent base from which to understand the Romantic view of 
play. The Anthropology was first published in 1798 (eight years after the Critique of Judgment) 
and it offers a profound and representative view on the role of play in the artistic mind as it was 
viewed by the German Romantics, and aesthetic philosophers and the poets who were 
influenced by them. In it he centralizes the role of play in taste, the faculty of using the 
imagination’s powers to make social judgments about objects external to the individual, a part of 
the aesthetic judgment which chooses with universal validity.  Taste also contains a tendency 
toward the external advancement of morality, as it offers the mind the feeling of freedom it 
needs for sociability with others, a freedom that results in pleasure in the play of images. Play 
provides, then, both pleasure and freedom. The judgment of taste is of an object’s “harmony or 
discord of freedom, in the play of the power of imagination and the lawfulness of 
understanding.” The understanding offers us the form that we need to determine a universal 
rule around the feeling of pleasure; we cannot expect this from sensations, which vary according 
to the individual” (137-38). Kant also explicitly considers rhetoric and poetry, saying they are the 
only two arts in which taste manifests (194). Poetry is privileged over rhetoric among the 
linguistic arts because of its musical element; in fact, even music is only art because it is poetry’s 
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 The scenes of play have been read through a psychoanalytic lens in various ways: the stolen 8
boat episode, along with the surge and swagger in his self-identification as a “fell destroyer” and 
“plunderer,” with their sexual overtones, are frequently read as Oedipal expressions of 
dominance over mother nature (Wilner 42).
handmaiden in language (145). The poetic source of inspiration slowly diminishes with age and 
the encroachment of habits, and playful poetry requires originality; novelty; only the caustic 
satires agree with the temperament of old age (147). Poets cannot be trusted because they are 
involved in the presentation of the passions, which are for Kant another sign of immaturity. 
While we may excuse a poet for presenting the passions as necessary, the philosopher must not 
accept this principle (167). It is “comfortable” to make oneself immature, and naturally makes 
one susceptible to manipulation by others; by extension, maturity is central to Kant for truly 
simple (as opposed to artificial) art (103-04). And passions are not merely unfortunate states 
but are “without exception evil.” The text contains his most developed articulations of the role of 
play in aesthetics, and as such, is a useful text for communicating to us how play was seen at the 
time, largely because it communicates the various contradictions in the culture’s use of the play 
concept.    9
 In the latter half this essay, I detail three elements of play which are especially integral to 
The Prelude: spontaneity and impulse; illusion; and idleness. The element which receives the 
most extensive treatment, and which I find especially interesting in Wordsworth, is spontaneity. 
On one hand, this temporal rupture, this unpredictability, affords the poet a way to create an 
atmosphere of veracity and unbridled, unmediated expression. Yet on the other hand, impulse— 
internal spontaneity made external—results in the boy’s various transgressions, including 
destruction and theft. The characteristic of illusion revolves around its intermediary status as an 
expression of the internal creative mind morphed into external reality; yet it brings with it a 
trepidation about the stability of the mind. Finally, idleness is a state which becomes 
increasingly associated with poetic labor; yet in idleness, of course, lies a trepidation about 
man’s natural inclination toward ease and a passivity toward truth-telling. By tracking these 
"25
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on one hand play is mysterious and serious: “we arrive at cognition of the play of forces through 
experience of its effect; but we cannot reach the ultimate cause and the simple components into 
which its material can be analyzed.” Yet that same mystery is what leads play to be an indication 
lack of deliberation, impulsiveness and the seeking of pleasure as an end: of the reproduction of 
the species we cannot assume “the Creator, simply for the sake of curiosity and to establish an 
arrangement on our planet that pleased him, was so to speak just playing” (70).
characteristics of play in the text we may better apprehend how play operates in Wordsworth 
and Romantic poetry generally.  10
!
II. Not Quite “Wilful Fancy” 
When reading these scenes of play as precursors to their own later composition as lyrical 
moments we must consider the extent to which the element of play overlaps with fancy as a 
component of the imaginative faculty. Fancy was popularly linked to poetry, with each 
containing elements of the other; equally if not more pronounced was its association with play 
and childhood. Both fancy and play are marked by the unusual combination of elements, 
expressing their creative power by juxtaposing unlike things: play theorists often identify a 
mode of play in the combination of what we would typically consider mutually exclusive 
behavior (fighting or nest building, for example). Importantly,  Fancy is whimsical, playful, 
trivial, sexual, and popular, with a disregard for propriety. Its kinesthetic energy—it is often 
described as “winged” or “sportive”— is difficult to control or predict. Both fancy and play wield 
subversive potential: in his excellent book on fancy, Unfettering Poetry, Jeffrey Robinson links 
this mode of the imagination to anti-bourgeois and revolutionary movements, noting that fancy 
“isn’t about ‘work’ or ‘usefulness’ but about play” (Robinson 11). “Fanciphobia,” as he terms it, 
appears in a variety of ways: in the trivialization of fantasy; in the association of it with escape 
and unreality; in its subordinate status to the Imagination; in its association with the carefree, 
simple child (and thus with the past, irrelevant to the present); and its status as solely a 
“gatherer of ‘raw materials’” (25). The success of an individual’s maturation was measured in 
part by his repression or elimination of fancy: in his anthology Elegant Extracts (1784) 
Reverend Knox links the child and adolescent mind to the fancy, warning parents to guide them 
through the pleasurable (“sportive”) but dangerous waters of poetry (the Fancy) so they can 
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 Two other modes of special importance in The Prelude and beyond are handled in subsequent 10
chapters: playing pretend and mimicry is explored through a close look at the Boy of Winander 
alongside John Clare’s “Progress of Ryhme,” and spectacle / festival, such as we see in the 
passages on the St. Bartholomew and Grasmere Fairs, is examined in a chapter focusing on the 
influence of Rousseau’s Emile and the Confessions on the British Romantic poets. 
enter adult reality (Robinson 25-6).  While in 1826 a “fancier” was a “dreamer,” the fate of fancy 11
was to be increasingly relegated to the ornamental, the lower faculty of the imagination; by 1856 
a fancier made ‘artistic designs,” especially decorative or ornamental elements, more commonly 
ascribed to indicate a decorative or superficial creation without the aspect of reflection and 
deliberation expected of art (10).  
  Fancy is devalued as immature, incomplete, and superficial. In order to suppress its 
more dangerous elements— excess, extravagance, lust, eccentricity, political subversion—it must 
be neutralized as play in these early scenes, as something obviously undergoing the process of 
correction (Robinson 28). And so we might be tempted to read play in the early books as a kind 
of concretization of transgressive fancy: the object dislodged by irrationality then inevitably 
righted by the imagination as reflected in nature. But it would be rash of us to collapse the 
terms. As with so many other matters, Wordsworth’s perspective on fancy shifts radically over 
the course of his life, and it is precisely because of the similarities he sees between the fancy and 
imagination that we can say his use of play is decidedly not just a projection of fancy. While he 
does not as definitively relegate the faculty to the secondary imagination as Coleridge does in 
Biographia Literaria, Wordsworthian fancy is without question pre-imagination. His Preface to 
the Lyrical Ballads had a profound cultural effect in establishing the domination of the 
imagination over fancy, yet his 1800 note to “The Thorn” emphasizes the importance of fancy as 
inspiring and retaining “sudden varieties of situation” [the problem with “superstitious men” is 
that their minds “are utterly destitute of fancy” (qtd. in Robinson 30)]. In the 1815 preface 
maturity in poetry is equated with the dominance of the imagination and maturity in age, and 
fancy is deemphasized and rendered more passive. By 1828 he will begin “Poems of the Fancy” 
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 As elsewhere, in descriptions of fancy “childishness” is alternately a derisive and exalted term. 11
In his praise of Wordsworth in Biographia Literaria, Coleridge states his admiration for the 
poet’s ability “To carry on the feelings of childhood into the powers of manhood; to combine the 
child's sense of wonder and novelty with appearances, which every day for perhaps forty years 
had rendered familiar;... this is the character and privilege of genius, and one of the marks 
which distinguish genius from talents” (Major Works, IV, 202). Yet later he defends the ballads 
by saying “Had Mr. Wordsworth's poems been the silly, the childish things, which they were for 
a long time described as being... they must have sunk at once, a dead weight, into the slough of 
oblivion, and have dragged the preface along with them” (XIV, 315).
in Poetical Works with “A Morning Exercise,” a poem devoted to the condemnation of the 
faculty when unchecked. Fancy is pleased to throw a “wayward dart,” appropriate sad visions of 
nature where no sadness is, and crowd innocent nature with symbols of tragedy; her influence is 
hyperbolic, harassing, restless, annoying, and affiliated with savages (l. 2-6).  In sum, fancy 12
“pervert(s) the evidence of joy” (l. 12). Even as early as the 1805 Prelude, however, we see 
glimmers of the later degradation of fancy as something melodramatic and wayward: in Book 
Eight he writes that “a wilfulness of fancy and conceit” is responsible for an excess of ornament 
in art and books, for rendering the “tragic super-tragic” with its “never-ending tears” (8: 
521-540). Wordsworth also calls our attention to the distinction by describing his frequent 
gazing at a black rock as it morphs into various fanciful visions: a “burnished shield... / 
Suspended over a knight’s tomb” or a door to a magic cave or fairy palace (8: 573-74). Here 
fancy is finally superimposed over the “feelings” of the imagination which then raises them in 
poetic value. Whether the natural environment tempers it or the imagination exalts it, the fancy 
is decidedly subordinate.   
 What the separation between fancy and imagination illustrates is the extent to which the 
poets and taste makers of the day felt some need to shape the reception of various types of 
creative expression. This performance of naming unfolds as one of control and submission, of 
“‘mind’ over ‘matter’ and the body, of ethics over ethical indifference, of maturity over 
immaturity and youth” (Robinson 29). Coleridge devotes Chapter IV of Biographia Literaria in 
part to the distinction; though he discusses how the meanings of both words blend into the 
other, their differentiation is expressive in all societies which have an “instinct of growth, a 
certain collective, unconscious good sense” (203). Indeed, Wordsworth’s treatment of the 
faculties of the fancy and imagination operate within such subtleties that they strike Robinson as 
demonstrating the “absurdity of the distinction on the level of poetry itself; it is only in terms of 
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 This savagery is depicted as somewhat paradoxically arising from its “Perpetual flight, 12
unchecked by earthly ties” which we would do well to “Leav’st to the wandering bird of paradise” 
(l.35-36). Fancy is able to manipulate the song of lesser birds at her bidding but “ne’er could 
Fancy bend the buoyant Lark / To melancholy service” (l. 23-24). 
ideological issues of social power and aggrandizement that the distinction has meaning” (32). 
But Wordsworth was in good company; in two points in the Anthropology Kant defines 
imagination and fancy using the same words (29). If we acknowledge the inherent subjectivity 
and danger of arbitrariness in the assigning of various works of art to, say, “the fancy” or “the 
imagination” (primary or secondary, at that), we might well ask ourselves: why duplicate the 
error and name these scenes “play”? In doing so, don’t we operate within an aesthetic house of 
mirrors, and by aiming to mark the distinctions between modes of the imagination only 
anachronistically reiterate the sociopolitical implications in the categorizing of aesthetic states? 
For our purposes it is enough that the poets, essayists, and philosophers saw the distinction—
and by extension, the commonalities—of the two faculties as having tremendous significance. 
The very debate about their differences and the occlusion of play is what sets the ludic apart. 
There are other, obvious reasons that play is divergent from fancy: the Romantic locating of play 
as part of the idealistic child of nature is one crucial way that play elides the debate of what is 
fancy, what is imagination; relatedly, play’s longterm status as the first aesthetic impulse to 
express itself after physical animal needs have been met, and thus its proximity to anthropology 
and animal expressions of play, is another crucial way it is separated from fancy. It is further 
protected from arbitrary categorization because it masks itself under a veil of unimportance and 
frivolity: it is safely housed within the world of the animal and child, and Western culture’s 
mistaken yet widespread assumption that the opposite of play is not what is real but what is 
serious.   13
 Fancy is associated with “a loosening of the borders of the ego or lyric subject,” and has a 
dispersive function which genders it feminine and marks its erotic potential (10). Relatedly, the 
faculty is linked not only with political resistance but sexual transgression as well [so much so 
that Robinson urges us to read the vitality of poetry’s fanciful language as stemming from the 
erotic (10).]11 In the 1815 preface Wordsworth limits fancy to the domestic and argues that fancy, 
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 In “Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming” Freud writes that “the opposite of play is not what is 13
serious but what is real” (437). 
unlike the imagination, allows its materials to be fixed and impermeable, unchanged or only 
slightly altered by her touch. The imagination by contrast “recoils from everything but the 
plastic, the pliant, and the indefinite.” Robinson distinguishes how Wordsworth and Keats use 
the fancy from the poets of the time: while visionary and transformative, fancy for them does not 
render the self limitless; rather, Wordsworth’s fancy is a vision of the mind in a sportive, 
compassionate, mischievous position precisely because “‘otherness’ is at stake” (255). The 
imagination is heralded for its synthesizing and unifying function, and in poetry that 
transformation necessarily “privileges the dramatic speaker, or lyric subject.” By contrast the 
fancy is dispersive, flighty, chaotic, blurring the distinctions between subject and object and 
without commitment to formal constraints (5). Furthermore, while fancy is an expression of the 
self capriciously dissipated into the elements around it, play is a sign of (in Schiller’s terms) 
“superabundance.” One way this appears in Wordsworth is as a demonstration of the child’s ego 
and superego development. For example, an often quoted passage from Wordsworth’s notes to 
“Intimations of Immortality,” dictated in 1843, is his memory of communing with nature as a 
child. The notes in part explain Wordsworth’s view on the idealization of childhood as 
representing a paradisal “prior state of existence.” He warns against it: “It is far too shadowy a 
notion to be recommended to faith,” and explains that because of this he felt justified using the 
idea as a poet. The most commonly quoted passage asserts how often as a child he felt he 
communed with nature as “something not apart from, but inherent in, my own immaterial 
nature. Many times while going to school have I grasped at a wall or tree, to recall myself from 
this abyss of idealism to the reality” (qtd. in Beer 22). Most often used to demonstrate the 
disorienting power of the fancy in Wordsworth’s eyes, the context reveals something else 
altogether. Immediately before this statement he writes: 
 Nothing was more difficult for me in childhood than to admit the notion of death as a  
 state applicable to my own being. I used to brood ... almost to persuade myself  that,  
 whatever might become of others, I should be translated, in something of the same way,  
 to Heaven. With a feeling congenial to this, I was often unable to think of external things  
 as having external existence; and I communed with all that I saw as something not apart  
 from, but inherent in, my own immaterial nature (Poetical Works 4:463).   !
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Wordsworth’s younger self’s inability to think of “external things as having an external 
existence” stands in stark contrast to the typical interpretation of “grasping at a wall or tree” to 
save himself from the “abyss of idealism”; it is not a sign of the ego’s surrender to its 
environment. Rather, Wordsworth’s own descriptions of childhood play tend to emphasize a 
childlike fantasy of omniscience, of having created the world. And this is what the notes to 
“Intimations” fixate upon: “Archimedes said that he could move the world if he had a point 
whereon to rest his machine. Who has not felt the sam aspirations as regards the world of his 
own mind?” (403). Though the notes assert something far more complex than the importance of 
humility, it is not the infinitization of the self which he is interested in, nor even man’s first 
union with his natural environment through the sublime moment. As with the scenes of play in 
Book One of The Prelude, the notes consider the developing ego of the lyric subject and its 
overreach. The only ‘otherness’ at stake is between the ego and its restraining impulses. So often 
in the early books the boy’s mischief is a careless testing of boundaries. It is an exploration of 
dominance to which nature offers projective response: the superego in formation, writ large 
[which, as Wilner notes, is for Freud not only composed of the parental “mode” but also 
“compounded both of aggressive impulses turned back on the self” (4)]. In these scenes play is 
most often part of a solitary and individuating action: the boy skates away from his companions, 
steals the shepherd’s skiff, steals the woodcocks from traps laid by another. It is only subsequent 
to the play that the lyric subject begins to apprehend the sublime moment and in so doing, enter 
into a dialogue with nature which approximates the “loosening” of the lyric subject which 
Robinson identifies.  Any dissipation happens through the imagination rather than play or 
fancy: the solid objects of nature ground him and he does not pine for “endless dreams” as “one 
in cities bred might do” (8: 604-609).  
!
III.  Spontaneity and Impulse 
!
 Power is much more easily manifested in destroying than in creating.   
 A child, Rousseau has observed, will tear in pieces fifty toys before he  
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 will think of making one.  14!!
The role of spontaneity in play is often pointed to in attempts to distinguish art-making from 
play. Impulsiveness is considered fundamental to the spirit of play; though a work of art may 
have its origin in unpredictable inspiration, it is the result of some sort of deliberative, reflective 
process (Huizinga 197). Even those play theorists who see play as manifest in all human 
activities agree that it is not continuously expressed (Hans 2). It is central to the poet’s 
authenticity: thus Wordsworth implores the reader never to doubt that he “still retained / My 
first creative sensibility”  (2: 378-79). The connection between spontaneity and lack of design or 
forethought is central to psychoanalytic readings of play as well: Winnicott centralizes the 
moment of surprise in the child’s experience of the transformational object, viewing spontaneity 
as an indication that the child has moved beyond mere compliance with the object (68), a 
moment when the infant can “enjoy the illusion of omnipotent creating and controlling” (qtd in 
Hopkins, 146). Inevitably, then, the representation of spontaneity in art is invested in it as an 
expression which has somehow elided the deliberative element central to art-making: it reveals 
the “true self” without conscious construction, the ego unburdened by the superego. This 
illusion of a “first” utterance is prioritized because it is unfettered by the revision of even 
momentary contemplation. The spontaneous gesture indicates the self’s desire to represent its 
own idiom, and when the self adopts forms which restrict its freedom it has entered into a realm 
of falsehood (Bollas 25). 
 The guise of spontaneity relies on the illusion of near-simultaneity with the moment of 
inspiration, a visitation of the muse concomitant with the appearance of her portrait. The effort 
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 William Wordsworth, Preface to The Borderers, p.76-77. Prose Works of William 14
Wordsworth. Ed. W.J.B. Owen and Jane Worthington Smyser. 3 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1974. The editors note that the nearest parallel is in Emile, Book 2, p. 36: “Reason alone teaches 
us to know good and evil. Conscience, therefore, which makes us love the one and hate the 
other, although independent of reason, cannot develop with it. Before reaching the age of 
reason, we do good and evil without knowing it; and there is absolutely no morality in our 
actions.” It also echoes Locke in Some Thoughts Concerning Education (1693): ‘I think I may 
say, that of all the Men we meet with, Nine Parts of Ten are what they are, Good or Evil, useful 
or not, by their Education.... I imagine the Minds of Children are easily turned this or that way, 
as Water it self.”
to mystically overthrow temporality in the creative moment is central to the poet’s labor, in 
contrast to the prose writer: the former races after the original inspiration in the moment, rather 
than composing at leisure. The convention in which the poet’s psyche exists in a constant state 
of receptivity is what links them in the cultural consciousness to soothsayers, fortune tellers, or 
otherwise possessed persons (Kant 81).   Spontaneity not only signifies the poet’s lack of design 15
(which would be antithetical to the eruption of truth which is to accompany the aesthetic 
moment), but is necessary to soften the impression of metric regularity and compositional 
element of the poem’s form, but which was also integral to the derided staidness of the 
ornamental Augustan lyric (Wesling 33). Christopher Miller describes the eighteenth century 
aesthetic of “surprize” as a catalyst which prompts the unification of the individual’s emotion 
and intellect in the face of the sublime (he criticizes the looseness of the term “epiphany” and 
attempts to distinguish moments of surprise more specifically).   There are differences between 16
surprise and spontaneity: “surprize” emphasizes more the experience of the observer, and 
“exemplifies a crux in the vocabulary of affect... an emotion ... both coming from within and 
seizing the self from without” (Miller 413). By contrast, spontaneity is a quality of time itself, 
generally expressed through the speaker rather than imposed upon him from without (thus we 
speak of “being” or ‘“feeling” spontaneous, of having a “whim,” more than of experiencing 
“spontaneity”). Still, both surprise and spontaneity ensure excitement by making the movement 
between tension and release in a poem unpredictable, while providing the illusion of verse 
composed without premeditation, yet with all the revelation of meditation. Each offers the 
reader the feeling that they are, for example, experiencing the sublime moment somewhat as the 
poet experienced it himself (and by extension some of the feeling or wisdom he has received 
through it). Both give nuance and a sense of veracity to the process of cognition, enabling us to 
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 At the same time, the spontaneous eruption is one which inspires trepidation in the poet, as I 15
explore in Chapter Three, for it reveals the unpredictable nature of inspiration.
 As an alternative he notes Paul Fry’s description of the Wordsworthian moment as an instance 16
of “a-theologic astonishment” or Bachelard's observation that every child is "an astonished 
being, the being who realizes the astonishment of being” (Miller 411, qtd in Nichols).
feel that we trace the development of ideas or feelings in the lyric subject even as they are 
experienced (McGann 63).  
 Wordsworth’s sentiments on the role of spontaneity in poetry are especially paradoxical: 
most famously in his assertion in the 1800 Preface to Lyrical Ballads that “all good poetry is the 
spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings: and though this be true, Poems to which any value 
can be attached were never produced on any variety of subjects but by a man who, being 
possessed of more than usual organic sensibility, had also thought long and deeply.” The 
assertion is made in a paragraph preoccupied with distinguishing the “triviality and meanness,” 
“arbitrary innovation,” from that which is genuinely enlightening. In the same text, Wordsworth 
offers two understandings of surprise: the sensory and aesthetic jolts of city life and popular 
culture versus the epiphanic experience of reading poetry. Though Wordsworth heralds the 
spontaneous moment he wishes to avoid the vulgar spectacle of the reader experiencing a “jolt.” 
And whereas the element of spontaneity in composition is typically used to separate the poet’s 
work from that of the prose writer, Wordsworth asserts here that the “best poetry need not differ 
from the best prose,” because the verse itself should, through the regularity of meter, balance 
and temper the excitement and passion elicited by the art. Thus Wordsworth writes of the 
pleasure we experience in the "small, but continual and regular impulses of pleasurable surprise 
from the metrical arrangement" (1.146, Miller 416); and we cannot help but note the 
contradiction of the “regular... surprise.”  In understanding the contradictions of 
Wordsworthian play and its relationship to spontaneous creativity we might also consider his 
response to “Mathetes,” a writer who submitted a letter to Coleridge's periodical The Friend 
regarding educational methods. The essay appears in two installments in the end of 1809 and 
beginning of 1810. In it he generally disagrees with the idea that youth need a moral instructor, 
arguing that freedom and self-direction are all a man needs to develop to his best self. In this he 
echoes himself in Book Five, with its rallying against the so-called “educationalists” of the time. 
Much of what Wordsworth speaks against is essentially fleetingness, revealing a discouraging 
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attitude toward whim which we see replicated in the poetry. This deliberation is explicitly 
attached to art in the essay; he writes that the youth must return to the world: 
 let him feed upon that beauty which unfolds itself, not to his eye as it sees carelessly the  
 things which cannot possibly go unseen, and are remembered or not as accident shall  
 decide, but to the thinking mind; which searches, discovers, and treasures up, infusing  
 by meditation into the objects with which it converses an intellectual life, whereby they  
 remain planted in the memory, now and for ever.... (18) !
His paradoxical assertion is that the youth’s engagement with an object, whether it be by chance 
or as an object of study, is marked by its lack of deliberateness, yet must itself be on a trajectory 
of reason and careful observation. Concomitantly, youth’s calling—his employment, his natural 
state—is to “accumulate in genial confidence; its instinct... is to love... to feel” (17).  
 The poet mourns the loss of the child’s power to experience nature in pure spontaneity, 
though the loss of that power is mediated by the development of the adult’s philosophic mind, 
the “tranquilizing spirit” which reaffirms his attachment to nature [(2:27-28); also see 
“Intimations” (Pack 127)]: after all, who doesn’t wish to give to mature “duty and to truth / The 
eagerness of infantine desire?” (3: 25-26). And when spontaneity is “recollected in tranquility” 
the emotion feels eerily compartmentalized in reflection. Though the movement between 
narrative tension and lyric reflection is The Prelude’s fundamental temporal and cognitive 
undergird, the philosophic and narrative gloss mediates our experience of surprise even beyond 
what is inevitable in composition. The collateral damage of this balancing act is that, subjected 
to repeat iterations, the autochthonous memory is an echo becoming more and more faint to the 
poet’s ear, a mirage becoming increasingly unstable the more one fixes its eye upon it. The 
recollection assures the poet he has the power to summon inspiration simply by returning to the 
curiosity cabinet of his own childhood memories; but in exchange, each recollected event, each 
“original surprise,” is muted.  
 Within the realm of play theory spontaneity does not so much counteract the effect of 
what is composed or signify a lack of deliberation; it more so indicates a desire to change or 
entertainment, a restlessness, an impulsive need for variation and novelty (Dissayanke 216). 
While ad-libbing in speech (“free association”) is for Winnicott a sign of the mind relinquishing 
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its defensive position in coherent thought and is precisely what makes play integral to the 
psychoanalytic framework, for Kant this kind of speech is nonsense, a fearsome glimpse of the 
wandering tendencies of the imagination which may incite madness (Winnicott 56, Kant 70). 
The Romantic aesthetic investment in the lack of design or deliberateness which spontaneity 
requires has a similarly destabilizing side: the individual who carelessly follows his mind in the 
free play of the imagination is habitually distracted, digressive, suggestible, prone to fabrication 
and the collapsing of representation with reality (Kant 102). The impulsive child in The Prelude, 
as an externalization of the internal whim integral to play, is no less troubled by these elements. 
The child who “fills the air” with her “involuntary songs” is compared to the wood sparkling, 
dangerously unattended on the hearth, in “Characteristics of a Child Three Years Old,” her 
solitary, unpredictable composition is troubling and dangerous (Spiegelman 60).   
What do we make of the fact that so many of the boy’s impulses in the early books are to steal or 
destroy? The child’s whim is often in Wordsworth a vision of eagerness mitigated by later regret; 
in “Nutting,” perhaps most famously, a scene of pure idleness gives way to violence, as the 
speaker moves from a “sweet mood” of contentment and ease to the sudden, unwarranted 
yanking down of the bough of a tree, “with crash / And merciless ravage.” In this poem, as in 
The Prelude, Wordsworth invites our skepticism as to his reporting of his child self’s pain and 
regret subsequent to this act, with “Unless I now / Confound my present feelings with the 
past” (lines).  
 We would err to think the destructive thrust in these scenes mitigates their eligibility as 
play, since joy in domination— whether originating in the overcoming of difficulties or anxiety, 
the apprehension of mastery, or triumphant feeling of omnipotence —is one of its more 
commonplace causes and/or effects (Dissayanke 214). For Bollas and Winnicott, impulse in play 
can only develop “out of a principle of ruthlessness. In order to use an object, the self must be 
free to destroy it” (Winnicott, qtd. in Bollas 179). In the boat-stealing, woodcock, and bird-
nesting scenes is what David Ellis calls the “predatory element in the boy’s vigour” in which the 
environment is assaulted and then responds more or less dramatically (Ellis 41). It has even 
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been argued that the poem’s protagonist is not, or not only, akin to Adam in Paradise Lost; 
rather, the scenes of play, revolving as they do around violence, transgression, and destruction, 
echo the fall of Satan (Speigelman 128).  In many ways, however, the speaker is also akin to 17
Eve. His intimate and adoring relationship to nature is followed in these instances by the sudden 
impulse to transgress; the voice of nature in response is not unlike the tempest that rains down 
on Eve after she has bitten the apple from the Tree of Knowledge. It is only after the 
transgressive action, “when the deed (is) done” (1: 328)— already hanging from the cliff in his 
aim to steal the eggs, for example— that the ministry of Nature becomes truly apparent: the 
ridge “perilous,” the wind with its “strange utterance.” In the ice skating passage it is the boy’s 
pride which dangerously propels him (making him closer to the fallen angel of Milton’s epic): he 
“(wheels) about / Proud and exulting, like an untired horse that cares not for home” (1:458-60). 
That carelessness  and pride is further emphasized when he “cut(s) across the image of a star” 
reflected on the surface of the frozen lake (1: 477-78). In 1799, the phrase reads instead a 
“shadow of a star”; this small change reflects, I believe, not only a desire to emphasize the 
implied transgression over nature, but also an increasing parallel between these scenes of play 
and poetic composition). By “stopping short” the boy experiences the sensation that the earth is 
rotating in its “diurnal round” before him; but he stands transfixed, until he is in a “dreamless 
sleep” (1: 489), a foreboding description coming after the death of the evening itself (473). The 
passage is exquisitely Miltonesque; in fact it closely echoes the beginning of Book Seven of 
Paradise Lost when the narrator invokes the powers of astronomy, Urania, over the Olympian 
muses:  
 Within the visible Diurnal Spheare;  
 Standing on Earth, not rapt above the Pole,  
 More safe I Sing with mortal voice... (though) 
 In darkness, and with dangers compast round, 
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 After the death of Robespierre, our speaker walks on the same shore he often played on with 17
his school-time friends where they had ridden together and “beat with thundering hoofs the 
level Sand” (2:144). This final impression reveals the savagery of the boys as much as the 
immaturity of the men: both are like mythical satyrs. At the same time, as Beer notes, the 
memory underlines the speaker’s feeling of glee and vengeance, and immature response, at 
Robespierre’s death (Beer 47). 
 And solitude; yet not alone ... !
 But drive far off the barbarous dissonance 
 Of Bacchus and his Revelers, the Race 
 Of that wild Rout that tore the Thracian Bard 
 In Rhodope, where Woods and Rocks had Ears [ 35 ] 
 To rapture, till the savage clamor drowned 
 Both Harp and Voice; nor could the Muse defend 
 Her Son. So fail not thou, who thee implores: 
 For thou art Heavenly, she an empty dream. !
In the above passage the Muse is Calliope, and the son she could not save is the poet Orpheus. 
Calliope is “an empty dream,” and Milton implores Urania to “drive off the barbarous 
dissonance / Of Bacchus and his Revelers.” By comparison, in the Prelude, the illusion of cliffs 
wheel by him, the earth rolls “with visible motion” within the “din / Smitten,” and amidst the 
“tumult” of the schoolboys (“Revelers”).  Whereas the narrator of Milton’s epic is aware that his 18
song is most secure when launched from “Within the visible Diurnal Sphere,” the child self of 
our narrator had not yet matured to his imagination. Instead he gives in to the fancy of mastery 
as if the earth rotated “her diurnal round” before him, and like the “empty dream” of Calliope, 
he watches until “all (is) tranquil as a dreamless sleep.”   In short, the boy is akin to Icarus—a 19
myth alluded to in the boy’s kite that soars high, sent from the meadow on a breezy day, and by 
pulling at its line impatiently is thus “Dashed headlong and rejected by the storm” (520-25). 
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 Critics have observed that the cyclical imagery of the poem, from “horses in a ring, the 18
heavens wheeling round inexorably, the years recurring, the tides returning, the earthquake 
repeating itself,” will move from images of “spiral and progress....into nightmare wheeling and 
enclosure” (see John Beer, for example, in Wordsworth in Time). But I see this move 
foreshadowed in the ice skating scene itself, which has a nightmarish wheeling of its own: 
exhilarating but nauseating.
 There are other similarities: “Rhodope” is a mountain and the “Harp and Voice” drowned out 19
by the “savage” revelers in the Paradise Lost passage is echoed in the 1799 version of this scene, 
which includes a pagan address to “Ye powers of earth, ye genii of the springs / And ye that have 
your voices in the clouds, / And ye that are familiars of the lakes,” saying that they “by the 
agency of boyish sports” impressed upon nature the forms of danger, desire, hope and fear.” The 
“familiars of the lakes,” of course, brings with it the eerie gloom of the Drowned Man of 
Esthwaite and the Boy of Winander. Again here the play and fantastical pagan powers within 
from the boy’s imagination (“ye genii of the springs”) intimidate him though he does not yet 
comprehend why. Unlike Milton’s narrator the boy is yet unable to harness his poetic powers or 
locate his song in the appropriate muse. 
The parallels with Paradise Lost here and elsewhere make clear not only that we are to read the 
boy’s actions as transgressions mimicking in spirit, if not in gravity, the sins of the fallen angel 
and Eve herself. The objects that he steals are symbolically revealing: a means of transport, of 
nourishment, of generation. In the raven’s nest passage, the sun shining on a knot of leaves 
“Decoyed the primrose flower” (335). The primrose in England was often called “Key Flower” 
because of its resemblance to hanging keys and indeed the boy seems to feel that something 
epiphanic is being withheld from him, some door kept locked. Yet the divine spirit that eludes 
him is not, or not only, a Christian God; rather, the poet is aware of having betrayed nature in 
his youth’s free play, so is he implicitly aware of having later misused the muse of childhood 
memory. The paradise which is lost in this case is not only childhood, it is also the integrity of 
the recollection.  
 Eve’s choice brings with it the birth of society; similarly, the play in Book One introduces 
the reader to the boy as operating within a social context rather than in the idealized, solitary 
state within nature the poet superficially depicts. At times the social context is straightforward: 
he steals from a trap laid by another man and a boat owned by a shepherd. At other times, the 
boy’s world is peopled but by ghosts and illusions, as the “low breathings” and “sounds / Of 
undistinguishable motion” follow him in the woods: the ice skating scene begins with a 
“tumultuous throng,” from which he breaks away; when they all together “give (their) bodies to 
the wind,” he watches as both friend and cliff “stretch in solemn train, / Feebler and 
feebler.” (1:476-88). His moment of “sportive” solitude gives way to  group experience, and the 
passage moves from group to solitary to group to solitary experience; meanwhile, the speaker’s 
moments of solitude give way to a deceptive feeling of omniscience because of his manipulation 
of physical elements (skating across the reflected star; stopping short so that the cliffs spin). The 
card game represents “persons of departed potentates” (1:551-52). This ambiguous social 
violence is all the more eerie (and ironic) once we recall that these are the  “spots of time” which 
presumably sustain Wordsworth after the grotesque devastation of the French Revolution 
(Harshbarger 115). And even the bloodthirsty revolutionaries will be compared to the “innocent 
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little one” who, dissatisfied with the motion of the windmill at his breath, must run towards the 
wind to watch it go faster (10:336-45). What the violence in child’s play, and the violence which 
will later be compared to child’s play, reminds us is that play’s most fundamental aspect is as an 
intermediate stage between the inner reality of the individual and the shared reality of the world 
(Winnicott 86). The child functions within a social world, but a world not built for him. This 
expression of play is also the destruction of nature as a transitional object which is already 
predicated on a paradox: the infant “creates” the object but it was also there waiting to be 
created, cathected and then decathected, as cultural interests develop (through, for example, 
education or poetry) (19). For Schiller, because play is the initial expression of man’s 
apprehension of the aesthetic the initiation of our aesthetic experience must come from the 
satiation of our primitive needs: once securing a foothold in what is enough, our mental activity 
is redirectable to the spontaneous and unnecessary.   Following Schiller, however, this moment 20
of freedom which yields to play must quickly be tempered for the introduction of moral 
education. When in Wordsworth this moral education is translated through the natural world, 
the adult poet’s aesthetic education is complete. If we pair Schiller’s focus on the education 
which play provides alongside the concept of the transitional object, we might add in a stage of 
destruction which is necessary to transition from freedom in play to an understanding of 
freedom which does not compromise the integrity of society. The most important function of the 
transitional object is to survive the subject’s destruction and his sense of omnipotent control; 
this is what marks the element of “use” in the relationship between them. Bollas tells us that in 
experiencing the transitional object  
 the infant evolves from experience of the process to articulation of the experience. With  
 the transitional object, the infant can play with the illusion of his own omnipotence... he  
 can entertain the idea of the object being got rid of, yet surviving his ruthlessness; and he 
 can find in this transitional experience the freedom of metaphor....the use of the   
 transitional object is the infant’s first creative act. (15)  
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 In this context we might the centrality of “pretend” hunting to his play is apparent in the 20
woodcock, raven’s nest, and ice skating passages. In the latter he and his boyhood friends 
imitate “the resounding horn, / The pack loud bellowing, and the hunted hare” (1:463-64), a 
reality which underlines the scenes as demonstrations of the boy’s awareness of his freedom 
from necessity.  
!
The subject loves the object precisely because it has survived his destruction (often in 
unconscious fantasy) and because the object assists the subject in finally living within the world 
of objects (120 - 21). The child’s damaging impulse toward his transitional object (nature), 
appropriately expressed in play, is responded to by nature. Nature in turn surprises him with a 
preemptive, sublimated pathetic fallacy, and by seizing and projecting for later internalization 
what is anticipated and prompted within him: moral conscience.   The relationship between the 21
infant and his environment (a term intended to convey all that is the mother for the infant—her 
holding, her idiom of gesture, etc.) transmits to the infant in an entirely private, idiosyncratic 
and intersubjective, and silent dialectic that “aesthetic of being that becomes a feature of the 
infant self.” Bollas will build on Winnicott’s concept of the transitional object with an object of 
his own: expressed in gesture, gaze, and “intersubjective utterance,” the transformational object 
is as much a process as an object. As an adult our efforts to recover the transformational object 
is part of our ongoing desire to surrender to something which will fundamentally alter us. The 
transitional object “is heir to the transformational period,” a new stage in the process of 
individuation which allows the infant to fantasize his omnipotence through its destruction; to 
use the transitional object is the “first creative act” (Bollas 13 - 15). Bollas’s assertion is that we 
seek a transformational object as adults as a way to reconnect with what is essentially an 
existential memory. And it is through the aesthetic moment that we are able to experience, 
however fleetingly, our original feeling toward the transformational object itself. He reads this 
quest for the equivalent to our original transformational object as integral to spirituality, as what 
we are seeking when we visit museum or theater, commit a crime, gamble, or indulge in 
“erotomania” (among other things) (17-18). 
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 "Internalization"calls up the picture of a force arising from within and seeking to discharge 21
itself externally-whether in speech or in deed-but thwarted in its initial thrust and directed back 
toward its source” (Wilner 32). Wilner concludes: “what matters to Wordsworth is not simply 
that the child's passions are ‘directed back toward the place from which they came’ (Freud), 
whether we understand that place as the child himself or the home he set out from, but that they 
are reflected back to him via the mediation of the surrounding landscape.... And it is of course 
precisely this "commutation and transfer of internal feelings, co-operating with external 
accidents" that, for Wordsworth, endows the incident with its poetic significance” (37-38).
 Certainly the observation that the boy’s interactions with nature are made to elicit in our 
imagination the infant and mother has become relatively commonplace. The larger question is 
“why the poem so explicitly conjures up this primary relation only to make it into something 
else” (Yousef 121). The boy’s experience of the environment mother is an example of the process 
one undergoes within the transformational object, and his play an example of the destructive 
tendency towards a transitional object typical in separating from the mother. The adult’s 
composition of the poem is overtly an attempt to trace the poet’s cognitive, moral, and aesthetic 
development; yet implicitly the poet seeks to recreate through an aesthetic moment what was his 
original holding environment. The “ruthlessness” which is part of the transitional object will 
manifest in culture and arts: as we work to recover our profound intersubjective experience with 
the transformational object, so the artist remembers for us and provides us with those 
memories. But our experience of the aesthetic moment “is neither social nor moral; it is 
curiously impersonal and even ruthless, as the object is sought out only as deliverer of an 
experience.” Far from being a beautiful, awe-inspiring occasion, it can be “ugly and terrifying 
but nonetheless profoundly moving because of the existential memory tapped” (28 - 29). 
Ultimately the transgressive element of play in these scenes, marked by the illusion of mastery 
through theft of the social or social object, is a refracted illumination of the ruthlessness of the 
poet’s use of the memory for creation of the aesthetic moment, which will itself elicit the 
existential memory that he was seeking. The spontaneous ludic event cannot be reproduced and 
the poet knows this: that reality is partially mourned in the theft. As the child is both invigorated 
and disconcerted by his activity, so the adult poet is reawakened yet disconcerted by his iterative 
use of the past self in the interest of poetic expression. An ironic foreboding takes shape over 
how the use of these scenes, intended to exalt him into the aesthetic moment, actually traps him 
within a world of play marked by illusion, impulse, idleness. In using the transgressive play of 
the child self to emblematize the development of the conscience, the poet reiterates the 
transgression and destruction of the transitional object. The effort to utilize these events for 
moral purposes is an effort to reincorporate that object, and to temper those destructive 
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elements which are so central to his memories of play. The natural and social objects —the 
woodcock, the boat, the memory, the moral lesson—are infinitely dislodged from their 
appropriate original place, and the transformational process always derailed.  
 For Winnicott, if not overtly for the Romantics, creative work is the antithesis of 
integration. We can only create when our personality is in a state of unintegration, and our 
creation becomes part of us only through the reflection of another (64).   In various Romantic 22
poems, the reflection may come not through another individual or “other” but rather the poet’s 
ability to imagine themselves as containing the other within themselves, or through the use of a 
memory of a previous, younger self: Coleridge’s “This Lime-tree Bower My Prison” comes to 
mind. The interpretation, the ordering of these experiences that produces the poems, though in 
a way that is invisible or silent, is the self reflected back to us: poetry relinquishing to chaos and 
play, the fragmentation of memory and the dream self against the organization of the form.   In 23
“Tintern Abbey” the poet appears to be reflected back by his sister: it is the “language of (his) 
former heart” (l. 117) which is captured by her. Yet she is herself remembered and reconstructed 
within the poem by the poet. The reflection we see in these scenes is offered from nature itself, 
which assists the poet in organizing his ego and entering into a more mature self. The boy’s 
impulse in the text expresses a restlessness, perhaps even more than an impulse toward 
domination. Or perhaps his fantasy of mastery is not over the thing itself, but of time and his 
place within it. It is counterpoint to the adult poet who, in recounting these moments of play, 
attempts to express mastery over time as well. The first theft is a necessary abuse: the object, 
warm and vital and receptive, is, must be, ecstatically adored and destroyed with the same 
passion. It must survive the instinctual, pure aggression of the child (Winnicott 7). But in these 
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 I am thinking here of his seminal essay “The Capacity to Be Alone.” I am not the first to 22
consider this essay in light of The Prelude. One particularly interesting account, and which also 
deals with the relationship between spontaneity and Winnicott’s “spontaneous gesture” as 
indicative of the “real” self is Brooke Hopkins’s “Wordsworth, Winnicott, and the Claims of the 
“Real" in Studies in Romanticism 37.2 (Summer 1998): 183-216.
 See especially Nancy Yousef’s “‘Unfathered Vapour’: The Imagination of Origins in The 23
Prelude.” Isolated Cases: The Anxieties of Autonomy in Enlightenment Philosophy and 
Romantic Literature. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2004: 114-148.
scenes, theft in play is also the theft of a symbol—a memory—which the poet attempts to claim 
from his boyhood self in the poem itself. Dislodging and disrupting the original memory for 
aesthetic ends, externalizing the internal, the poet appears to mirror his development from 
playful (composition) to the aesthetic, social and moral. Sharing these scenes with his audience, 
having imposed upon them a moral framework in which nature’s articulation is in service of 
correcting the boy’s transgression, the speaker of the poem has replaced the original theft from 
nature with a second theft from the self. In fact, it is not so much that the child is corrected by 
nature, or not only; but also that it is perceived as responding to his private, inner psychic 
reality. This very fact of being seen in the most intimate of ways, prepares him for entrance into 
a social world, where his play will be diffused into culture. Nature shifts into a state of limbo: not 
forgotten, not mourned, but having lost some kind of meaning which the individual was initially 
able to access.  It is almost as though the boy’s original exclusive intimacy with his 24
transformational object reveals, in its omniscient atmosphere, a narcissism which must be 
relinquished when the individual exits nature and enters the social world, the world of language 
and lyric. Without this transition, there would be no speech at all—all would be unspoken, 
intuited. There would be no poetry, no poet.  
!
IV. [ ] phantoms  [ ]: Illusion / Fantasy 
“Play is finite creativity in the magic dimension of illusion.”    25
!
One of the earliest available fragments of a poem by Wordsworth describes a melding of illusion, 
spectacle, and the nightmare. He describes lying in bed as a child, and in the darkness seeing 
 Processions, multitudes in wake or fair 
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 Summarizing the special qualities in the relationship between infant and transitional object, 24
Winnicott writes: “Its fate is to be gradually allowed to be decathected so that in the course of 
years... It loses meaning ... becomes diffused, have become spread out over the whole 
intermediate territory between ‘inner psychic reality’ and ‘the external world as perceived by two 
persons in common,,’ that is to say, over the whole cultural field” (7).
 Eugene Fink, “The Oasis of Happiness: Toward an Ontology of Play,” 28.25
 Assembled, puppet shews with trumpet, fife, 
 Wild beasts, and standards waving in the (field?). 
 These mounting ever in a sloping line 
 Were followed by the tumult of the shew... 
 These vanishing, appeared another scene -  !
 ... Succeeding with fantastic difference 
 And instant, unimaginable change. 
 [ ] phantoms  [  ]  26!
As spontaneity and impulse (“instant, unimaginable change”) are causes for concern, so ruleless 
illusion thus begins in the child’s imaginative faculty.  Manifest in adult society and culture, it 27
will be attributed to the madness of artists and religious zealots. There has always been fear of 
the play of fantasy in dreams: while Kant names that place of play a “healthy” expression of the 
power of the imagination, saying that, in fact, the gaps we experience in memory of our dreams 
keeps us rooted in reality, he cannot resist warning us never to take the narratives we dream up 
to be “revelations from an invisible world” (68-69). What dreams and nightmares represent is 
the omnipresent possibility that our imagination will overtake us, leaving us without control and 
entirely the victim of our fantasies: that the division between the rational and mad mind 
becomes increasingly blurry the more we invest in our illusions. As we find with Coleridge’s 
Biographia Literaria, De Quincey’s Confessions of an English Opium Eater, Shelley’s Julian 
and Maddalo: A Conversation and elsewhere, the line between the play of fantasy which in 
dreaming is healthy, and madness is hazy, is frighteningly flexible.  The word “illusion” from 28
the Latin ludere means “in play,” and this element is central to play as a worrisome component 
of the imaginative faculty in the eighteenth century. The illusory element of play may be what 
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 W.J.B. Owen, "'A second-sight procession' in Wordsworth's London," Notes and Queries 16.1 26
(1969): 49-50.
 Heather Glen explores the relationship between spontaneity, illusion, and ethics in 27
Wordsworth, in Vision and Disenchantment: Blake’s Songs and Wordsworth’s Lyrical Ballads. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 1983). She argues that illusion and reality are totally opposed in 
much of the poetry precisely because illusion is associated with intrusiveness, itself an indication 
of the failure to recognize the other: the “most spontaneous feelings...are seen as fundamentally 
appropriative, instinct with aggression: however frivolous they may seem, this is what at basis 
they mean” (316).
 See Schlutz, Mind’s World.28
most intimately connects it to fancy, as they are like siblings in the same house; whether a self-
generated deception for the sake of enjoyment, a willing forgoing of the balancing power of 
reason, or an unwilling hallucination, illusion and fantasy may lead a person to believe he sees 
and feels that which is only an invention of his own mind (Kant 71).   In a passage that 29
definitively connects the play of imagination with the play of children Kant writes forebodingly 
of the unintentional visions which can result from the deceit he calls “fantasy”:  
 fantasy, the tendency to harmless lying that is always met with in children and now  
 and then in adults who, though otherwise good-natured, sometimes have this tendency  
 almost as a hereditary disease. The events and supposed adventures they narrate issue  
 from the power of imagination like a growing avalanche as it rolls down, and they do not  
 have any kind of advantage in view except simply to make their stories interesting (73,  
 emphasis in original). !
The passage articulates the preoccupation of the uncontrollable illusion, the “hereditary disease” 
of hallucination, even when it begins in individual agency (lying). Still, the transgressive 
potential of the illusion is in its proximity to deceit and the lie; the child who playacts the king is 
not the king, but his very aping of the figure degrades its integrity. Following in Plato’s footsteps 
Kant asserts that poets are especially not to be trusted, as in their pursuit of fantasy they 
sacrifice all, including friends and loved ones, to the altar of wit. They ignore their conscience, 
are “capricious, moody, and (without malice) unreliable” and have “no character.” Though they 
don’t harbor hatred they make many enemies, and though not wanting to hurt a friend they still 
mock him [this is partly due to their innate temperament in which “eccentric wit” rules over the 
power of judgment (147)]. Illusion eases its way into culture in other ways, as in the fantasy of 
foresight: astrology is “childish and fantastic,” an example of our willful misreading of signs and 
foolhardy belief that we might gain some ability to anticipate what is impossible to predict. This 
childishness is linked to a failure of the supposed universality of signification: though we are 
united in language we can sometimes be “as distant as heaven from earth in concepts” (86). 
Fantasy also leads to the mistaken attribution of affects to objects rather than our own history or 
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 According to Robinson, in the Oxford English Dictionary and Etymological Dictionary, the 29
word “fancy” in 1579 meant “delusion.” It comes from Greek ‘phantasia’ - ‘to make visible’ and 
from ‘phainen’ - to ‘bring to light,’ and ‘to shine.’ He argues that the conviction that the fancy 
was dreamlike, irrational, and even untrustworthy goes back to the Homeric epics (5).
sensibility, as in the case of nostalgia. We become lost longing for, picturing our childhood 
home; upon visiting the place we are crushed with disappointment, because its image does not 
deliver with it our youth, the warm sociability of childhood or its freedom from obligation (71). 
Illusion can weaken human beings by rendering them superstitious (or if they already were so, 
further weakens them). Interestingly for our purposes in one passage he singles out hunters, 
fishermen, and gamblers (especially lottery players) as being particularly superstitious. They 
delude themselves through the illusion that the subjective is objective, that their own inner voice 
is equivalent to “knowledge of the thing itself” (176)—not unlike our boyhood Wordsworth and 
his experience of nature’s response to his “hunt.” In the games of boys in hitting a ball, 
wrestling, running, or playing soldier Kant writes that, though the boys believe they are playing 
with each other it is nature that plays with them. Stimulated by the illusion of mastery, however, 
they fail to notice this, and are instead swept away in “the most violent and long-lasting passion” 
(176). Thus inherent in the fear of illusion is that the individual will be led astray by his 
passionate fantasies.  
 For Winnicott, illusion is at the root of what is dangerous but also exciting and powerful 
about play: it is a characteristic that arises not from “instinctual arousal” (as the Romantics 
would fear) but from the “precariousness that belongs to the interplay in the child’s mind of that 
which is subjective (near-hallucination) and that which is objectively perceived (actual, or 
shared reality)” (118). In Wordsworth: Play and Politics, John Turner describes the play area in 
the Lyrical Ballads as in part an area of illusion, which he says expresses “precisely both the 
excursive confidence and the vulnerable fears which are expressed,” and argues that we might 
see the text as an early attempt toward object-relations psychology where play is the relational 
locus upon which subjective and objective convene (118). The “near-hallucination” which 
Winnicott speaks of appears in both spectacular and subtle ways in The Prelude, but illusion is 
rarely depicted without the mediating function of after-thought: having described at length how 
fancy led the poet to see a simple black rock become “a burnished shield / suspended over a 
knight’s tomb,” now an “entrance into some magic cave, / Or palace for a fairy of the rock” (8. 
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575), the narrator will reassure us that he “At all times had a real solid world / Of images about 
me” (8: 604-05). Yet the text is littered with  dreams of shells and stones, pantomimes and 
miniatures, panoramas and raree shows; with cabinets or “wide museum(s), thronged with 
fishes, gems, / Birds, crocodiles, shells, where little can be seen” (3. 652-54); “singers, rope-
dancers, giants and dwarfs, / Clowns, conjurors, posture-makers, harlequins”— in short, our 
pious narrator serves us with a generous smattering of “Delusion(s) bold” (7: 294-308). And of 
course, most of the scenes in Book One, as we have discussed, are presentations by the adult 
narrator of his boyhood self dealing with the illusion of nature’s embodied response to his 
transgression. The illusions he experiences are in keeping with the paradox of play as vacillating 
between two opposed poles, as though attempting to inhabit both opposites: illusion has the 
appearance of being simultaneously a surrender to the imagination and a quintessential 
expression of the imagination’s agency, a hallucination both summoned and forced upon us 
(Kaiser 119).  In The Prelude, the delusion of omnipotence or mastery in stealing or destroying 
objects in the world and/or separating himself from his community (as I discussed earlier, in the 
spontaneous impulse which demonstrates his uneasy vacillation between solitude and society), 
is closely related to the illusion that the natural world observes and reacts to him in admonition. 
These two modes replicate the play continuum: the Apollonian expression of self-actualization 
versus troubled, Dionysian self-abandon (Fink 25-26). And while the former is often expressed 
as a sort of unbounded creativity, the latter is the cause of madness and the fragmentation of 
rationality. Wordsworth’s preoccupation is less with what is illusion and what is madness; 
rather, he works to distinguish between what is delusion and what is illusion catalyzed by a 
divine, benevolent, natural spirit. We see this when he defiantly asks the reader if we might 
name the idealized way he saw the shepherds in his boyhood 
 A shadow, a delusion? -- ye who are fed 
 By the dead letter, not the spirit of things,  
 Whose truth is not a motion or a shape  
 Instinct with vital functions, but a block  
 Or waxen image which yourselves have made, 
  And ye adore. But blessed be the God 
 Of Nature and of man that this was so,  
 That men did at first present themselves  
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 Before my untaught eyes thus purified,  
 Removed, and at a distance that was fit. (8: 431-440)  30!
 In this passage, it is clear that illusion is not delusion. Rather, illusion purifies his vision, 
eliminating noise and detail to show a thing for what it is in essence; it can strip something in 
order to reveal its aesthetic. In this way Wordsworthian illusion is companionable with its 
function in object relations: for Winnicott and Bollas, as we explored earlier, illusion is the 
integral element in art, religion, dreaming, and fetishism in adult life, which are themselves 
clarifying quests for the existential memory of the maternal aesthetic [such quests most often 
surface in social and cultural ways, and some communities are even formed based on shared 
illusions (Bollas, The Shadow of the Object, 30).] The illusion in The Prelude of nature’s 
response to the boy’s actions seems to be a classic aesthetic moment, which is crucially related to 
the transformational and transitional objects. Indeed, the connection between play, illusion, and 
the aesthetic moment was certainly quite clear to Bollas, who references well known play 
theorist and anthropologist Gregory Bateson’s “double bind” theory as indicative of the infant’s 
experience of being caught between two contradictory experiences: “the conflict between the 
form as utterance and the content as message.” The aesthetic moment cannot be learned, 
summoned, or escaped; it is essentially a powerful illusion which elicits in the subject a feeling 
that he has been “selected by the environment for some deeply reverential experience” (34-39). 
It is an existential memory of the first idiom of care, when thought and speech were unrelated to 
our survival; when seized by the aesthetic moment, we experience the memory of a pre-linguistic 
pause within time in which we felt in suspension within a “deep enigmatic privacy,” a quiet 
sensation of profound exchange, which would eventually make possible our entrance into 
society. After the aesthetic moment has passed, we are left with the uncanny sense that the 
moment was initiated by the object itself (35). Wordsworth asserts that “by intercourse of 
touch / I held mute dialogues with my mother’s heart,” and his subsequent “fleeting moods” will 
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 Here he again separates his experience from the deliberative process of art-making, which is 30
derided (“a block / Or waxen images which yourselves have made, / And ye adore”). The 
spontaneity implied in the “spirit” of things, the “untaught eyes,” is the result of his age, in 
which all creativity expressed itself in harmless illusion.
search endlessly for it: “the soul—/ Remembering how she felt, but what she felt / Remembering 
not” (2: 283-36). It is the aesthetic moment, with its existential memory of the first aesthetic of 
care when the “soul / Claims manifest kindred with an earthly soul” (2: 241-42), which is offered 
through the reprimand, through nature’s response to his private and solitary act. From the 
gentle breeze which seems “half conscious of the joy it gives” (1: 4), the “low breathings” among 
the solitary hills, (l. 330), the suspension he feels “by the blast which blew amain” (l. 345). When 
the spectacle of the cliff leaves him “with a dim and undetermined sense / Of unknown modes of 
being” (l. 419-20) we are reminded of Bollas’s “unthought known,” where the rules of being and 
relating originate within “the dialectic of the inherited and the acquired” but have not yet been 
thought (9). 
 There are many more palatable forms of illusion in play, one of which we see in the 
“game” of playing pretend.  Kant acknowledges that some illusion is permissible on moral 31
grounds, saying that our increased civility is predicated upon our ability to play a part. We adopt 
the expressions of respect, warmth, humility, and generosity, and eventually the virtues 
themselves morph from performance into habit: “They adopt the illusion of affection, of respect 
for other, of modesty, and of unselfishness without deceiving anyone at all, because it is 
understood by everyone that nothing is meant sincerely by this. And it is also very good that this 
happens in the world” (42). In another of play’s excellent paradoxes, the illusion that is 
imitation transgresses the original while also reifying it: the mantle that the child wears when 
playing “king” ensures that the children around him will associate that sign with the real king, a 
“stability of style or code” which “provides socially beneficial results of order and predictability 
that seemingly contradict the playful impulse from which they originally evolved” (Dissayanke 
216). This is how play becomes united with work: in the imitation of adult life, conversation, 
even adult occupation. Thus the child in “Intimations of Immortality” moves from objects or 
toys (the plan and the chart) to ritual, such as playing at weddings, to more abstract aspirations 
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 Mimicry is a component of “playing pretend,” as I explore in the subsequent chapter on Boy of 31
Winander and John Clare’s “The Progress of Ryhme.” 
which reveal his fantasy of human life (Spiegelman 44). To transfer this “playing pretend” into 
the role one plays in society requires the forfeiture of another more grave type of illusion, in 
which we take our  own self-generated illusion for the thing itself.  For Kant, the only illusion in 32
society which must be entirely dispensed with is our self-love, the veil of our virtue and power 
which conceals from us our moral defects (45). If Wordsworth is to be taken at his word, it is 
nature which will tear the veil from us. Thus though the dialogue between the boy and nature 
would seem to be a disavowal of aggressiveness, that is far from the truth; his own self-love 
remains entrapped in a hostile inability to “bear the thought of being freed by anyone other than 
(him)self” (Lacan 86).  
!
V. Idleness / Indolence 
“We sauntered, played, we rioted, we talked / Unprofitable talk” (3: 251-52) 
!
Is play a form of celebration, an expression of joie de vivre? Or is it, finally, idleness? The 
history of indolence as a vice in Western literature is in part one of its slow transformation into 
creativity, into “a version of labor,” for which Wordsworth is the exemplar. In the Romantic era 
idleness shifts from laziness to a prefiguration of the receptive labor which the poet undertakes 
(Speigelman 9). This displacement will cause the Victorians to be increasingly interested in 
identifying its utility, while warning that idleness can leave adults open to manipulation and 
fogginess of moral vision [as when someone bends from the side of a slow boat enjoying his eye’s 
revelations, “Yet often is perplexed, and cannot part / The shadow from the substance, rocks 
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 In dreams we are familiar with the phenomenon of one thing standing in for something else; 32
metaphor is another crucial an element of play. Gregory Bateson memorably described the play 
of metaphor in metacommunication in “the playful nip” which “denotes the bite, but it does not 
denote what would be denoted by the bite.” In this paradox is a manipulation of expectation: 
“these actions in which we now engage do not denote what those actions for which they stand 
would denote” (Bateson 180, emphasis mine).
and sky” (4: 247-55)]  But the Romantics were not the only ones to value idleness and its 33
relationship to creative production: the concept is built into the German word for muse, musse, 
meaning idleness (Huizinga 158) and it is the ultimate aim for Aristotle, “the principle of the 
universe.... preferable to work; indeed, it is the aim of all work” (qtd. 161, emphasis in original).  
 Idleness in play represents a sort of middle state, a slippery and dangerous aspect of 
creativity taken too lightly, usually typified in either entirely positive terms (in which it is a sort 
of energy gathering for creative expression) or negative (in which it is morally reprehensible, 
akin to the Christian sin of sloth). In the early books of The Prelude we see idleness in children, 
in which it reveals the primal basic creative receptivity available to children and animals. and in 
poets, who attempt to sustain or reclaim that receptivity. Idleness in poets who attempt to 
sustain or reclaim that receptivity risk falling into the same trap as everyday adults, where 
idleness gives way to paralysis or sloth. Some indolence is considered harmless, such as the 
restless seeking out of entertainment such as card playing; adults who engage in idleness 
“withdraw” again into a carefree childhood, a silly but also charming or even healthy state (Kant 
98). While it can indicate thoughtlessness and waste [as the poet describes himself “Unthinking  
.... / having in my native hills given loose / To a schoolboy’s dreaming” (3:433-35)] it is often 
also a process of collecting impressions for later composition. Describing the “moral life” he 
attributed to natural objects early on in life, Wordsworth writes that the world he had about him 
was his own; he made it, it only lives to him and to the God who saw into his mind. “Some,” he 
asserts ironically, “call’d it madness,” this time when his perception was activated to identify all 
“shades of difference” as they were hidden in all of nature’s forms— from the leaf to the stone, 
the ocean to the “azure heavens” (l. 160). This will later translate into the poet’s work— and as 
such is part of the education which will secure his career. Play gives way to labor (Speigelman 
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 In a more social and political context, idleness gives way to being a pawn in war. John Ruskin 33
writes, for example, that there are two races: one of workers and the other of players. This 
second group is composed of men who remain idle, having found no course of study to interest 
them. “Continually...needing recreation,” they make excellent soldiers or “human pawns” in the 
“game of war” (Ruskin 108, qtd. in Huizinga). 
46).  Finally it is man’s birthright: it is lamentable to lose that “majestic indolence so dear / To 34
native man” (8: 389-90). As Wordsworth writes in his reply to Mathetes, “above all, Youth is 
rich in the possession of Time, and the accompanying consciousness of Freedom and Power.” 
Entirely unshackled by the negative emotions associated with the mature ego, youth stands “at a 
distance from the Season when his harvest is to be reaped, — .... he has Leisure and may look 
around— may defer both the choice and the execution of his purposes” (Prose Works, 13).   35
  Idleness in play often functions as the catalyst or counterpoint to the spontaneous 
eruption or epiphanic moment which characterizes the poem as a whole and is itself so 
characteristic of play (Dissayanke 213). To choose and to act, whether for virtue or vice, is to be 
alive; idleness in the adult is often a sign of boredom and passivity, a paralyzing inability to act 
or create [to be an “idler” is the source of shame, to “(defraud) the day’s glory” (5: 509-14), to be 
burdened by “Idleness, halting with his weary clog” (l. 600)]. In Book Four, a fruitful state of 
exaltation and meditation, a delight in small events or objects, immediately precedes 
Wordsworth’s admission of an “inner falling off” after having been released from the university. 
Interestingly, this momentary lapse, which is the result of adult play [dances, revelry, feasts and 
games (4: 273-5)], is what gives way to his somber meeting with the discharged soldier; thus 
indulgence is tempered by pity (Speigelman 51). At the poem’s start our narrator is in a state of 
languishing inactivity, having relinquished many hours to empty musing. He cannot separate 
“Vague longing that is bred by want of power, / From paramount impulse not to be 
withstood” (1: 240-255); this prepares him for the fruitfulness of the poem:   
 Ah better far than this to stray about  
 Voluptuously through fields and rural walks 
 And ask no record of the hours given up 
 To vacant musing, unreproved neglect... !
 In indolence from vain perplexity,  
 Unprofitably travelling towards the grave... 
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 The word “idle” is entirely absent from Book Ten onward, a quality the poet works to sustain 34
and reclaim as he increasingly focuses on the social and political world (thus his mind is unlike 
the “mother dove” that sits, brooding; it is full of fits of “unmanageable thoughts” (1: 149-52).
 These words are often misattributed to Coleridge, who edited the essay. 35
  (1: 252-56, 267-71) !
Too much indulgence in idleness can render the imagination child-like and weakened. Boredom 
is the evil twin of idleness; it is  “a disgust with one’s own existence, which arises when the mind 
is empty,” its cause the deceptive, “natural inclination toward ease,” which makes us glad to do 
nothing because at least we’re not doing anything bad. The deception, in turn, of boredom itself, 
is anything which “passes time,” which deceives us in our tendency toward idleness. With the 
fine arts, or even aimless games, we keep our mind “at play”: thus one “outwits” the inclinations: 
“as Swift says, surrender a barrel for the whale to play with, in order to save the ship” (Kant 43). 
Without the quality of creative reverie, indolence becomes boredom or laziness, akin to the 
Christian sin of sloth. Strangely, this boredom or restlessness is often read as a sign of 
insatiability. Kant describes the relationship between boredom and a desire for constant 
enjoyment as “a luxurious living which is at the same time an erosion of life, where one becomes 
hungrier he more one enjoys” (174-75). This hunger for entertainment can appear in the blank, 
unreflective indulgence in the beauty of objects, a passivity which at its most extreme appears in 
the “ministry of fear,” negating the energetic creativity the human being is capable of (Beer 207). 
The early books of The Prelude are marked by such infantile appetite: “in a period that is rich 
and dumb” until language slowly infringes on the awe of experience and the remembrance of joy 
(Oronato 112). But while Oronato asserts that for Wordsworth poetry, as “partially elusive of the 
limits of ordinary speech,” offers the adult the fantasy of “a prior and superior existence, 
perhaps as soul, from which the sense of self and time are a gradual estrangement” (112), I 
believe the reality is far more complex.  
 As the transgressive element of childlike impulsiveness is rooted in the child’s 
intermediate position between internal and external experience, so idleness, which when 
experienced in solitude is a state of “gathering” for poetic inspiration, is in society more 
dangerous. The narrator’s indulgence in idleness at first demonstrates an inclination toward 
society rather than solitude (3: 236); by Book Six, he has become part of “indolent and vague 
society”  (6: 20). Idleness is frequently associated with chaotic experience within a crowd: in 
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France, he describes his presence in the “ant-like swarms / Of builders and subverters” as being 
in the middle of “gaiety an dissolute idleness” (l. 66).  His depiction of adult leisure overall 
draws on eighteenth century notions of fancy as an immature expression of creativity, as 
something to dispense with; play-as-mischief, as sport, game, or general diversion does not 
appear in books 11-13 virtually at all. The social form of play manifest in festival and celebratory 
gatherings, with its accompanying glee in illusion (pantomime, farce, and the like), is indicative 
of stunted morality and superficiality: “the inner heart / Seemed trivial, and the impresses 
without / Of a too gaudy region” (l. 444-46). 
 As with the role of illusion in play, the careless, casual, relaxed quality of idleness often 
accompanies a flexibility toward veracity in the interest of poetic composition, often surfacing as 
a concern that the spontaneous quality of play harbors in deceit. Idleness is related to a 
fogginess of memory; the poet asks if he should allow himself to “(copy) the impression of the 
memory — / Though things remembered idly do half seem / The work of fancy” (7: 145-48). 
While idleness is a component of the poet’s labor the reader is encouraged to be wary of the 
poet’s account of that thoughtlessness. To be in a state of “idleness” one must protest his 
innocence and defend himself against charges of sloth. Wordsworth’s state as an “idler among 
academic bowers,” (l. 403) allows him to idealize man, but that perspective is actively 
challenged by the vice of those around him. And here as elsewhere he admits he can’t attest to 
the veracity of his account: of his “naked recollection of that time,” he tells us, some “may ... 
have been called to life / By after-meditation.” (l. 610). If he errs in his account, it is a mistake 
characterized more by “innocence” and “delight” than purposeful deception, all part of his 
“careless” roaming through memory, his “submissive idleness”:  
   ... Carelessly I roamed 
          I gazed, roving as through a cabinet 
 Or wide museum thronged with fishes, gems 
 Birds, crocodiles, shells, where little can be seen 
 Yet still does every step bring something forth 
 That quickens, pleases, stings— and here and there 
 A casual rarity is singled out 
 And has a brief perusal, then gives way 
 To others....  
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          Meanwhile, amid this gaudy congress framed 
 Of things by nature most unneighbourly, 
 The head turns round, and cannot right itself; 
         ... Yet something to the memory sticks at last 
          Whence profit may be drawn in times to come. !
            Thus in submissive idleness, my friend, 
          The labouring time in autumn, winter, spring,               
          Nine months—rolled pleasingly away (3: 651-71) !
This roaming is a description of his childish fickleness, his easily garnered attention; any one 
object would alone be seen as “most unneighbourly” all together, and the careless browsing 
turns the head around so it cannot right itself. Though in the moment he may have felt the 
pleasurable and disorienting “sting” of displaced entertainment, which itself caused an 
unproductive rapidity of time, this “submissive idleness” has its profit in the poet’s work so that 
what was luxurious frivolity is as a seed to be  harvested in years to come. Yet in protesting these 
objects as insignificant and deceptive at such length, their entertainment distracts him from 
where his attention should properly be. This, combined with his earlier acknowledgment that his 
account may not be entirely truthful, makes his depiction of recollected play for poetic effect 
especially uneasy. In attempting to turn “profit” from memories of idleness the idleness is 
negated, the truth is elided, and the poet is left questioning his use of the memories; whether his 
imagination culls from the “wide museum” of his memory or whether he is manipulates a vague 
illusory past for poetic purposes.  
!
VI. Conclusion !
“Yet each man is memory to himself ... / I am not heartless” (3: 189-91) 
!
I take the quote in the title of this chapter from a passage toward the end of Book One in which 
the poet summarizes his remembrances thus far. As a child, he asserts, he was able to experience 
the spectacular wonders of nature purely, unmediated by philosophical, intellectual, or moral 
consciousness, or by the associative memory (a la Hartley) which inevitably results from a more 
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mature mind. Without even the strange, reflective feeling of “quietness or peace,” his eye could 
move over “three long leagues” of water, collecting “New pleasure, like a bee among the 
flowers” (1: 605 - 09). He continues: 
 Thus often in those fits of vulgar joy 
 Which through all seasons on a child’s pursuits 
 Are prompt attendants, ‘mid that giddy bliss 
 Which like a tempest works along the blood  
 And is forgotten, even then I felt 
 Gleams like the flashing of a shield. !
 ...And if the vulgar joy by its own weight 
 Wearied itself out of the memory,  
 The scenes which were a witness of that joy 
 Remained.... (1: 600-28) !
 This is ordinary, mortal, bare, unmediated joy; an unexpected “tempest,” a momentary “flash”  
which leaves only its trace light. Its very ordinariness is predicated on the lack of habitual 
associations which accompanies memory, on being entirely devoid of a similar image to recollect 
(1: 603). Yet this joy is introduced to us as annual, attending “all seasons on a child’s 
pursuits” (1: 610-11). And the simile of the pollinating bee activates in our mind the sensation of 
the rapid conjunction of new images to old objects and feelings. His recitation in the following 
stanza of all those elements which alter our experience of nature further obscures the reader’s 
ability to experience what is “beauteous and majestic” about the scene: the following stanza lists 
the collisions and collateral objects, “ill-sorted unions,” and “links” which are soon gathered 
[though “doomed to sleep” until “maturer seasons” call them forth to “impregnate and elevate 
the mind” (1: 615-24)]. By describing these early experiences of “vulgar joy” in such a fastidious 
and exalted form, the passage performs the difficulty the poet faces in drawing from a similarly 
spontaneous ecstasy. We cannot help note the irony of the poet who wistfully recounts a child’s 
experience of nature as “pure” because of his lack of associations or memory, within the 
meticulously constructed epic of the development of his own mind.  
 To forget is an activity, a process; a forgoing which leaves us spiritually vulnerable. It is 
in our charge to relinquish the illusion that our memory is ever intact, an expression ever entire, 
and yet “(be) willing nevertheless to say you are strong again, recovered as from an 
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illness” (Cavell 75). In my view, this is the unspoken, yet equally heroic, tale of the early books of 
The Prelude. To undergo the process of recollection in this poem is to write “with hand however 
weak” upon a palimpsest which still reveals what is written below; despite the poet’s aspiration 
for truth much of that rewriting is a smoothing gloss, a tension which is he readily admits: “in 
the main” the development of an individual mind and soul “lies far hidden from the reach of 
words” (3: 184-85).  The poet is apprehensive that in ascribing, for each scene of impulsive play, 
a knowledge gifted to the child by nature, that he has destroyed some spontaneous element of 
that original scene. And so he indulges an idealization of these “god-like hours” and repents with 
an exaggerated, haunting pathetic fallacy. The editorializing context is a gloss which tempers the 
complex power dynamics inherent in the use of this memory and the poet’s requisite denial of 
that very use. In this way, the young boy’s theft of the natural object is a prefiguration of his later 
dislodging of personal memory through his use of it: in these scenes of play, the central object is 
either destined for trouble or the cause of it. The transformational object (nature) later 
manifests in the strangest of ways: as the memory of the incorporation of the transitional object 
(the boat, the woodcock, the egg).  
 To accept the incompleteness of memory in a project such as this is to be paralyzed in the 
face of an inconsistent muse. Memory is distinct from the imagination, Kant tells us, because we 
are able to reproduce moments from our life at will: it is our agency in recollection which  
demonstrates to us that our minds are not a “mere plaything of the imagination.” It is especially 
imperative, therefore, that we keep fantasy discrete from memory: if the two are to become 
intertwined, memory becomes “unfaithful” (75-76). It is difficult to parse out what exactly 
“unfaithful” means when the memory itself is to be integrated into the exalted play of art-
making, the memory a pillar upon which a poem (with its dangerous proximity to illusion) is 
based. The reader of The Prelude is further dizzied, as the memory upon which account this new 
work is built is itself one of play, a play that involves the idleness and illusion we have been 
warned about as coming from the poetic imagination. Yet it is far better for the poet to posit this 
problem as fundamentally chronological, as being about the veracity of memory, rather than an 
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aesthetic or moral one. To read nature as opening up the twoness of our being by assisting us in 
the transition from solitary to social being, from infant to man, allows the poet to exploit the 
idea of a doubled self fragmented just by time: “The vacancy between me and those days,” he 
writes wistfully: “sometimes when I think of them I seem / Two consciousnesses” (2: 29-32).  
 Yet the “twoness” which Wordsworth articulates here is not his identification with 
himself as a boy, and then as an adult, but actually two experiences of adult contrition and 
regret: the adult who needs not be reminded of the folly of pride because of his experiences as a 
child, and the adult who wishes he could apply the same passion he had as a boy to his 
newfound investment in duty and truth. Cavell argues that the Mariner silences the albatross in 
order to establish an intimacy which transcends the seeming arbitrariness of human 
responsibilities; in other words, to make of the albatross a version himself. The appropriative 
action which the poet undertakes over the child’s play in the early books of The Prelude is 
similarly incorporated into the chaos and violence of the French Revolution. Which is to say, the 
boy in play becomes the sacrificial spectacle through which the poet aspires to elucidate some 
version of himself, to affirm the deep communion we hope to experience with our child self. The 
child transgresses by dislodging or destroying the natural object even as the poet compromises 
through iteration and inevitable alteration his own memory for the purposes of lyric: these 
paradoxically creative and destructive acts are a prefiguration to the violence to which the ideals 
of man (not to mention man himself) will be subjected in later books. For “to say that social 
freedom can only be built on the basis of the ‘freedom of the individual mind,’ as is 
Wordsworth’s conclusion, “is to say that certain philosophical dreams of justice ... require not 
seeing the human being as weak, and all that he may become as vulnerable to accident and 
circumstance (Yousef 138). His answer to this difficulty is to end The Prelude in a way suspect 
for its simple optimism (119). What the poet has actually done is hang an original transgression 
around the light figure of his child self, displacing guilt only to later revisit it in the form of a 
different fall of man. What makes this move singularly Wordsworthian, however, is the first 
embedding of the apocalyptic element into the boy’s frivolity. We were warned: he calls this time
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— when the world “lived only to (him),” when his bounty was ephemeral joy—nothing short of 
prophecy. Others called it simply “madness” (3: 147-51). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Chapter Two  !
Birdsong Mimicry and Repetitious Play in John Clare and Wordsworth 
!
  
 So finally (form) begins to take possession of him himself, transforming  
 at first only the outer, but ultimately the inner, man too....the confused  
 and indistinct cries of feeling  become articulate, begin to obey the laws  
 of rhythm, and to take on the contours of song. If the Trojan host storms  
 on to the battlefield with piercing shrieks like a flock of cranes, the Greek  
 army approaches it in silence, with noble and measured tread. In the former  
 case we see only the exuberance of blind forces; in the latter, the triumph  
 of form and the simple majesty of law.  36!!
           O fret not after knowledge—I have none,  
   And yet my song comes native with the warmth.  
   O fret not after knowledge—I have none,  
   And yet the Evening listens.  37
  !
In The Republic Plato argues that mimesis renders both painting and poetry exceptionally 
seductive, if inferior. The poet, a master of it, must be held carefully at bay— an enchanter who 
will negate one’s reason and moderation, who will bark like a dog, bleat like a sheep, or crow like 
a cock without the guidance of a narrative (86). Even those with the best character cannot help 
but enjoy the rapturous sympathy or lasciviousness that a poem stirs within us; but in the real 
world we would be ashamed to be overrun with such feminine, exaggerated sentiments. The role 
of mimesis in art has always been a conflicted one: even beyond Plato’s conviction of its 
potential for deception, the sheer pleasure of repetition was reason enough to keep poetry out of 
his republic.  There is something contagious about imitation: by awakening our passions the 38
poet— a manufacturer of images thrice removed from the philosopher king—inculcates in us his 
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 The poet may be allowed back into the city but only if she defends her utility and amiableness 38
in lyric or meter. But the philosophers must be prepared to refuse her as they might refuse a 
lover to whom they are deeply attached, but have quarreled (330). 
own tendency toward evil and lawlessness. If one does imitate, one should only imitate the best 
of models: for example, the child can learn to become by modeling that which is “brave, sober, 
pious, free” (Mitscherling 153).   One wonders what Plato would think, then, of a poem 39
presenting us with an individual playfully mimicking the sounds of lowly animals: the 
representation of mimicry embedded within an already mimetic art would surely be four times 
removed from what is true, and perhaps doubly enticing. This essay considers a speaker’s 
phonetic transcription of his childhood mimicry of nightingale song in John Clare’s “The 
Progress of Ryhme,” and a boy’s playful mimicry of owl calls in Wordsworth’s “Boy of 
Winander” passage as it appears in The Prelude (1805). In these poems the mimicry appears to 
illustrate a child’s spontaneous play within nature, the fickle nature of inspiration, and the adult 
poet’s attempt to corral both for poetic purposes. The cessation of that mimicry marks Clare’s 
exile from society; for Wordsworth, the boy’s silence is the very thing announcing the realization 
of his poetic skills. In both cases the adult speaker’s depiction of child’s play with animal 
utterance ends in a melancholic denouement.  
 “The Progress of Ryhme” is an apostrophic ode to poetry: its subject is the child’s 
discovery of verse alongside his exploration of landscape. In it Clare names poetry as his only 
balm as a hard-working boy, a passion more like a friend or guardian than a literary genre. 
“Poesy” is placed in opposition with various societal ills detailed in the verse: vulgarity, insults, 
class prejudice, and aggressive masters. But to claim the title of poet was a frightening act; one 
which intimidated him with its power so that he feared being laughed at by others. His shame 
was felt so deeply that he would not speak his rhymes aloud even when alone. Though self-
deprecating about his early attempts, his first songs have a sympathetic and kindred ear in 
nature: unlike the social world later, it listens approvingly “no matter how the lyre was 
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 A similar idea about the potentially educational benefits of imitation is expressed in Kant’s 39
Anthropology, as I discuss in the fourth chapter. 
strung” (l. 209).   In fact it encouraged, almost bewitched the young poet into attempting to 40
replicate its visual and aural images, the fields appearing to hum in concert with him on “Those 
burning days when I should dare / To sing aloud my worship there” (l. 68-70). Yet as he 
develops his poetic skill, our speaker describes being plagued by anxieties in the human world 
while his intimacy with nature is compromised by his maturation. Eventually he interrupts his 
own narrative with a sonorous transcription of his mimicry of nightingale song as a boy. 
Originally this was a moment of ecstatic lyricism and  harmony with nature. The passage is a 
kind of mirroring of memory in which nature’s responsiveness is re-imagined as the poet 
articulates it falteringly through imperfect language and letter: 
 - 'Chew-chew chew-chew'- and higher still  
 'Cheer-cheer cheer-cheer'- more loud and shrill  
 'Cheer-up cheer-up cheer-up,'- and dropt  
 Low 'tweet tweet jug jug jug' and stopt  
 One moment just to drink the sound  
 Her music made and then a round  
 Of stranger witching notes was heard 
 As if it was a stranger bird 
 'Wew-wew wew-wew chur-chur chur-chur,  
 Woo-it woo-it'- could this be her   
 'Tee-rew tee-rew tee-rew tee-rew,  
 Chew-rit chew-rit,' and ever new 
 'Will- will will-will, grig-grig grig-grig'  
 The boy stopt sudden on the brig  
 To hear the 'tweet tweet tweet' so shrill  
 The 'jug jug jug,' and all was still  
 A minute- when a wilder strain  
 Made boys and woods to pause again  
 Words were not left to hum the spell.  
 Could they be birds that sung so well  
 I thought- and maybe more than I  
 That musics self had left the sky  
 To cheer me with its magic strain  
 And then I hummed the words again 
 Till fancy pictured standing by  
 My heart's companion poesy (l. 239 - 64) !
Let us contrast this passage to another, if much more well known, Romantic example of a child’s 
mimicry of birdsong: Wordsworth’s “Boy of Winander.” Originally appearing in Lyrical Ballads 
"63
 John Clare, The Oxford Authors: John Clare. Ed. Eric Robinson and David Powell (Oxford: 40
Oxford University Press, 1984), 158, line 209. All references to the poem are sourced from this 
text; line numbers will be given for the lines of the poems quoted.
under the title “There Was a Boy” it makes its way to Book 5 of The Prelude (1805), 
Wordsworth’s epic poem in blank verse tracing the development of the poetic mind.  The book 41
is devoted to his fierce, unorthodox ideas about education, but makes its case in dizzying and 
occasionally seemingly irrelevant twists and turns (its aimless quality has been frequently noted 
by critics).  The “Boy of Winander” passage is, among other things, a strange and sad tangent, 42
placed so awkwardly amid the poet’s long criticism of educationalists. Much has been made of 
the story in Romantic criticism and of what it conveys about the possibility of human 
communion with nature. The speaker recalls a boy who once stood on the shores of a cliff, or by 
a lake, mimicking owl calls. It isn’t clear how or whether the speaker personally knew the boy: 
the natural world, however, is described as knowing him well, which by virtue of contrast 
implies the speaker did not (Kneale 24). As the boy calls out to the owls they call back and the 
sound is echoed so that the boy’s mimicry and the owl’s actual calls are indistinguishable 
literally and symbolically (as the owl’s calls are doubled by their own echo as well as by the boy’s 
mimicry, and subsequent echo of his call): 
 There was a boy- ye knew him well, ye cliffs 
 And islands of Winander—many a time 
 At evening, when the stars had just begun 
 To move along the edges of the hills, 
 Rising or setting, would he stand alone 
 Beneath the trees or by the glimmering lake, 
 And there, with fingers interwoven, both hands 
 Pressed closely palm to palm, and to his mouth 
 Uplifted, he as through an instrument 
 Blew mimic hootings to the silent owls 
 That they might answer him. And they would shout 
 Across the wat’ry vale, and shout again, 
 Responsive to his call, with quivering peals 
 And long halloos, and screams, and echoes loud, 
 Redoubled and redoubled - concourse wild 
 Of mirth and jocund din. (l. 364-79) !
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Occasionally the owls fail to respond and while the boy waits, listening, he receives “unawares” a 
sublime vision of the reflection of the woods in the lake, of the rocks, sky, or the sound of 
mountain rivers (l. 379-85). Shortly thereafter we learn the boy died, though the circumstances 
are not given. What makes the scenes of mimicry in these two poems feel like play, despite the 
boy’s death and the increasing dismay of the adult speaker in “The Progress of Ryhme”? The 
ludic aspect is largely owed to the incongruous juxtaposition of a human child imitating animal 
sounds: the boys choose to momentarily forego the eloquence of language in favor of guttural 
utterance, a willing sacrifice toward their efforts for cross-species play. The representation of 
these events in the poems nestles these events squarely between the sensual (animal) and formal 
(rational) modes of the imagination and they have a spontaneous quality. Clare’s passage in 
particular seems to erupt out of sheer impulse and joy. Both cases seem to be without aim, an 
important quality of play. But that spontaneity and lack of direction are called into question 
precisely because of its mimetic quality. The awkwardness of the phonetic passage in Clare 
reveals the adult’s inability to re-experience the natural sensuality of his boyhood, more than the 
joy or music of nightingale song. In Wordsworth, the perfection of the mimicry gives it by 
definition a direction or aim, as well as a chronological temporality— for one can only mimic 
what one has previously heard.    43
 Bird mimicry is a shrewd choice for a Romantic ars poetica: throughout the era poets 
deprecatingly compare their own art to that of the bird in song, which in turn symbolizes a 
mercurial and flighty muse [remember Coleridge’s nightingale, Shelley’s skylark and eagle, 
Keats’s nightingale and thrush (Doggett 554-61)]. Demonstrating a mode of composition that is 
relaxed, joyful, even effortless, the child and bird are opposed to a laboring poet, who chases a 
tantalizing but ever elusive muse. That this pursuit often also reveals distress about one’s 
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mortality—as with Keats’s “When I have fears that I may cease to be” or Shelley’s “fading coal” —
makes the child in particular doubly revered, if also envied.  Both Clare and Wordsworth’s 44
depictions are of a child whose experience of time is decidedly more ambiguous than the poet’s.  
While that quality is for Clare something to be forever mourned, the boy of Winander’s 
momentary suspension is the dramatic climax from which the poet demonstrates the 
ephemerality not only of the boy’s life, but also the stage of creativity which is expressed in his 
play. It is a striking move, and all the more so because of the eternal quality so often linked to 
the Romantic bird. The bird in flight is also one of aesthetic philosophy’s beloved symbols: the 
dove illustrates Kant’s point that it is a fallacy to believe that one might leave the world of air 
altogether, because they enjoy the freedom of flight [he compares this to Plato who, enjoying the 
freedom of human cognition, leaves ‘the world of sense’ (50)]. Music is especially kindred to the 
flight of birds in Shelling’s view: it frees itself of corporeality more than any other art “by being 
carried by invisible, almost spiritual wings” (117). As with today’s anthropologists, psychologists, 
and biologists, the aesthetic philosopher hoping to make sense of what exactly play is turns to 
animals to elucidate their thoughts. The entirety of the 27th letter in Schiller’s On The Aesthetic 
Education of Man is devoted to animal play, and the entire work, in fact, is interwoven with 
literal and metaphorical references to animal play. Schiller draws liberally from Kant’s Critique 
of Judgement, but his is still one of the first major works in the Western canon to offer a full 
meditation on the relationship between play, art, and moral feeling, and with an overwhelmingly 
affirmative perspective at that. It was centrally influential to Romantic attitudes toward play: 
eagerly read by Byron and Shelley, Coleridge translated much of Schiller’s work (his impact on 
the latter poet is apparent especially in Biographia Literaria as well as “Sonnet XV. To 
Schiller”).   Wordsworth was introduced to Schiller’s work through Coleridge, and it has been 45
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persuasively argued that Schiller’s maxim “May the poet compose from gentle and faraway 
recollection” became Wordsworth’s famous definition of poetry as the “spontaneous overflow of 
powerful feelings: it takes its origin from emotion recollected in tranquility” (Davies 234-35). 
Schiller’s spieltrieb or play drive is at the center of the aesthetic experience. Play is most simply 
defined as the ability to create without overdetermination. The pleasure we experience in the 
aesthetic moment comes from the play between our rational and sensual selves, and our 
anticipation of form.  He identifies prototypical examples of play in the animal world and—
especially important for our purposes—in man’s games with animals: the play impulse 
manifests in bull fights, horse races, gondola races, and animal baiting (107). Animals are 
embody play as the formless expression of superabundance and excess, as the play impulse only 
expresses itself in animals and man after basic human needs— food, shelter, and warmth, are 
met.  For this reason, play is best understood as the natural outgrowth of freedom and active 46
self-determination, a remarkably simple but important assertion: yet when man’s imagination is 
in a state of entirely formless play his imagination is still part of his animal or sensual state. This 
stage may indicate freedom from external sensuous needs but it fails to demonstrate creative 
independence. And this is where the aesthetic comes in: it is the artist’s ultimate responsibility 
to shepherd man from the sensual, to enable him to use form for generalizing from specific 
experience. It is the movement of play which takes us from the sensual to the formal, and 
ultimately into a moral condition. While the ability to play may lead to an abundance of 
creativity nature must be overpowered by art: this is how we discourage hedonism and vulgarity. 
As a symbol, man’s games with animals render especially apparent the intermediacy of play, 
with the human imagination on the precipice of being released from the formal into the 
aesthetic. The Romantic trope of children (and some adults) playfully mimicking animals, then, 
often symbolizes man’s evolution or devolution and/or moral/aesthetic to or from the irrational 
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or sensual. We see examples of each—aesthetic advancement and rational disintegration— in 
these two works.  
!
The Role of Mimesis and Repetition 
 For Clare the mimicry of animal sounds is a regression that reveals the speaker’s retreat 
into a fragmented internal state—man and boy, poet and laborer, creator and mimic. It is poor 
compensation for being so painfully ill at ease in the world. For Wordsworth mimicry is one 
stage in a trajectory toward the aesthetic condition. Neither case of mimicry is dialogic which, 
though seemingly paradoxical, is central to the type of mimesis which yields to the aesthetic. The 
seemingly paradoxical potential of mimesis-as-repetition is prioritized in both Schiller and 
Gadamer’s work. The essential cognitive response to imitation is the experience of recognition, 
Gadamer argues: one imitates not to be discovered but to acknowledge through representation 
what he knows to exist (112). This recognition-in-imitation must go beyond seeing the familiar 
in something, beyond mere repetition; for the aesthetic experience must be as illuminating as it 
is pleasurable (the relationship between repetition and pleasure also arises in Freud and 
Kierkegaard, as I will shortly discuss). Far from being an exact copy, artistic imitation reveals 
the essence of the thing itself, most commonly by exaggerating some elements.   When the 47
mimesis is a memory, the difference between repetition as copy versus as recognition is 
essentially that of repetition versus recollection— a central and pleasurable problem in 
philosophy and psychoanalysis.  Freud’s transference is a form of repetition: the resurfacing of 
feeling the patient once had with another authority figure in his/her life. “A kind of intermediary 
realm between illness and real life, through which the journey from the one of the other must be 
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made,” repetition brings the patient to the recollection of the trauma which is responsible for 
their symptoms (160-65).   Most usefully for our purposes, Freud sees the analyst’s purpose in 48
observing the patient’s repetition as to “at last (understand) that it is his way of 
remembering” (161, emphasis mine). To say that transference is necessary to turn repetition 
into recollection is to say, strangely, that a second repetition— the story told in analysis, the 
analytic relationship— is required to transform the memory of affection into recollection, which 
is the resurfacing of the original relationship for analysis. One finds a similar entanglement in 
Kierkegaard. In Repetition he recounts a friendship between himself and a young man who 
comes to him after falling deeply in love, then finding himself paralyzed by his memory of his 
love as she first was originally. Kierkegaard uses the example of the conflict to elucidate the 
difference between recollection and repetition and to to privilege the latter: rather than falling 
into a mature repetition of love the young man, plagued by recollection, is dissatisfied and his 
affair ceases to be fulfilling. At one point, in a digression, he describes returning to the theater 
for a farcical production which he had already seen. He is profoundly disappointed in small 
changes in the theater and production (a girl, some new pants), a problem he identifies as being 
one of having clearly and deeply recollected his previous experience. The young man who 
remembers the woman as she was rather than as she is, is himself stuck in an infant stage of 
love: repetition is by contrast “(the) beloved wife of whom one never wearies, for one becomes 
weary only of what is new” (132). What Kierkegaard experiences in repetition, however—the 
sensation of order and ease—comes from the subconscious memory or feeling or “presentiment” 
(one of several ways it is akin to Freudian transference). In this way, despite being less 
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sophisticated, recollection is necessary for the pleasure of repetition which he so values. He 
finally concludes that there is, after all, no repetition because everything is a variation on a 
recollection. By emphasizing that repetition is what allows us to live freely, Kierkegaard makes 
recollection an initiatory stage in which one can, if not mature or sophisticated enough, be 
trapped. Both Freud and Kierkegaard present recollection as something with the potential to be 
paradoxically original: the actual source of pleasure in repetition, or the second but unique 
articulation of affect in the transference. Likely because Kierkegaard's ideas stay within the 
realm of the ostensibly personal or philosophical— he is not writing of a technique to be put into 
practice—he ultimately acknowledges the futility of differentiating between the two. For Freud, 
in part because he is speaking relatively pragmatically, recollection and repetition can be 
usefully understood as meaningfully discrete.  
 The fascinating ambiguity appears again in Gadamer. His interest is always equally 
focused on the audience or recipient of the image as it is on the work itself: his or her experience 
of recognition is part of the co-creative play of the mimetic work of art. Because recognition is 
predicated on the work reproducing the essence of a thing rather than its exact copy, sheer 
repetition is opposed to what we might also call “recollection.” For when we imitate something 
we show the thing that we know to exist in the way we currently know it to exist. This is how we 
recognize the essence of the thing which in turn creates our affective response (25). He writes: 
 A child begins to play by imitation, affirming what he knows and affirming his own being 
 in the process. Also, when children enjoy dressing up, as Aristotle remarks, they are not  
 trying to hide themselves, pretending to be something else in order to be discovered and  
 recognized behind it; but, on the contrary, they intend a representation of such a kind  
 that only what is represented exists. The child wants at any cost to avoid being   
 discovered behind his disguise. He intends that what he represents should exist, and if  
 something is to be guessed, then this is it. We are supposed to recognize what it “is.” (18) !
If we see something as familiar, as something that we already have knowledge of, we will not 
comprehend recognition at its deepest, profoundest level [“we do not understand what 
recognition is in its profoundest nature” (13)]. Imitation must “bring forth” by omitting that 
which is unnecessary and exaggerating central elements: it is necessarily revelatory and a 
natural tendency in play, so that “The structure of play absorbs the player into itself, and thus 
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frees him from the burden of taking the initiative, which constitutes the actual strain of 
existence. This is also seen in the spontaneous tendency to repetition that emerges in the player 
and in the constant self-renewal of play, which affects its form (e.g., the refrain)” (105).  Because 
he sees the aesthetic as mutually constitutive, object and spectator are never complete without 
the other. Though they maintain their separate ontological status, placed together in the 
aesthetic event they become part of an ongoing, participatory game. The “primacy of the play” is 
more important than the subjectivity of the viewer or the originality or separateness of the work: 
the work itself is “the playing of it,” the spectator and object both altered through the aesthetic 
event. For this reason all artistic mimesis is already creation: he quotes Schlegel that “All the 
sacred games of art are only remote imitations of the infinite play of the world, the eternally self-
creating work of art" (qtd. in Gadamer, 105). Finally, while Gadamer makes use of Schiller’s 
spieltrieb or playdrive to articulate the centrality of movement which occurs in play, part of his 
project is to free the view of art from subjectivity, which he sees as the fatal flaw in Schiller and 
Kant’s theory of the aesthetic. Rather than focusing on beauty or morality Gadamer’s focus is on 
the mode of the aesthetic experience itself, a variable and never ending thing (Gill 4-5, 13).  
In both Wordsworth and Clare the primary mimicry between the boy and nature becomes a 
striking, melancholic symbol for the loss of play and intimacy with nature, but only through the 
extension of the second mimicry of the poem itself. I read these scenes through the lens of 
mimicry as a dialogue or movement within the aesthetic, and the relationship of that mimicry to 
child’s play. The recounting of each story deep in midst of a lengthy verse about the 
development of poetic skill is itself far from the spontaneous play which Gadamer privileges 
(114). And rather than presenting us with a binary which would require, for example, a 
renunciation of the sensual world in order to embrace form, Schiller is clear that one cannot 
exchange one for the other. He must contain all within himself in an interplay closely akin to 
Gadamer’s own theory.  Schiller argues that while the origin of the sensual is unpredictable it is 
form—the antithesis of spontaneity—that allows man to liberate himself from the relaxed, 
associative, free movement of play [this concept recurs in the play theory of art, as I discuss 
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elsewhere, which  stipulates that play’s spontaneous, undirected quality distinguishes it from 
art-making (Dissanayanke 212)].  49
 Any mimesis which succeeds in becoming the aesthetic does so through the subtle and 
implicit conversations it makes between the original and its iteration. The owl’s hoot, the 
nightingale’s twitters: these are sounds for children to repeat, these poems tell us. The mimicry 
of the children in these poems is presumably play: their sounds, the echoes, and the response of 
the birds are all part of what appears a ludic scene. In Clare this original play is always mourned, 
whereas in Wordsworth it is indicative of the immature and unformed imagination. By pairing 
the symbol of the bird with the child in play, both poets harness a readily available trope in the 
cultural consciousness.  The second mimicry, the poem itself, is compromised by the hazards of 
memory, the limitations of translation, and the poet’s need to assess or create a meaning for play 
in the child’s experience and within the context of the poem. When Clare’s adult speaker 
attempts to make use of the sound or the story, it is the seduction of repetition which Plato 
warned us about; the speaker falls prey to it, which leads to his tragic end. In the case of the boy 
of Winander, the poet’s voice emerges triumphant from the interplay between sensual and 
formal, having gained in the recounting of a child’s repetition the reassertion of his own 
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gesture a graceful and harmonious miming speech” (213). The playdrive, embodied in the birds, 
lies in the “becomes” of the first clause. After the sensual and before the formal and rational, 
after the animal and before the citizen, is a cacophonic spell that somehow, very gradually, 
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 I am reminded of another ars poetica with birds, many years later. Howard Nemerov’s 50
“Because you asked about the line between prose and poetry,” demonstrates the fortitude and 
flexibility of flight-as-ars-poetica. It reads, in its entirety:  !
Sparrows were feeding in a freezing drizzle 
That while you watched turned to pieces of snow  
Riding a gradient invisible 
From silver aslant to random, white, and slow. !
There came a moment that you couldn’t tell. 
And then they clearly flew instead of fell.
originality and the artistic vitality of strong intellect and a rational mind.   Meanwhile the death 50
of the boy of Winander is needed for Wordsworth’s cool triumph.   
  
Heteroglossia into Monologue 
 Comparing these poems one first sees a case of dialogic mimicry writ large: "The 
Progress of Ryhme" appears to be modeled on Wordsworth’s “There was a boy.” We know that 
Clare was given a copy of the four volume collected edition of Wordsworth’s Miscellaneous 
Poems by his father in 1822, and that it included “There was a boy.” He was already familiar 
with Wordsworth, especially through the Lyrical Ballads, and Clare writes about the poems he 
encountered in his 1820 correspondence.   Both it and “Boy of Winander” attempt to track the 51
development of the poetic mind, and though Clare’s 346 - line poem does so more modestly, 
various thematic and linguistic similarities are apparent. Written sometime between 1830 - 
1835, Clare’s titling of the poem demonstrates his learnedness and familiarity with literary 
gestures during the time; so-called “progress pieces” were a small genre which flourished in the 
18th century and waned slowly in the 19th, with topics shifting from the sociopolitical to more 
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esoteric or philosophical.  Both poems use the imitation of birdsong as a central metaphor for 52
original, natural poetic inspiration; certain overlaps of diction also indicate the influence of 
“There was a boy” on Clare: for example, the young speaker who "paused to answer" the birds 
echoes the boy of Winander’s efforts to get the owls to “answer him.” Importantly, the line “The 
boy stopt sudden on the brig” (l. 252) is jarring as a sudden switch to third person, a change that 
makes the passage more closely mirror “There was a boy,” while also accentuating the speaker’s 
progressive disorientation. And a sudden silence—”all was still / A minute— when a wilder 
strain / Made boys and woods to pause again” closely mirrors the “chance” or “surprize” of the 
owls’ silence (l. 404-07), though the woods are similarly arrested, the moment has much less 
significance and does not lead to the apprehension of the sublime.   
 While a reading of "The Progress of Ryhme" as Clare's rewriting of "There was a boy” is 
long overdue, this essay notes the context primarily to demonstrate that the echoes of 
Wordsworth in the Clare poem are no accident; my reading is more dependent on the important 
differences between the two texts, despite their clearly overlapping frames. In keeping with 
Clare’s resistance to representing the poetic self through potentially exploited abject figures, the 
boy is the speaker as a child rather than a separate character. This, along with the surprising 
address to a female companion at the poem’s conclusion, make this poem actually more akin in 
sentiment to “Tintern Abbey.” And unlike the boy of Winander’s perfect mimicry of the owls, the 
adult speaker in “Progress of Ryhme” emphasizes his lack of skill. In one of many overlaps of 
diction, the speaker describes his boyhood efforts as “mock(ing) the birds with artless skill” (l. 
216); this is reminiscent of the “pauses of deep silence” that mocked the boy of Winander’s 
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“skill” (l. 405)]. This seemingly slight alteration in the use of the word “mock” has in fact 
tremendous implications: the owls’ silence as mockery seems a rebuff, or even reprimand, to the 
boy’s play. The mockery in Clare’s piece, coming as it does from the boy himself, actually 
emphasizes the generosity of nature’s observation of his efforts, and the adult speaker’s present 
humility. In general the adult speaker’s conflicted subjectivity infiltrates the memory of the 
child’s play much more obviously than in “Boy of Winander”; his insecurities are sharply 
contrasted with the carefree boy he depicts, and he alternates between describing his early 
creations as flawed originals or harmonious copies of the natural environment. And the 
narrative structure of Clare’s work is, in some crucial ways, the reverse of Wordsworth’s famous 
piece: the boy’s fearful experience of what seems the sublime, as I later discuss, preempts his 
birdsong mimicry, not the other way around. This moment of ecstasy and fright— “I used to rove 
/ Thro...the darksome grove / Of limes,” experiencing a burning vision of the “song sublime 
beneath” his breast—is autogenous rather than an expression of divine nature. But generally I 
consciously avoid a reading of Clare as the “Wordsworthian shadow,” though I do note those 
instances where he borrows most liberally.  John Goodridge’s recent book John Clare and 53
Community criticizes at some length the tendency to read “poor Clare” primarily through his 
biography or through his references to other poets, demonstrating how much of import is 
excised from such an approach (23). By smoothing over the many deviations from Wordsworth’s 
text in “The Progress of Ryhme” we would once again underestimate or oversimplify the 
idiosyncrasies of his aesthetic or the ways his political and social challenges manifest in his 
poetry.  
 A related trope which resurfaces in Clare criticism is the idea that the poet’s depiction of 
nature is more simple, literal, concrete, or more vitally and personally relevant, than that of the 
“major Romantics.” While for Keats and Shelley, for example, the bird is a complex symbol “of 
unknown modes of being, suggestive of an ‘unpremeditated art’ or ‘harmony’ or ‘ease’ one might 
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go in quest of, could one only escape the supposed limits of human life.... in Clare the bird does 
not transfigure into a mystery. It remains stubbornly bird-like” (Swingle 274-76).   This 54
supposedly stubborn, earthy quality, that inflexibility of song which will not be figurative, is a 
commonplace observation of Clare’s readership typically attributed to his especially intimate 
relationship to his Helpston home. He was exiled from it due to British enclosure laws, making 
childhood far from Clare’s only mourned finite resource. As Alan Vardy writes, “Unlike 
Wordsworth, whose elegies most often construct his poetic sensibility as their ultimate product, 
Clare does not have the luxury of distanced sympathy. Rather, he finds himself among the 
natural objects under threat” (156).  The truth is that Clare’s representation of nature does in 55
fact fail at that “distanced sympathy” which is arguably necessary to turn the natural object into 
a metaphor for poetic use. His deviation from that pattern in “The Progress of Ryhme” makes it 
an especially startling poem worthy of our attention. Rather than pointing to the degradation of 
his environment, for example, or depicting an idealized memory of Helpston, nature is the 
vehicle through which he represents a deep existential crisis of feeling caused primarily by the 
social world—not of politics or enclosure, but of poetry and romance. In the poem’s conclusion 
the speaker explicitly states that all that has come before—his vivid detailing of his experiences 
as a child in nature, and the entirety of his poetic attempts in those early days— were actually 
reflections and homages to his lover Mary. The end feels like a confession because this tragic 
and bare declaration is one of sorts: “But I mistook in early days / The world—and so our hopes 
decay” (l.344).  
 The speaker’s mistake has been foreshadowed by his attempt to repeat a long past, 
harmonious, playful mimicry into the fundamentally metaphorical system that is language. By 
turning what is play into what is “work” (the rest of the poem will make readily apparent the 
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nature of the poet’s labour, and what it costs him) he forfeits the essence of that original, playful 
moment that lies, in part, in its spontaneity. The reduction of childhood play to the poet’s 
dramatic monologue is an Edenic loss: it reveals the devastation of the professionalization of a 
personal art, and the failure of language to liberate creative memory. The original mimicry is a 
nearly ideal example of the work of art being in what Gadamer would call “the playing of it,” or 
existing in the space between the composition and the audience. Nature is responsive, 
encouraging, and empathetic to his creative efforts, and it and the young are in constant 
dialogue. He is able to elicit a response from “the bird in glee” who “Seemed pleased and paused 
to answer me” (l. 227-28). A storm arrives; its sound rings over the sound of his own labour and 
his soul responds in kind: he “joined the chorus till the storm / Fell all unheeded void of 
harm” (l. 164-65). “No matter how the world approved / Twas nature listened,” he tells us, and 
so even when he “mock(s) the birds with artless skill” (l. 216), blowing a note through a blade of 
grass, the muses are pleased with him. These lines subtly reveal how  his utterance hovers 
between mimicry and composition: “I caught with eager ear the strain/And sung the music oer 
again” (l. 139-40). Later he tells us “And then I hummed the words again / Till fancy pictured 
standing bye / My hearts companion poesy” (l. 262-64, emphasis mine). The phonetic passage 
begins much like the boy of Winander, in its way:  
 And nightingales O I have stood 
 Beside the pingle and the wood 
 And oer the old oak railing hung 
 To listen every note they sung 
 ...The more I listened and the more 
 Each note seemed sweeter than before (l. 229-36) !
Standing there, engrossed in aviary song, this could very well be our boy of Winander, who is 
also shown as having “hung / listening,” (l. 406-07), suspended physically and psychically by the 
environment.  But what comes after is, of course, very different. The song of the birds which he 56
repeats in “Chew-chew,” “Cheer-up,” “Woo-it woo-it” is most significant for its otherworldliness. 
Between the phonetic bursts, the speaker again and again emphasizes the strangeness of this 
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scene: the notes go “higher still,” become “more loud and shrill,” then “dropt / Low... and stopt,” 
(l. 239-43), and soon even “stranger witching notes... // As if it was a stranger bird” (l. 245-46). 
The song is with each sound “ever new,” so that he asks “could this be her”? (l.248). He even 
begins to wonder whether they are indeed birds at all (switching from singular to plural, “Could 
they be birds that sung so well / I thought” (l. 258-59). We must recall here that eventually (as I 
will shortly explore) the speaker admits that all the images in nature are variations of his 
beloved, Mary; the strangeness of the bird is especially tragic in this context. But the passage is 
most interesting because it tries to represent a cacophony of different voices—or rather, the 
multiplicity of the bird’s own voice, which stands now for song and poetry, and now for Mary, 
and now a friend, a balm, a harp, etc. Its eerie quality is predicated on how constantly in 
movement the notes are and this variability is a social something, a metaphorical something.  
 Perhaps it is too banal to say that poetry is by contrast a very solitary (or stodgy) affair. 
Still, it is the move from aural to written that catalyzes the speaker’s isolation and it intensifies 
his yearning for a more friendly past. To say so reminds one of Bakhtin’s flattening assertion 
that “the ethical forms of dialogic encounter and exchange” that are apparent in the novel are 
impossible in poetry for there, “even discourse about doubts must be cast in a discourse that 
cannot be doubted” (286). Yet as Mara Scanlon rebuts, those lyrics that include a multiplication 
of voices such as we see in Clare, and those forms that draw on the tradition of call-and-
response, are just two ways that poetry does demand an ethical encounter with an answerable 
reader (2). Thus while the passage describes a heteroglossic original mimicry, its repetition as 
phonetic sound occludes joy by being so obviously of the poet’s singular voice.  Indeed, the 57
speaker prefaces the passage of phonetic transcription with a few lines on the impossibility of 
the whole endeavor by saying each note is more beautiful than the last: “And aye so different 
was the strain / Shed scarce repeat the note again” (l.235 - 38). There is necessarily a decreasing 
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 I cannot find it in myself to generally agree with Bakhtin’s assertion that “The poet is not able 57
to oppose his own poetic consciousness, his own intentions the language that he uses.” 
Fortunately, he adds: “This is not to mean, of course, that heteroglossia or even a foreign 
language is completely shut out of a poetic work” (286).
accuracy and efficacy of a sound repeated too often; maybe a perfect copy of the sound is 
actually entirely beyond the point.  
 For the adult Clare, this heteroglossic mimicry is haunting, an ever-present infinitization 
of remembered mirrors which disorient him in the real world; his attempt to recall it through 
phonetic speech within the poem separates our speaker even more sharply from the spontaneity 
of the original play. By drawing on a variety of sources for his inspiration and including many 
natural voices (however falteringly), the boy’s composition demonstrates the warmth, 
playfulness, and mutuality. The jarring switch to the third person at the height of the speaker 
jarringly refers to himself as a boy in the third person immediately after the phonetic passage 
only confirms the speaker’s alienation (l. 252); before it returns to the “I”, the speaker states  
“Words were not left to hum the spell,” indicating to the reader that when the speaker later 
replicates the song his tools are imperfect (when “musics self had left the sky” “I hummed the 
words again”). Some have read this section as a success for the poet in his ability to make “new 
words,” a positive transformation of the non-linguistic into the poetic. In this passage, they 
argue, onomatopoeia becomes a way to unite the sound of nature with human language, in 
hopes that it will affect the reader so that they are as ecstatic as they would be in nature, were 
they overhearing the music as it happened. But this new “sound” is altogether different: “The 
reward reaped from a process Clare tells us began in imitation is thus a poetics that... remakes 
nature's music according to the musicality not of the nightingale or the thrush but of the 
poet” (Weiner, “Listening with John Clare,” 384). Others have read the scene—more 
persuasively, in my view— as a symbolic rendering of the failure of language. Richard Cronin 
argues that while the passage "looks like a proto-modernist experiment" it in fact expresses 
nostalgia for his naive belief in the ability to use language to "fully (assimilate)... birdsong." 
Jonathan Bate agrees, arguing that the passage of onomatopoeic mimicry is “nonsense that 
reveals the insufficiency of language to convey the ‘poesy’ that Clare found in the fields” (qtd. in 
Weiner, “Listening,” 384-85). The integration of onomatopoeic words into rhymed iambic 
couplets indicates the translation of nature’s music into a human language is an impossibility, a 
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failure, or a sign of the poet’s exile from his home. In other words, the phonetic speech 
emblematizes an estrangement from which he cannot recover.  
 Central to his disappointment is the impossibility of representing spontaneity in 
language. The words are offered in replacement for the sound that has been lost, but that sound 
is characterized by the surprise the poet felt while hearing and attempting to repeat it and by its 
very unpredictability. Perhaps the failure is simply because artistic “articulate spontaneity” is 
only possible if it occurs without “recognizable figuration” or “the diversion of referent”(Gosetti-
Ferencei 215). But while we tend to think of spontaneity as being an unexpected moment in 
time, it is also a matter of cognition: the unexpected is possible only when something deviates 
from what the observer expects; and a repetition of a memory is not that. One might argue that a 
repetition can never be spontaneous, but as I hope to have shown, there is mimesis and then 
there is aesthetic or dialogic mimesis. If spontaneity is a central quality of play, a related 
attribute is that play is nonteleological; one doesn’t play in anticipation of a goal which would 
bring the dance that is play to an end.   Declining to significantly distinguish between games 58
and play Gadamer writes: “games are not presented for anyone—i.e., they are not aimed at an 
audience. Children play for themselves, even when they represent (108, emphasis mine). The 
presence of birds in the child’s play in “The Progress of Ryhme” is a happy accident of audience; 
the adult poet is putting the memory to use for the benefit of his reader. In may also be to enact 
the Freudian repetition which spurs recollection, with the reader as recipient of the 
transference. But by placing the iteration in narrative it lacks the element we expect of the 
analytic environment and which only speech offers: that which is free, undetermined, 
associative. The repetition is also incomplete without the adequate presence of the analyst that 
accompanies the analytic environment, and the blank page and silent reader stand in stark 
contrast to the pastoral, Edenic setting and the sympathetic twittering bird.  
 Lacan emphasizes the sense that one is being mirrored and yet mirroring, both reciting 
and creating; this vacillation and ambiguity results in the instability of that apprehended 
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maturation of power. Ultimately, the fragmentation of the self is the core of this instability—the 
I as both social and spectral, both contained / confined in the realm of “reality” which it 
constructs (Lacan 2-3). It is a violent fragmentation and one I see in “The Progress of Ryhme.” 
The speaker’s self is fragmented into pieces after the illusion of having mastered verse, and the 
violence he does to language and memory is a transgression against himself. It is an act of 
omniscience, bringing the destruction of an idyllic memory, and thus a part of the self, while 
demonstrating the hopelessness of poetry. The apocalyptic element is well within the context of 
Clare’s vision of nature, which includes the inflexibility of its violence. Swingle points out the 
many ways that Clare depicts the violence of nature, the vast interplay of survival and 
destruction that he sees in a colony of ants, the “butchering” of a moth, or in the boy who 
pursues the fox cubs, who chases blackbirds, who vault after the butterfly in “The Vixen.”  His 59
fascinating conclusion is that, while the Wordsworth of “Nutting” must tie natural imagery to a 
human viewpoint, Clare seeks to stake a claim within the tense exchange of man and nature but 
to do so without ego; to be, in short, “like God” (Swingle 282-83).  There is a sense of 60
inevitability to this effort, just as there is in nature. As Swingle writes: 
 Saints become the Sinners, and the ultimate effect of the poetic experience is to lead  
 us to abandon our own coloring efforts, and accept instead those non-judgmental  
 colorings of the poetry’s shifting surface. We are encouraged, finally, to embrace a  
 sort of  kaleidoscopic experience, in which we appreciate the aesthetics of interaction  
 and shifting conflicts instead of identifying with one element or another... drawn into  
 the conflict as vicarious participants and suffering the anxieties the conflict produces  
 (282). !
Having warmly reassured the poet of the correctness of his choice of vocation, the birds 
disappear, and what comes after it is terrible shame and distress. Though the spontaneous event 
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 Swingle quotes from a passage entitled “On Ants” in Clare’s “Nature Notes”: “I once when 59
sitting at my dinner hour in the fields seeing a colony of red pismires near one of the black ones 
tryd the experiment to see wether they would associate with each other... (one) curld up & dyd at 
his feet I then put a red one to the colony of the blacks which they instantly seized & tho he 
generaly contrived to escape he appeared to be terribly wounded & no doubt was a cripple for 
life” (Prose 201).
 In opposing Clare and Wordsworth’s birds, Swingle omits the latter’s “The Redbreast Chasing 60
the Butterfly,” in which the poet laments the aggression of the bird who seeks to destroy the 
insect: “O pious Bird! whom man loves best, / Love him, or leave him alone!” (perhaps because 
of its obvious political symbolism). 
of the poem initially appears to be his reliving of his boyhood song—the reader is certainly 
surprised by the repetitious, nonsensical, phonetic play—what it ironically foreshadows is the 
end of responsiveness within nature to his compositions, the rupture of the speaker’s own mind, 
and subsequent confusion of past and present self. Increasingly destabilized, he becomes more 
and more distanced from nature, the social world, poetry— even his (deceased) lover Mary. The 
playful mimicry leads the poet to his tragic monologue, veiled as it is in simple repetition. 
!
Repetition and Lyric !
          O BLITHE New-comer! I have heard, 
          I hear thee and rejoice. 
          O Cuckoo! shall I call thee Bird, 
          Or but a wandering Voice? !
          While I am lying on the grass 
         I hear thy restless shout: 
          From hill to hill it seems to pass, 
         About, and all about! (l. 1-8)  61!!
Wordsworthian birds are a diverse bunch, as likely to be sinister or evaluative of the poet’s song 
as to serve as muse [see “The Sparrow’s Nest” (1807), “The Cuckoo and the Nightingale” (1842) 
for examples of the latter]. In “The Poet and the Caged Turtledove” (1835) the bird is placed in a 
position of judgement over the poet and his engagement (or lack thereof) with his environment. 
“O Nightingale! Thou surely art” (1807) appears initially to celebrate the era’s favorite bird, but 
its activity while humanity sleeps is rather dubious: “A song in mockery and despite / Of shades, 
and dews, and silent night” (Randel 50). Even the owls in the “Boy of Winander” are not the first 
sign of aviary foreboding in The Prelude: as has been previously noted, the passage closely 
parallels another in Book One when the speaker recalls hanging above a raven’s nest as a child to 
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Stephen Gill. Oxford: Oxford World’s Classics, 2000: 245.
steal the eggs.   What is remarkable about the cuckoo in the above passage is not its gorgeous 62
song but its ability to be at once everywhere and nowhere—an “invisible Thing,” “a voice, a 
mystery” (l.15-16). Wordsworth’s birds have a special skill with throwing their voice (or song), a 
quality which is frequently linked to their ability to seem to be suspended in all places and all 
times; they work well as a symbol for that is eternal and ephemeral all at once. No less with this 
bird: it inhabits the present, but initiates in the poet powerful visions of the past and future, 
inhabiting as it does the “vale / Of visionary hours” (l. 11-12). It even brings the poet to “beget / 
That golden time again” (l. 27-28). The cuckoo’s doubled (an early version describes it as 
“twofold”) song is infectious, and the poet’s tense proves sympathetic to its collapsing of past 
and present: “I have heard, / I hear thee.”  
 The boy of Winander passage offers yet another variation on the theme of bird as 
mercurial muse. It is apparent that we are to read this scene as paralleling in some way the 
spontaneous creativity we expect of our poet. A central ambition of The Prelude is to trace the 
development of a child’s creative harmony with nature through its manifestation in poetic skill, 
and Wordsworth’s progress through his life-in-verse is a movement from past to present self, 
child to adult, playful into formal. In this scene, the boy’s playful performance appears to be one 
of spontaneity and harmony, if not explicit collaboration, with his environment. His mimicry is 
described in ways that call on prayer, as others have noted, with “fingers interwoven, both 
hands... Pressed closely palm to palm.” But the actual sound comes from him “as through an 
instrument...// That they might answer him”; the allusion to music making aligns him more 
closely with the poet than with the devout. And the owls’ sudden, “deep silence mock(s)” not his 
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Nineteenth-Century English Literature 27.1 (1985): 7 - 8. Mudge and De Man both write of the 
obvious parallels between the scene and that of the boy of Winander. The speaker in the earlier 
passage recalls being a boy on a ridge, which will be echoed in Winander’s cliffs; and as the lake 
reflects the sky in latter scene, so this early passage includes what “(seems) not a sky / Of earth.” 
An important difference, of course, is that only the wind speaks a “strange utterance”— the 
speaker does not mimic the sounds around him. It is as though even in his memory of his own 
childhood, the speaker cannot portray himself as in playful concert with nature, but rather only 
as an adult observing its mystery from an estranged, albeit poetic, point of view. For 
Wordsworth, play, like nature, is only possible to depict as a stage on the way to art.
play but “his skill” (l. 395-405), a word that connotes vocation and training. Finally, the boy’s 
repetition is what leads to the owls’ silence and then the sublime vision, the experience of which 
is the impetus for so much Romantic poetry. The scene, then, makes the boy more akin to a 
shepherd or poet than a pious adolescent; if intended to be the latter, his expectation of 
response would surely indicate a more presumptuous pride than is borne out by the rest.  
 This scene of the boy is quite jarringly placed, in the context of Book Five (on “Books”) 
and in the epic’s overall development. That Wordsworth revised the poem from first to third 
narration makes obvious he viewed the separation of narrator and boy as crucial to the poem’s 
success. If both are characterized through their creative constitution, how do we know the two 
are foils rather than parallels? Is the boy’s action even creativity? Isn’t it “just” play? To begin 
with the first matter, while it is true that the boy can be read as one of many abject figures 
appearing throughout The Prelude as projections of the speaker’s own self, reading the passage 
in this way precludes us from acknowledging the profundity of the distinction between the 
speaker and the boy (De Man 74). In fact, as is so often the case in the Lyrical Ballads, the 
reader is gently urged to be aware of the construction of the speaker’s account of the boy— most 
particularly as it relates to his experience of this event in time, as I will shortly discuss. In my 
view the speaker’s repetition of this story is an opportunity for him to demonstrate his own 
artistic triumph— to reveal the transition from play to art, as it were, before his reader’s very 
eyes. That the poet intends the death to be an opportunity for dominance has been previously 
argued in the wide expanse of Winander criticism; however, my focus is on understanding that 
move specifically through the role mimesis plays in the text.  It cannot be stressed enough, 63
however, that though opposed the two figures are not antithetical to one another—are not, for 
example, hero and anti-hero. The poet’s demonstration of worth through the boy’s death is not 
one of exultation, righteousness, or jubilation. In fact, the poet takes pains to show how his 
repetitive play unifies him with his environment. The boy’s mimicry of the owls is so accurate 
that it is unclear whether what is echoed is the boy’s voice, that of the owls, or yet another echo 
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of either. As with the young boy in Clare’s poem nature is “responsive,” answering, however 
eerily, with “long halloos, and screams, and echoes loud / Redoubled and redoubled” (l. 
402-03)]. Though the response is described as coming from the owls, the description of echoes 
makes clear his own calls must reverberate so that nature (“ye cliffs / And islands of Winander”) 
mimics the “original” sound of the owl calls and the boy’s mimicry, too. To complicate matters 
even further, in one sense the owls’ calls are actually not original, because they are a response. 
These various threads are a sort of sacred merging leading to the owl’s sudden, profound silence, 
which elicits his “gentle shock of mild surprize” and allows for the boy’s vision. The redoubling 
establishes the profundity of the indistinguishable in the poem: that the echoes cannot be 
discerned from the original sound that prompted them shows that his is a boundless if 
momentary concord, where mimicry and actual and child and nature are deeply in flux. At the 
same time the boy’s play happens within a suspension of time, a frame showing its 
transcendence. His play seems an example of the successive temporality which Schiller 
identified as linked to the formal: it erases temporal boundaries as well as those between 
species, self and other, even author and audience. Because his creation is generated alongside 
the inspiration that is its genesis—is before and after, specific and generalized, original and 
replica—it exhibits an absolute simultaneity and spontaneity. In his essay “‘Unrememberable’ 
Sound in Wordsworth's 1799 ‘Prelude,’" J. Mark Smith reminds us that Wordsworth was 
intrigued by the departed sound that has moved beyond conscious recollection, saying: “The 
heart of the paradox lies in the fact that the sentences of a poem are actually at odds with this 
pre-semantic ‘time’: for once possibility has been instantiated in, or ‘spread’ out into, sentences, 
it can no longer be a blank and unrememberable fullness” (503). 
 Because of the association of the boy with composition, we wonder whether his activity 
may be accurately deemed creative such as one would expect to find in art-making, or if it is 
“just” play. Of course the question hinges on one assuming a meaningful distinction between 
them, a matter about which I am still frankly mixed, if leaning toward the negative. But 
Wordsworth obviously had an altogether more stern view of the issue (as I explore in the 
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previous chapter). To start with the obvious, then: the child’s mimicry clearly leads to a unique 
revelation— he has some access to a unique experience that the adult poet does not, or does not 
presently, and that knowledge is revealed by his activity. What he offers is of course illusory: a 
fresh, ludic encounter with the natural world unmediated by the retrospective effect of the poet’s 
own education, socialization, poetics, or maturation. The child’s ability to easily move from the 
actual into the virtual has long been viewed as indicative of an easy (if unformed) penchant for 
the aesthetic (Gosetti-Ferencei 200). Here too, because he is a child and not ostensibly a 
representation of Wordsworth, the reader more easily slips into the experience as being one of 
unmitigated veracity; without our skepticism about the narrator’s self-critical, editing eye, the 
boy of Winander has the ring of truth. In this way it seems to be creative: it reveals something 
that creates an affective response, and does so through an uncanny exchange between two 
normally estranged languages. And, of course, Wordsworth’s painting of the scene lends it a 
striking and ethereal tint. But the boy’s mimicry cannot stand as an idealized, creative 
experience within nature, because the poet must demonstrate his aesthetic evolution and his 
personal chronology. And so the poet reinstates time, as we shall see. For though the adult poet 
evades the recreation of the child’s play (in the first person, for example), and cannot 
comprehend its atemporality, he can process it through the form that is human rationality and 
chronology.   
 Is it play? It certainly seems so, at least simply or traditionally understood. The unusual 
juxtaposition of animal sounds and a human voice, the spontaneity of it, the youth of the 
“player,” the call and response like a ball being batted back and forth—yet the only words 
connoting play are in those lines about the “concourse wild / Of mirth and jocund din.” In fact, 
the description of the scene suggests his alienation and a worrisome unpredictability. The owls 
are ominous, capricious, fickle, and capable of a mocking silence. When they do call back it is in 
shrill and frightening bursts: “with quivering peals / And long halloos, and screams, and echoes 
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loud” (Mudge 7-8).  In the strangest of ways the characterization of their call reminds one of 64
the Queens in Alice in Wonderland: their speech play is at once terrifying, even murderous, and 
yet delightfully effervescent. Perhaps one way to approach the contradictory representation of 
this call-and-response is to consider the element of spontaneity in play. Certainly Wordsworth 
encourages us to view the boy’s play as repetitive: it is temporally so, as he has done this before; 
and the mimicry itself is, as so precise a repetition, not exactly unpredictable. Yet the owls’ 
sudden silence is in fact spontaneous; if it were not, it would not give a “gentle shock.” That 
temporal pause lets the reader witness with the boy how the fantastical becomes something real
—his fantasy of unification with the owls is strangely externalized and validated by this internal 
receptivity. It is a merging central to the aesthetic experience and which we experience naturally 
as children (Gossetti-Ferencei 202). Kneale addresses this in his excellent reading of the poem, 
calling the mimicry a repetition-with-a-difference. He, too, concludes that the echoing of the owl 
calls is central to Wordsworth establishing of his poetic voice: 
 The conferring of speech on nature, anticipated in the personifying apostrophe to the  
 cliffs and islands, implies that the poet calls on these natural objects to have them testify, 
 to make them ‘responsive to his call’ or invocation. Reiterating this movement, the Boy  
 plays Narcissus to the owls’ Echo, giving them a voice but half their own. The poet,  
 through his poem, mutely ‘answers’ the Boy, whose hootings are now ‘the ghostly   
 language of the ancient earth’ (Prelude 2.309), de profundis. (27) !
Even the regularity of the boy’s visitations doesn’t keep the figure from appearing to be in this 
one instance within a spontaneous suspension of time. In fact, the depiction of time is markedly 
unsettled, to a large extent characterized as linear/chronological or cyclical/eternal depending 
on whether the reader is being asked to focus on the boy or the speaker. The speaker first 
identifies the time in which the boy would call to the owls as “at evening,” a pronouncement 
underscored by “when the stars had just begun.” The subsequent description of those stars as 
“rising or setting,” however, while perhaps literally pointing to the many instances in which the 
boy played this game, introduces an ambiguity. These equivocating phrases could be a way for 
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the the adult speaker to describe his own indeterminate view of time—that he himself sees the 
appearance and disappearance of stars as fluid—but such a reading is contradicted by his 
absence from the original scene of play, his initial description of the time as “evening,” his 
general emphasis on the boy’s atemporal experience, and the precision of his subsequent 
descriptions on matters of duration and time. At the same time the respective ages of our figures 
are called into attention; the speaker is “setting” in his age and wisdom, the young boy “rising.” 
In his solitary ability to mimic nature he apprehends and perhaps temporarily succeeds the 
arbitrariness of human time. Their positions will switch soon enough, a reality that further 
distinguishes them.  
 The adult speaker’s need to construct meaning from the boy’s play appears to place him 
at odds with the ludic freedom that the boy embodies—its “functionality” as a story within the 
poem is all the more apparent because its beginning and end are so arrant and abrupt. Gadamer 
insists on the nonteleological nature of play and the use of mimicry play for poetic purposes is 
what announces Clare’s tragic end. Yet it is precisely this quality that for Wordsworth makes the 
boy’s play an empty space within which his narrative can occupy. Fundamentally the boy’s play 
signifies an ambiguity of the creative impulse that is progressively destructive.  In the exchange 
of sounds which could be owl, or boy, or echo, or both; the confusion over what is real and what 
is pretend; and what the difference is at all and whether it matters— these are the questions 
sharply answered by the death of the child. It essentially leaves him in the limbo of the play 
drive, moving back and forth between sensuality and form, animal and rational, actor and 
audience. The adult poet’s transformation of that material into the aesthetic is totally dependent 
on the reinstatement of chronological narrative that the boy’s death allows. His triumph is his 
ability to create independently of nature’s echo: it is a transcendence, a radical if careful 
overthrow of the deification of the natural object (the birds who “mock” the boy’s call is in this 
context an apt projection of the Romantic poet’s anxieties, perhaps, about this act). But that 
move cannot be made without the reader affirming his spectatorship, and so the owls are 
silenced to make way for the voice of the sublime to enter the boy, and the death of the boy 
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allows the sublime poet’s voice to reach the new audience of the reader. As in Gadamer’s concept 
of the “event” of the aesthetic, our attention is requisite for the completion of his epic. He ends 
the boy’s sensual imitation in a work of art that is by contrast shaped in rationality, reason, and 
a sense of temporal succession, asserting the evolution of the adult poet over the innocence of 
childhood and even the experience of the sublime. In this way art is the only mimesis that is 
genuinely dialogic and lives on—the poet and reader continue in their eternal exchange.  
 In Book Three Wordsworth writes of the “pageant” that was his time at the university, 
which he experiences as carelessly and roaming as “through a wide museum,” casually picking 
up and examining this, then that object. That “pageant” is far from irrelevant: in fact, it might 
“well demand / A more substantial name, no mimic show / Itself a living part of a live whole” (l.
623-25). This seems an appropriate description for the boy of Winander: as with that scene the 
images of the pageant will be stored by the poet for later use. Though both scenes are of “an 
aching and a barren sense,” a melancholy without wisdom and without mature love, with both, 
“something to the memory sticks at last / Whence profit may be drawn in times to come” (l.
667-78). It is a type of idleness, this mimicry. And as that passage gives way to the narrative 
progress introduced by Book Four, so the boy of Winander demonstrates with his death the shift 
from playfulness into art-making: a shift, as Schiller always maintained, necessary to reach the 
aesthetic condition. It is partly his incorporation of the scene into a narrative that makes this 
achievement possible. That returns us to Plato and Bakhtin’s assertion that only narrative 
transforms the aesthetic into the ability to extrapolate from individual experience, which then in 
turn makes it ethical. In Wordsworth the exalted mimesis is one that shows his incorporation of 
nature’s song temporally and psychically, and his assertion of mastery as a rational and creative 
is far from mere repetition— if anything, it is actually a repression of lyricism.  65
Thus play with animal sounds is a way to portray a stage of pure sensual creativity; a play which 
morphs into the mature, rational, tempered, and heightened art of the poetic speaker.  
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 One is reminded of his assertion in the Preface of the Lyrical Ballads that “the language of 65
every good poem can in no respect differ from that of good Prose” (68).
Lost Mary and the Lost Boy 
 John Clare knew the difficulties of trying to translate his delight in nature through 
poetry, compounded as it was by his negotiations with the publishing world. The poem itself is 
bracketed by his distress in the human world, and poetry is initially set up as the antidote to that 
discomfort: as a day laborer, it was “poesy” that, like a friend or “parents first regard,” cheered 
him. When his master’s disapproval shamed him to tears, it was poetry which “check(ed)” its 
effects. Poetry is what keeps the boy from sighing at the world’s malice and allows him to ignore 
the insult or sneering of mean and vulgar men, and he believes that it is poetry that will be his 
balm until death (l. 14-30). His first attempts to write are marked by solitude and the fear of 
scorn by others. It is this aspect of “ryhme” that becomes the speaker’s focus after the phonetic 
birdsong passage—his social isolation after the insults and accusations of plagiarism by those he 
considered friends. Thus the blossoming of his self-identification as poet leads to tremendous 
disillusionment. Before that passage, he describes himself in more ambiguous terms: a “happy 
and lonely” boy (l. 222). But that same isolation is decidedly more pained after the seemingly 
jubilant “Cheer-up cheer-up” of birdsong; “The Progress of Ryhme” is nearly as much a progress 
of disappointment in humanity. He never really recovers, and his attempt to represent in writing 
a world of aural collaboration— in which human and animal voices are dynamic, alternately 
discrete and unified—is a doubled wound, illustrating the failure of language and the absence of 
Helpston’s kindly birds to play with.  
 There are political and economic underpinnings to this feeling of otherness, even as it 
manifests most basically with the poet’s sense of estrangement from language. By becoming a 
“professional” poet he is forced to bear witness to the radical editing of his own words:  
correspondence with his publisher John Taylor reveal their ongoing disagreements regarding 
his idiosyncratic punctuation, grammar and diction (Weiner, Clare’s Lyric, 25). Indeed, his 
defiant assertion that he has a “right” to a happiness stemming from the labour of poetry rather 
than agriculture reveals the extent to which becoming a poet was a form of rebellion (l.108). 
When the master shames him it is because sheep and horses who have strayed under his watch, 
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as though the very inability to corral animal life is an ongoing strife for our poet, one that will 
frequently result in humiliation (l. 21-22). Later when the speaker describes how poetry “hardly 
turned my sheepish eye / I worshiped yet could hardly dare,” (l. 52-53), the image again calls on 
the wandering sheep: poetry is a temptation from traditional and enclosing labor. It also subtly 
underlines how the day laborer felt he was property of his master). When he praises nature he 
will not relinquish its wildness but he emphasizes its communal qualities: weeds “(make) a 
garden free for all” (l. 86).  The poet’s education is often described in terms of cultivation of the 66
land: his “musings” are praised despite his own lack of “garden care” (l. 117). 
 As his poetry was more and more recognized, he gained friends. But the off-hand way in 
which he mentions those friends discounts the idea that he increases in happiness in sociability: 
“Twas then I found that friends indeed / Where needed when Id less to need” (l. 297-298) he 
says cryptically, after explaining how he was unexpectedly paid for poems. The subsequent 
accusations of plagiarism and false friendship he describes is especially devastating after this 
picture of a nature which, though perhaps sometimes violent, is decidedly without malice. The 
tone shifts into one of defense and protection: “My harp tho simple was my own” (l.133). While 
nature was his teacher if his poetry is dilute or temperate “Tis I not they who bear the blame” (l.
144). The speaker’s scope of interest begins to substantially include other men (and their less-
than-ideal traits); the slow-dawning understanding of his own potential triggers a recognition 
that there are other humans with whom he must interact, and not always happily. For it is only 
once the speaker “blossom(s)” into identifying with the role of poet that he experiences a 
revelation of self as subject, and he must then, and only then, delineate his own work from that 
of others. The explosion of his identification of self-as-poet [“just as a blossom bursts to bloom/
And finds its self in thorny ways” (l. 114 - 15)] is simultaneous with his pronouncement of so-
called “friends” as traitors and liars who claim his work for their own.  
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 He makes a point, however, that wildness is not a requisite for natural harmony: “As garden 66
flowers with all their care / For natures love is even there” (l. 102-03). Nature in any 
manifestation is full of maternal warmth. 
 The more discomfort he experiences in society, the more intense and dialogic his poetry 
becomes. It is described as the unconscious song of a dreaming bird; poesy is a magic “spell” and  
“(his) soul to its responses rung / And joined the chorus” of a storm. He takes shelter under a 
tree during this storm, and the tree becomes a palace within which he may safely compose.  We 
see elements of that shared composition I discussed earlier, but the mutuality dissipates into 
something fearsome. As the speaker’s focus on poetry is shifted to “beholding” the sublime: 
when an “ancient lime” becomes like a church (or grows into the roof of a church) we feel the 
sudden instability of the poet’s song manifest in his body, his gasping breath and beating heart. 
We might recall Clare’s assertion that “The fields were our church and we seemed to feel a 
religious feeling in our haunts on the sabbath”— the lime tree, which before was like a “princely 
pallace” and thus inhabitable by man, is now ominous, something which will “haunt” him on the 
sabbath (qtd. in Bate 29, l. 168). The vision grows in magnificence, awe-inspiring, until the poet 
awakes from the vision ready to write. And yet he doesn’t: a “gloom” spreads over him, and the 
urge to write is nearly smothered by a melancholy mood. The composition of verse has always 
been stifled by the speaker’s humiliation, so we are not entirely thrown. But what intense gloom 
it is! The aforementioned dreaming bird, a symbol of his poetry, finds itself in “thorny ways” not 
only because of others; it is also due to the fragmentation of the speaker’s own perspective. And 
his own biography isn’t what leads me here; it is omnipresent throughout the latter half of the 
poem.  The tragedy of Clare’s poem is not only the inability of language to accurately ascertain 
the memory or beauty it represents, nor the exile of the individual from nature, society, and his 
own childhood. It is also the poet’s use of nature as metaphor that is solely relevant in a social 
context rather than for its own sake. It is ironic: in a poem specifically about his development as 
a poet, he defies those future critics who see him as naive and literal especially when it comes to 
nature. His turn to the song of birds is a turn away from human speech, from meanness and 
vulgarity. The mattin, the sparrows— any utterance they make is a joyful song to dissipate the 
cloud of grief hanging over him, “shroud(ing)” hope (l. 160). And when we move into the 
phonetic passage, again and again the song is described in terms that place it antithetically to his 
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loneliness: “No friends had I to guide or aid,” no friend “but (his) own kin and poesy” (l. 
285-86).  
 The poem ends with a devastating lament for his lost love, Mary Joyce. He speaks 
directly to her, explaining that his passion for nature’s beauty was really because it inspired him 
to write poems about her. He begins: “And Mary thou whose very name / I loved whose look was 
even fame” (l. 321-22). The poem rapidly draws to a close with an examination of how her 
otherworldly beauty—the “fairy form” of Mary (l. 325)— was his inspiration. But aesthetic 
beauty and poetry progress in parallel paths and do not meet. Afraid to reveal his love to her “to 
them I talked aloud / And grew ambitious from the crowd” (l. 339-40) of flowers, and those who 
initially praised his work. What is doubly devastating about this end is his admittance that 
nature is all a metaphor for Mary. Even his own gentleness toward the landscape is because he 
sees in it his idol: 
 I saw thy blush and thought it love 
 And all ambitious thee to please 
 My heart was ever ill at ease 
 I saw thy beauty grow with days 
 And tryed song pictures in thy praise  
 And all of fair or beautiful 
 Where thine akin - nor could I pull 
 The blossoms that I thought divine 
 Lest I should injure aught of thine (l. 331-36) !
The ending of “The Progress of Rhyme” is a confession, an apology of sorts to his reader. When 
the harmony of nature was described as one of deep generosity and maternal care, so that the 
thirsty animals are “kindly” rained upon, and the flowers are smiled upon by the sun [“No 
matter how the world approved,” he tells us, “Twas nature listened” (l. 207-08)], we now 
understand it as an address to his idealized love. The love poem in the guise of an ars poetica 
feels duplicitous. After the frightening and overwhelming experience with the sublime, the 
speaker grows up: he moves from his reflective and harmonious play with nature into a world of 
social (dis)affection.  The poem narrates an individual who only understands his ambition to 
become a poet through the lens of his adoration of Mary. But the anticipation of success as a 
poet is complicated by the increasingly and inevitable reliance on others (critics, friends, editors, 
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and the like). The resulting, self-imposed isolation is parallel to the iconic trajectory of the infant 
who, after the jubilation of recognizing his own image in the mirror, must then understand that 
the “self-mastery” of that image is contingent upon separateness. Years removed from his 
childhood love affair with language, the poem ends with the message that human love and social 
acceptance are impossible as language fails him. Childhood, its remembrance and its play, are 
seen by the Romantics as a special gateway into the imagination. It is a powerful fixation and 
will be far-reaching in the Victorian era. But when an author attempts to so directly mimic 
childhood play, as Clare does, we see Plato’s warning come to pass: the excess of feeling 
destabilizes his psyche and compromises his ability to function within society. Because the 
mimicry is of his own previous mimicry, he deceives himself. By contrast, Wordsworth uses the 
narrative of a boy’s playful mimicry with the owls to show himself as being “of sheer 
language” (De Man, The Rhetoric of Romanticism, 18) as well as the extent of his poetic 
ambition. In considering the death of the boy of Winander let’s first turn to a brief excerpt from 
Clare’s prose on Wordsworth, in which he writes of his concern that Wordsworth (a poet who he 
sees as very worthy of praise) is not more popular. Finally he assures himself that “this lack of 
living praise is no proof of his lack of genius. The trumpeting clamour of public praise is not to 
be relied on as the creditor of the future. The quiet progress of a name gaining ground by gentle 
degrees in the world’s esteem is the best living shadow of fame to follow” (Life and Remains of 
John Clare 314).  
 We know now more than ever, of course, that “poor Clare” was very prescient indeed to 
have been so assured of Wordsworth’s own “progress of name.” That fame is due in no small 
part to the much celebrated passage of the boy of Winander. After the scene of the boy of 
Winander’s mimicry, which explodes into “redoubled and redoubled” echoes, the owls cease 
their call. The silence, and his eager anticipation of sound during it, makes him receptive enough 
for the sublime to enter his consciousness:  
 ... And when it chanced 
 That pauses of deep silence mocked his skill, 
 Then sometimes in that silence, while he hung 
 Listening, a gentle shock of mild surprize 
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 Has carried far into his heart the voice  
 Of mountain torrents; or the visible scene 
 Would enter unawares into his mind 
 With all its solemn imagery, its rocks,  
 Its woods, and that uncertain heaven, received 
 Into the bosom of the steady lake. (l. 379 - 88) !
Here the narrator shifts from describing what is actually observable into hypothesizing not only 
the boy’s subjectivity but, radically, his unconscious reception of imagery. The move is jarring 
enough that it urges our awareness of the fictitious quality of the account, even as it reifies the 
notion of the sublime, and it reminds us who is steering this ship, as it were: the owls and boy 
must now fall as silent as us. The lines also increasingly make apparent that the boy’s play is 
intended to be a metaphor for writing poetry—a change that occurs alongside an emphasis on 
his solitude, as the owls cease in their call-and-response play and fall silent. The easy, playful 
atmosphere gives way with the introduction of words suggesting art making: “skill,” “imagery,” 
“scene.” Gadamer argues that Huizinga’s most important contribution to play theory was his 
conjoining of animal and child’s play with “holy play,” as being ultimately an acknowledgement 
of the vital indecisiveness of one’s consciousness when at play. The “uncertain heaven” that is 
“received/Into the bosom of the lake”— which is taken into, or becomes, the heart of the lake— 
shows us that when we are playing we never know what is believable and what is not, for in play 
“the difference between belief and pretense is dissolved” (qtd. in Gadamer 109). Earlier the boy’s 
reverberated play collapsed author, responder, and audience into an ambiguous cacophony of 
echoes. Now the boy’s singularity is something to contend with, or else it makes him vulnerable. 
In the speaker’s confident hands the setting moves from relational and fluid— from “knowing 
well” the boy, with stars which rise or set, to formidable and dignified: “with all its solemn 
imagery, its rocks,” “Into the bosom of the steady lake.” Whereas earlier nature joined in on the 
game through its echoes, it is now evaluative, offering what seems almost a reprimand 
(“mocked”).  
 Lionel Trilling reads this turn as preserving the boy’s mystic suspension in nature;  
Mudge sees the exchange of silences here—the boy sudden silence with the poet’s, standing by 
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his graveside—as essentially a “usurpation.” For Wordsworth survives: “The speaking poet 
evidences the ability to move through that silence as the trauma of both past and present is 
paradoxically alleviated by a return to the original scene.... belatedness here operates as a 
distinct advantage, once again stabilizing the narrative by providing the poet with a borrowed 
legitimacy” (Trilling 125-26, Mudge 8-9).  I agree with Mudge’s assessment: belatedness is, for 67
Wordsworth, a stabilizing and legitimating force. This is one reason why spontaneous play in 
Wordsworth is so often a transgressive, destabilizing, and unformed stage that the poet must 
overcome. While the ambiguous temporality and unifying chorus that initially defines the boy’s 
mimicry may remind the poet of his mortal and artistic limitations, its status as repetition rather 
than recollection or creation forces its surrender. At no point is the poet himself caught 
unaware, as we see in the rather blasé way he passes over the fact of the boy’s death. He makes 
the spontaneity, he is not subject to it. Having invoked the reader’s awe with this vivid scene the 
poet plucks the first, then second figure from the cliffs upon which they play, leaving only the 
“uncertain heaven” reflected in the lake. The narrative choice is made all the more strange 
because we expect the boy’s seemingly extemporaneous play to be idealized by our speaker: the 
boy communicates with nature in a unifying, overlapping interplay until he receives a startlingly 
profound vision. But the poet insists we see nature as the boy’s audience, not as his muse or lyric 
match (that is for the poet). The silence is a strong rejection, so that the owls are not so much a 
playmate that suddenly won’t play—after all, the mimicry is not dialogic but pure repetition—but 
an audience who, without warning, spins on its heel and exits the theater.  
 Perhaps this is a sheepish expression of the poet’s fears —a jolting rejection that will 
prefigure his death as the boy’s mimicry prefigured his own. After all, recollecting one’s life in 
epic verse already intimates an ominous awareness of mortality; what would it mean for the 
"96
 Barbara Johnson also views the death of the boy as a manifestation of the epitaph which 67
demonstrates the poet’s power. See “Toys R Us” in Persons and Things. Cambridge: Harvard 
UP, 2008: 10-11.
reader to refuse to read on?  But lest we become too fixated on the silence or death, the poet (as 68
Mudge argues) firmly takes over, standing over his grave, ruminating. The conclusion of the 
scene shows the poet reorienting us within the limitations of human time. We shift from this 
temporary, ephemeral scene of “rising or setting” into one in which time is certain [the passage 
is populated with words marking time (“evening”, “oftentimes” and “erewhile,” “A full half-hour 
together I have stood / Mute”) (l. 396-97)]. In an early draft of his essay on the boy of Winander, 
De Man wrote the following sentence and later crossed it out: “Being the father of man, the child 
stands closer to death than we do.” What he does include is this: in Wordsworth, 
 evocations of natural, childlike, or apocalyptic states of unity with nature often   
 acquire the curiously barren, dead-obsessed emptiness of non-being. The poetic   
 imagination... realizes this and thus encompasses source and death, origin and end  
 within the space of its language, by means of complex temporal structurizations of  
 which we found an example in “The Winander Boy” (“Time and History” 274). !
Wordsworth eliminates the birds and then the boy to establish the originality of his voice.  De 
Man finally returns to Hartman’s account of the poem: “that when Wordsworth speaks about 
the daring of his imagery... this risk involves more than mere experimentation with words. 
Hartman refers to this danger as an apocalyptic temptation, in his words, ‘a strong desire to cast 
out nature and to achieve an unmediated contact with the principle of things’” (278-79).  Like 69
Kneale, I read the boy’s death as the restoration of the poet. The manifestation of language into 
structure is something that reveals our “true being,” our “origin and end”: these matters would 
otherwise continue to be reticent of representation and withdrawn (Gadamer 110-12). And so 
the adult speaker’s transformation of the mimicry into poetic structure is his triumph. 
Wordsworth’s poem “To the Cuckoo” concludes thus: 
          O blessed Bird! the earth we pace 
          Again appears to be                                          
          An unsubstantial, faery place; 
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 De Man argues “The objectification of the past self, as that of a consciousness that unwittingly 68
experiences an anticipation of its own death, allows him to reflect on an event that is, in fact, 
unimaginable. For this is the real terror of death, that it lies truly beyond the reach of 
reflection” (“Time and History” 272).
 See Geoffrey H. Hartman, Wordsworth’s Poetry, 1787-1814. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1987: 69
xxvii. 
          That is fit home for Thee! (l. 29-32) 
                                     
Earth has the appearance of being an “unsubstantial, faery place”— in actuality it is far from 
that, and this is something that poetry, as the imposition of form and rationality on the play 
impulse, allows him to apprehend. Wordsworth takes pains to create the illusion of temporal 
complexity in the boy of Winander passage: why? To, as De Man argues, “(demand) the 
description of a future experience by means of the fiction of a past experience which is itself 
anticipatory or prefigurative” (272)? Maybe the temporality of the poem is more simple than it 
appears: a depiction of the way we experience time as children versus as adults. Feeling the 
center of everything, the actor on central stage or in play forgets the existence of time altogether. 
This is one reason why the village church is personified as forgetful of the boy’s death, and the 
death of all those in her graveyard. She is preoccupied listening to the transitory—already as 
“withered leaves in winds” —”gladsome sounds” of the “race of real children” who play in her 
churchyard. She does so not because they are innocent, pious, or transcendent: they are “mad at 
their sports,” “wanton, fresh, / And bandied up and down by love and hate,” “doing wrong and 
suffering” (l. 427-41). Rather, her preoccupation of the living children urges us, as the poet 
cannot, to accept the boy’s death as part of the natural trajectory of play. The illusion of a 
suspension of time is what allows Wordsworth to aestheticize the boy’s mimicry as more than 
simple repetition, demonstrating his own poetic skill and making his sudden disappearance an 
all the more striking declaration of the poet’s dominance. 
!
At Last the Spectator !
 Jonathan Bate writes of Clare that “... he frequently imagined childhood as a kind of 
Eden, but the point about Eden is that those who write about it have been expelled from it” (19). 
We might read Clare’s speaker’s childhood harmony with the Helpston landscape as a moment 
of doomed glory that the adult speaker elegizes with his delayed mimicry. While the poem 
ostensibly sets out to track a simple and lonely working boy’s turn to poetry for respite, its 
concerns enlarge to eventually encompass how the poet expresses his adoration of his lover 
through the natural world, how we first apprehend our own identity by recording and playing 
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within our vocation, and how seeing oneself reflected in nature is quite different from 
understanding oneself through the eyes of others. The end of the poem reveals a speaker who 
must surrender the point that the very poetic language so desperately coveted as a child is 
flawed, and by so doing he lays bare the weakness of his own idealized childhood. In social and 
aesthetic contexts, the speaker’s attempt at mastery is enabled and hindered by his ever 
imperfect tool: words. For Clare the only connection there can be between child play and adult 
lyric is that an inability to play gives rise to poetry mourning its loss: he makes his home not in 
the natural, poetic, or human world but in the space between articulation and inarticulation, 
fragmentation and totality. If in Clare’s poem the tragedy is linked to the use of nature as 
metaphor not for poetic composition but for social relationships, then in Wordsworth his 
triumph is in the incorporation of a scene of mimesis in his own mimetic art. “Boy of Winander” 
ends with an awkward transition back to the subject that preceded it: the speaker wishes aloud 
that children will learn not through schoolteachers but through books and nature. This will 
result, he hopes, in “knowledge, rightly honored with that name - / Knowledge not purchased 
with the loss of power!” (l. 424-25). It is an acknowledgment of all that is lost in the shift from 
youthful ecstasy to mature and tempered aesthetic, and what he has worked shown here: a 
wisdom come not in spite of but because of the relinquishing of youthful intimacy with nature. 
Wordsworth’s art is one that needs, requires, expects, a spectator. De Man also notes that the 
specific time, the “curiously exact full half-hour that becomes available to (the poet), is a purely 
meditative time proportionate to the time it takes us to understand meditatively WW’s own 
poem” (9). In this I see Wordsworth’s success:  
 Even a play remains a game—i.e., it has the structure of a game, which is that of a closed  
 world. But however much a religious or profane play represents a world wholly closed  
 within itself, it is as if open toward the spectator, in whom it achieves its whole   
 significance.... In fact, it is experienced properly by, and presents itself (as it is "meant")  
 to, one who is not acting in the play but watching it. In him the game is raised, as it were, 
 to its ideality (Gadamer 114). !
Gadamer’s primary point is that the subjectivity of the player is less relevant than Kant and 
Schiller admit; rather, as “the work of art has its true being in the fact that it becomes an 
experience that changes the person who experiences it,” so is this true with play. Play indicates 
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at a primordial level what is medial, what is happening, what is going on (something is “playing” 
at such and such a time) (104). Comparing “Nutting” to “The Woodman” Swingle writes that the 
boy in both poems experience a feeling of pain. He continues, “But Clare is not Wordsworth.  
Clare’s whole endeavor is to prevent the tension from being resolved. Wordsworth has been 
termed the spectator ab extra. But Clare lays a more valid claim to that title. Wordsworth is 
profoundly ad hominem, ultimately, as are all the major Romantics” (283). The inability or 
unwillingness to liberate his speaker from the nostalgia of childhood, and subsequently from an 
intermediate space between past and present, creative and failed mimesis, is where the tragedy 
of Clare’s poem lies. Plato would describe Clare as the “writer of tragedies,” an imitator who is 
“two removes from the king and the truth” (316-17). By contrast, Wordsworth would be the 
better artist: 
 If he really knew about the things he imitates, I imagine, he’d be much keener on action  
 than on imitation of it. He’d try to leave many fine actions as memorials to himself, and  
 be much more interested in having poetry written in honour of him than in writing  
 poetry in honour of others (318). !
It would be an unfair and inflammatory assessment, but I point it out to show the Platonic 
nature of Wordsworth’s piece and the devastation of Clare’s work. Language and mimicry are 
veils in “The Progress of Ryhme,” whereas in Wordsworth’s the mimicry is a sort of unveiling of 
the boy’s unification with the environment and later, the poet’s more enduring aesthetic. And 
Clare’s veiling is linked to the speaker’s distrust of humanity. Consider again Gadamer’s 
assertion that the aesthetic is mutually constitutive, that it is an event through which both artist 
and spectator are forever altered. Clare’s estrangement from society alienates him from his 
spectator as his use of nature for metaphorical lover’s ends estranges him from the birdsong. 
What Wordsworth manages so well is to demonstrate that the failure of sheer repetition, though 
lovely and affecting, is due to the unification of sounds. Sheer repetition makes it impossible to 
differentiate speaker from listener, and fundamentally elides that spontaneous element which is 
central to all true play. Repetition or mimesis which erupts from a genuinely spontaneous play is 
of a different character than that of Clare’s adult narrator or Wordsworth’s boy. As 
Nachmanovitz writes, “we can be thrilled by the beauty of a child’s spontaneous play and 
"100
fantasy, but if we ask the child to repeat the same sequence when the relatives come over, we 
have a horse of a very different color— and a double bind for the child” (10). Wordsworth’s 
reimposition of temporality onto the scene at the graveyard reinstates the respective roles of 
























“Incessantly Beneath (our) Gaze”:  
The Spectacle of Vain Rousseau !
  That (the child) do or undo is a matter of no importance; it suffices  
  that he change the condition of things, and every change is an action.  
  If he seems to have more of an inclination to destroy, it is not from  
  wickedness but because the action which gives shape is always slow  
  and the action which destroys, being more rapid, fits his vivacity better.   70!
  Although in certain respects I have been a man since birth, I was for  
  a long time, and still am, a child in many others. I never promised to  
  present the public with a great personage. I promised to depict myself 
   as I am.....I should like in some way to make my soul transparent to the   
  reader’s eye, and for that purpose I am trying ... to contrive that none  
  of its movements shall escape his notice.  71!
I. Rousseau in the English Public Imagination 
In 1816 Coleridge wrote a piece for The Statesmen’s Manual condemning the “French wisdom” 
which inspired Jacobinism. Its “nature of rapacity, levity, ferocity, and presumption” turns into 
a “prurient, bustling, and revolutionary” spirit. The result, he warns, “is heartless frivolity 
alternating with a sentimentality as heartless... a neglect of moral self-discipline and deadening 
of the religious sense.”  The statement is one of many by Romantic authors which referenced 72
Rousseau in spirit but not in name, using him to typify the worst aspects of French character. 
The English response to Rousseau vacillated from the dismissive—in which he was an author of 
mere “romances,” with a lively imagination and childish temperament— to fearsome, a 
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 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile, or On Education. Trans. Allan Bloom. New York: Basic Books, 70
Inc. 1979: 67.
 Ibid, Confessions. Trans. by J. M. Cohen. London: Penguin Books, 1953: 169.71
 From Collected Works of Coleridge, Lay Sermons, ed. R.J. White, 6: 74-77. Qtd. in Duffy 72
66-67. Duffy later adds that “these general condemnations of Jacobinism in the Statesman's 
Manual are to be compared with a letter of Coleridge's, written two years later and containing, 
as his last extended reference to Rousseau, the insistence to a conservative friend that he had 
been a mocking critic of Rousseau for no less than two decades” (Collected Letters, 4: 880). He 
continues, “The moral is clear; Coleridge’s Rousseau is the staple of caricature, the natural man 
down on all fours but still driven by vanity; to follow him is to let things go to the devil. 
Coleridge certainly believes this in 1818; he protests rather too much that he already believed it 
in 1797” (165-66).
dangerously manipulative figure whose vanity reached catastrophic proportions, becoming the 
winds that spurred on the disastrous, bloody Revolution.  
 The English reception of Rousseau’s work in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries reflects their ambivalence about the role of the imagination in moral education, and 
the public perception of Rousseau paralleled his discussion of the forming of character, 
temperament, and the imagination in his novel Emile, or On Education (1762). In fact to 
understand the influence of Emile on English perceptions of the child’s imagination, one must 
first understand the public spectacle that was Rousseau. The widespread influence of Emile 
coincided with a shift in English public opinion about its author: Rousseau’s vanity and 
megalomania were at first read as the natural outgrowth of a fundamentally innocent, 
nondestructive, childlike personality. At times his obliviousness was even interpreted as naiveté 
revealing the extent of his genius: “It is not Voltaire's Candide, but Rousseau's Jean-Jacques, 
who presents the most accurate pattern of the naive in world literature” (McFarland 58). In 
February 1762 a reviewer in the Critical Review described Rousseau this way: “we conclude with 
regarding the author as a prodigy of genius, misled and infatuated by caprice and the affectation 
of peculiarity.”16 Eventually, however, these same traits were interpreted by English society as 
deeply disturbing, and Rousseau becomes a deeply disturbed sensualist indulging a need for 
spectacle, who thrusts himself into the public eye and flagrantly ignores the rules of social 
decorum. What this evolution reveals is the way in which English society in the eighteenth 
century wrung their hands over matters of the “immature”: should one celebrate free play, or 
work to repress its urges as inappropriate?  Are we to draw inspiration from the tendency of 
children toward fantasy and fancy, or redirect it as dangerously quixotic? 
 Edward Duffy’s study Rousseau in England: The Context for Shelley’s Critique of the 
Enlightenment remains the most thoroughly researched exploration of the influence of 
Rousseau on English society, and I find myself heavily relying on it in the first half of this 
chapter. I am indebted to his hard work and research, which turns to the Critical Review, 
London Chronicle, the Annual Register, the Analytical Review and other periodicals to 
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establish what the literary reception was of Rousseau’s works and how they were influenced by 
widespread assessments of the author’s character. Another indispensable text is Thomas 
McFarland’s Romanticism and the Heritage of Rousseau. Both authors paint the following 
picture, more or less: at the beginning of the 1760s, the English viewed Rousseau with a 
lukewarm sense of his complexity but couldn’t be troubled to think further about the matter. 
Most were rather content to waver between dismissal and favor of his work (McFarland 16). 
Some considered him as limited to the genre of romance: the London Chronicle confidently 
asserted that Rousseau was so distracted by his own “irregular fancy and a proud spirit of 
misanthropy” that his “performances” would never be appropriate to the upper classes. He 
would “never...succeed in any undertaking which requires sound judgment and an accurate 
spirit of investigation.  The denigration of his work was overwhelmingly linked to his 73
immaturity, so that the reading public’s response tended to be that of an exasperated parent or 
an indulgent aunt. Midway through 1763 and before the peak of public derision Samuel Johnson 
wrote the following: 
Rousseau, and all those who deal in paradoxes, are led away by a childish desire of 
novelty. When I was a boy, I used always to choose the wrong side of a debate, because 
most ingenious things, that is to say, most new things, could be said upon it.   74!
This public characterization of his childish impetuosity reveals more than what we typically 
expect of insult. For the English literate classes, Rousseau was either a child endeared by the 
dazzling brightness of his own intellect, erroneously believing that whatever was novel was true; 
or he was devious, working to con favor through his strange, elaborate tall tales. In the case of 
the latter the “enchantment of (his) words” was a dazzling cosmetic to cover up the sinful nature 
of his opinions (Duffy 19). In the case of the former, less ominous characterization, Rousseau’s 
intellect and often paradoxical ideas are ridiculed. The Critical Review’s observation of Emile 
was thus: 
"104
 London Chronicle 12 (26-28 February 1762): 204. Qtd. in Duffy 19.73
 Boswell, Life of Johnson, 1: 441. Qtd. in Duffy 19. 74
Mr. Rousseau can handle the most beaten topic with novelty, and throw new light on 
subjects which have been thought exhausted. As if he enjoyed a peculiar sensation, every 
object strikes his mind in a very uncommon manner, and hence it is possible that his 
writings will be admired as the effusions of genius, while his precepts will be neglected as 
the effects of caprice and affectation.   75!
By the time Rousseau came to London on January 13, 1766 he was quite a celebrity, and was 
lavishly courted by cabinet ministers, the owners of wealthy country estates, “a legion of nobles, 
members of Parliament... the director of the reading room at the British museum,” and 
“Chevalier’ d’Eon, the former soldier, spy, and representative of the French court in 
England” (Zaretsky and Scott 115-123). King George III offered him a pension of one hundred 
pounds per year. When his dog Sultan was lost in the city, it was reported in the papers (118). 
Attending a production on Drury Lane, it was Rousseau’s presence which became the show 
rather than the stage, or even the king and queen in attendance. In fact even they looked more at 
Rousseau, observed Hume, than at the production. The wife of famous actor David Garrick later 
reported that “the recluse philosopher was so very anxious to display himself, and hung so 
forward over the front of the box, that she was obliged to hold him by the skirt of his coat, he 
might not fall into the pit.”  Hume rather jealously remarked of the public’s “great interest in 76
M. Rousseau; and though we are now in the hottest time of our hottest factions, he is not forgot” 
(115). 
 Those works of Rousseau that fall outside the realm of political philosophy were widely 
read, a fact which has been somewhat lost by contemporary focus on the Discourses— The 
Social Contract was far less widely reviewed than Emile and other fictional or nonfiction texts; 
this was especially true in England (22). Julie, or The New Heloise was published in English 
nearly immediately after its debut in Amsterdam, and it helped establish Rousseau as a 
sentimental novelist— a man with a passion for the morally beautiful. In 1759 Lettre a 
d’Alembert sur les spectacles (Letter to M. D’Alembert on Spectacles) was reviewed by the 
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London Chronicle, the Monthly Review, the Critical Review, the London Magazine, and Burke’s 
Annual Register (in fact that year the Annual Register reviewed only six books, of which it was 
one). Rousseau’s ambivalent text on the theater, combined with his Discourses and Julie, or The 
New Heloise gave the English the impression that Rousseau was a moralizing, rigid man with a 
vision of austerity “pushed to an unsociable fierceness.”  He was a man with a middle class 77
imagination and without the Parisian sophistication they craved (11-12). When Emile first 
appeared in England in 1762, then, it was received by an English populace well familiar with  
Rousseau and his work. Initially many saw Emile as another relatively benign text detailing the 
subtle pleasures and values of middle class life—the London Chronicle used the first book to 
encourage mothers to nurse their children and the romantic relationship between Emile and 
Sophie was emphasized in the English title Emilius and Sophia; or a New System of Education.  
 Reviews of his work increasingly emphasized the frivolity and childishness of the 
language with both author and work guilty of deceitful affectations. Even if Rousseau’s work is 
read as erupting from a child’s spirit— impulsive, drawn to devil’s advocacy, rebellion, and 
paradox— this in no way undermined a very real fear about the dangerous impact of his work.  
In fact, the two viewpoints were intimately related. In Emile the relationship between vanity, 
childishness, and destruction was perplexing: though the text professes to be about the ethical 
righteousness of educating the child according to his own nature much of Emile shows the 
child's imaginative play as savage and destructive. The imagination must be guided out of this 
stage in order to shape the sensibility and prepare it for citizenship. At the very time of its 
publication Rousseau's own impulsive vanity was inextricably tied in the public eye to the 
question of the boundaries— or lack thereof—of his imagination and self-interest, with the result 
that his works were also seen as terribly destructive. This overlap reveals the extent to which the 
British public turned the play of the child and literature about the education of the child into a 
spectacle with meaning far beyond the maturation of imagination. Rousseau was a man driven 
mad by vanity: a reputation which ironically coincided with Emile, a text which identifies vanity 
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as the one folly of man which cannot be undone (Emile 245). In fact, the narrator warns that in 
socializing young men one must take care to protect them not from sensuality but from vanity, 
because "amour-propre produces more libertines than love does" (311)]. These criticisms 
conflate the faults of Rousseau’s vanity with that of a child “captivated by the bright lights of his 
own rhetoric and mistaking for the truth anything that was capable of forceful and original 
expression”:  
... he entertained no principle, either to influence his heart or to guide his understanding, 
but vanity. With this vice he was possessed to a degree little short of madness. It is from 
this same deranged, eccentric vanity, that this, the insane Socrates of the National 
Assembly, was impelled to publish a mad confession of his mad faults, and to attempt a 
new sort of glory from bringing hardily to light the most obscure and vulgar (174). !
That response was colored by the European reaction to the Savoyard Vicar as a scandalous 
denunciation of traditional church doctrine—the Monthly Review noted the “extraordinary” and 
“severe treatment” of it abroad).  The shift from viewing the author as naive to seeing him as a 78
tempestuous idealogue was also caused by Edmund Burke’s scathing review of Emile and its 
author. The novel, Burke exclaimed, was not only "impracticable and chimerical" but also 
positively “dangerous."  In Duffy’s view this is the turning point for the reception of Rousseau’s 79
work in the English press, which increasingly moves from a vague appreciation to distaste for 
his ideologies and skepticism about the soundness of his mind (17-18). His personal 
eccentricities had begun to haunt him: the first controversies attached to Rousseau would not be 
due to “The Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar” in Emile nor to the radical ideas of the 
Social Contract, but rather his personality (Duffy 19-22). Hume concluded that Rousseau, who 
confused his friends by alternating between sociability and reclusiveness, was “a man flayed 
alive, thrown into the recoiling confusion and beauty of our world, deprived of the protective 
layers of education and etiquette, objectivity and distance, that society wrapped around the rest 
of us” (Zaretsky and Scott 136). The discord between Rousseau and Hume that increasingly held 
the public’s interest furthered the view that he was, if not mad, then certainly a quarrelsome 
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eccentric. His paranoia became increasingly notorious: his sudden flight from England, spurred 
on by a conviction that he was under siege, was widely publicized as was his appeal to the 
Chancellor of England for assistance. “And so England,” concludes Duffy, “long the distant 
spectator of Rousseau the eloquent writer, became the theater for the last and noisiest outburst 
of Rousseau the paranoid. Occurring in complete view of the public and at a time when 
Rousseau was frantic, the affair left the English with a sharp and intimate impression of 
Rousseau's madness” (26).  
 The vanity that Rousseau became famous for reached beyond himself: he typified 
something in the English cultural consciousness that was already worrisome. When Burke called 
Rousseau “the great professor and founder of the philosophy of vanity in England” (174) it was 
in part out of fear of the connection between vanity and fantasy in the public eye, and how this 
madness may lead to destructive political notions. Rousseau’s work was perhaps a mirror for 
what was mad in society itself: collapsed into a sin of deceit and egomania, “the show of tender 
and equalizing sensibility; the reality of selfish and tyrannical indulgence; the consequences of 
personal madness and public carnage” (51). By the 1790s, the deceased Rousseau was little more 
than a scapegoat for the tragedy of the French Revolution. As a consequence the kindest reviews 
of Rousseau’s work are those which follow the tradition of the philosopher as “a specimen of 
abnormal psychology”: the Critical Review concluded that if Rousseau’s work had any utility at 
all it was to entertain men who enjoy observing a capricious mind at work.  As one reviewer 80
wrote:  
 In a word, we see a performance, every paragraph of which contradicts the plainest  
 maxims of common sense... and we conclude with regarding the author as a prodigy of  
 genius, misled and infatuated by caprice and the affectation of peculiarity.  81!
Relatedly, as the public became increasingly convinced of the extent of Rousseau’s mad egotism 
it is more frequently described in genetic or corporeal terms, with the accompanying potential 
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for contagion.  Hazlitt described Rousseau’s “craving after excitement (as) an appetite and a 82
disease” so that what genius he possessed was solely “the effect of his temperament” (88-89). A 
more generous view by “Citizen Corancez” depicted a Rousseau driven to madness by the 
public’s assault on his character but only because his mind was already suffering from “the 
smouldering elements of distemper” (62). In The Friend, in 1809, Coleridge wrote: 
But the strange influences of his bodily temperament on his understanding; his 
constitutional Melancholy pampered into a morbid excess by solitude; ... these, or at 
least the predisposition to them, existed in the ground-work of his Nature: they were 
parts of Rousseau himself.  83!
For his part, Rousseau had professed to accept in advance a reception to Emile that 
fundamentally misunderstood both its aim and import, saying that he cared not if men took it to 
be only a novel when it ought to be a history of his species (Emile 3). His statement proved 
prescient: though he was increasingly portrayed as a sort of willful, confusing 18th century 
performance artist, Emile was influential to aesthetic philosophers including Kant and Schiller. 
The latter’s contribution to aesthetic criticism and play theory, On the Aesthetic Education of 
Man, was inspired by the novel. The former’s assessment was that “it is the work which attempts 
to reconcile nature with history, man’s selfish nature with the demands of civil society, hence, 
inclination with duty” (Bloom, “The Education of Democratic Man: Emile” 88). If Emile’s 
“Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar” and the frenetic, painful escapades of its author were 
the source of controversy, the novel was still deeply admired. 
!
Rousseau’s Influence on the Romantics 
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The locating of Rousseau’s vanity in his body points to yet another contradiction in the public’s 82
view of his persona. Was Rousseau simply another “unfortunate children of temperament, who 
mistake the fretful irritability of their nerves as a yearning of soul”? Or was he to be pathologized 
as a delusive paranoiac? Diagnosing Rousseau is a project which continues on well into the 19th 
century. See “The Insanity of Jean Jacques Rousseau” by William Noyes, M.D., in The American 
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It has often been said that Rousseau’s Confessions, published first in 1782, was the most 
important single text in the advent of Romanticism. It is a valid enough assertion considering its 
widespread dissemination in the European reading public. Irving Babbitt identifies Rousseau as 
“the most significant figure” if not the originator of “emotional romanticism” (257); several 
decades later De Man states that “the affinity of later poets with Rousseau... can well be 
considered to be a valid definition of romanticism as a whole” (10). The Confessions has all the 
central tenets of Romanticism: the rejection of the city and society; the prioritization of 
individual sentiment over rationality; heightened, even epiphanic emotion; and the celebration 
of seclusion in nature. It is Rousseau who demonstrated the utility of viscerally minute self-
exploration. Rousseau’s radical egotism in the Confessions and later his Reveries forcefully 
ruptured the moralizing Christian self-abnegation which had long reigned in European, and 
especially English, art and literature. McFarland notes how difficult it is, indeed, to imagine De 
Quincey’s Confessions of an English Opium Eater, Lamb’s Confessions of a Drunkard, Hazlitt’s 
Liber Amoris, or Wordsworth’s The Prelude without Rousseau’s astonishing work (50-52). The 
Confessions was published in two installments: the first six books in 1782 and the second six in 
1789. Until the latter date, the memoir as it was known to the English public ended with the 
youthful Rousseau many years away from the political writings which would make him and his 
moral righteousness famous (Duffy 33). The immediate reaction was thus a rejection of its very 
salacious contents. Even worse than the scenes of sexual perversion, hypocrisy, and 
transgression contained in the Confessions was Rousseau’s declaration of his own self-
importance and genius which revealed him to be  
a man whose vanity and presumption so imposed on his understanding, as to lead him to 
imagine that mankind would lend a ready ear to the most trifling, to the most dull, to the 
most impertinent, to the most disgusting relations, because they concerned ROUSSEAU! 
that they would examine every folly, and forgive every fault, because they were the follies 
and faults of the incomparable Author of Emilius and Eloisa.   84!
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It was especially horrifying for the public to read of Rousseau’s desire to be spanked like a child, 
or his early penchant for thievery and public masturbation, as he was known as the author of a 
novel about the ideal education of children.  
 The notoriety of the Confessions became a central motivation for Romantic writers to 
explicitly deny the author’s influence on their own aesthetic, even when his influence is readily 
apparent. But he is never absent from their writings: Coleridge wrote "crazy ROUSSEAU... the 
Spinner of speculative Cobwebs... quick-eared for every whisper of the public opinion; the 
Teacher of stoic Pride in his Principles, yet the Victim of morbid vanity in his Feelings and 
Conduct!"  Stanzas 76-84 of Byron’s Childe Harold offer a portrait of Rousseau which, in just 85
seven stanzas, includes the words “vanity, sophistry, self-pity, emotional masochism, eloquence, 
verbal wizardry, sensibility, idealism, sensuality, paranoia, insanity, social and political 
revolution, and selfishness"  Mary Wollstonecraft had the conflicted response to Emile that we 86
might expect, finding his ideas about man’s nature rather on point though she objected to his 
depiction of women. Her Original Stories from Real Life with Conversations Calculated to 
Regulate the Affections, and Form the Mind to Truth and Goodness, often misidentified as a 
work of children’s literature, is an educational text in direct affinity with Emile. It largely 
reiterates Rousseau’s notion that the ideal education of the child is one which follows his or her 
own natural inclinations. Most revealingly, it replicates an underlying trope of Emile in which 
children are savage creatures who must be tamed and protected from themselves. More 
famously Wollstonecraft published her Vindication as a rebuttal to Emile's system of women’s 
education, and her response was doubtless informed by the sexualization of women in the 
Confessions (Duffy 49). In fact, she is likely the author of this Analytical Review piece:  
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 Duffy continues to say that Byron's portrait does indeed direct a good deal of personal 86
criticism at the “‘self-torturing sophist, wild Rousseau.’ The fictional Harold is himself one such 
lair for the cleansing passion epitomized by Rousseau. So too, perhaps, is the real Byron. 
Although he denied it, the apparent similarity between Byron and Rousseau was an assertion 
repeatedly made in the English press. Blackwood's called him a ‘patrician Rousseau. The 
Longan Magazine called them twin masters of a ‘minute moral anatomy’ of the self” (73 - 74). 
(Rousseau’s) most enthusiastic admirers must allow that his imagination was sometimes 
rampant, and breaking loose from his judgment, sketched some alluring pictures, whose 
colouring was more natural, than chaste, yet over which, with the felicity of genius, he 
has thrown those voluptuous shades, that, by setting the fancy to work, prove a 
dangerous snare, when the hot blood dances in the veins.  87!
Her future son-in-law ultimately viewed Rousseau with more unequivocal favor, and his work 
was a tremendous influence on Percy Shelley. Initially his view was in keeping with the time: 
vaguely scornful and dismissive with a tint of humor. In a letter to T.J. Hogg written in 1810 he 
references the Confessions, saying that they are “the only thing of the kind that have appeared, & 
they are either a disgrace to the confessor or a string of falsehoods, probably the latter.” But by 
1814 he had read Reveries of a Solitary Walker and given Claire Clairmont the job of translating 
from it (93). Two footnotes with amiable references to the first book of Emile on the matters of 
vegetarianism and breastfeeding appear in “Queen Mab”(1813), and Mary wrote that “Hymn to 
Intellectual Beauty” (1816) was inspired by Shelley’s fascination with La Nouvelle Heloise (94, 
102).  Shelley’s change of heart is made most apparent after 1815, in his assertion that 88
Rousseau is “essentially a poet”; by 1816 he had quite made up his mind and wrote that 
"Rousseau is indeed in my mind the greatest man the world has produced since Milton.”  By 89
1821, the time of Shelley's "Defence of Poetry,” Rousseau was a "[poet] who had celebrated the 
dominion of love, planting as it were trophies in the human mind of that sublimest victory over 
sensuality and force" (99). Claiming Rousseau once again for the ranks of the poet, his portrayal 
in “Triumph of Life” (1821) is equivocal: a symbol of the world divided “between the divine 
poetry of love, and the self-centered humans chosen to be its vehicle” (104-05).  
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 French and American scholars have remarked upon the supposed similarity between the 88
protagonist of Shelley’s “Alastor: The Spirit of Solitude” and the character of Rousseau as he was 
perceived by the English reading public. Duffy contests this point, saying that Shelley’s 
Rousseau of “The Triumph of Life” is significantly more developed, a hero undone by his own 
egomania, than the more ambivalent figure he held in mind during the composition of “Alastor.” 
He concludes that it was only after 1816 that Shelley began to fully view Rousseau as a “visionary 
poet” (94).
 Shelley, Letters, Ed. Jones, 1: 84 and 2: 278. Qtd. in Duffy 87, 98. 89
 It isn’t difficult to understand Shelley’s feeling of kinship with Rousseau: both writers 
foregrounded the role of sentiment and emotion over reason. Wordsworth and Coleridge were 
significantly more affected by Burke’s damning assessment of Rousseau: the two poets iterated 
his assessment even as their letters, library records and own published works reflect the 
influence of Rousseau’s thought (Duffy 53). Coleridge’s opinion on Rousseau was more 
ambivalent than Wordsworth’s and he described himself as “never more than a very lukewarm 
admirer” of the idealistic Rousseau, though he was “better-hearted” than Voltaire.  His ideas 90
were terribly destructive— Rousseau was lucky to die before having seen “a tenth part of the 
miserable effects of his doctrines.” Rousseau and Voltaire become for Coleridge the very reason 
for the “Democratic phrensy, the uncontained and destructive revolutionary energy so feared by 
Kant in the Anthropology, and Coleridge saw it as his personal mission to prevent England from 
such devastating philosophical and political confusion” (Schlutz 249). But there is ambiguity in 
his depiction of Rousseau. For instance Coleridge frequently compared him to Martin Luther, a 
figure he much admired (McFarland 38). Wordsworth viewed Rousseau's egotism and radical 
confessionalism as entirely odious while he also availed himself of many of the moves which 
Rousseau made. Duncan Wu’s study identifies evidence for Wordsworth’s reading of Emile, the 
Discourses on Equality, and the Social Contract by 1799, and the likelihood of him having also 
read the Confessions by that date, of which he had a copy in his library, is extremely high (52). 
Wordsworth agreed with conservative opinion that the French philosopher was largely 
responsible for inciting the  disastrous revolution, and so he would have had grave significance 
for him even if he actually hadn’t read much of the philosopher’s work: “He was,” writes Duffy, 
“an ideological wild oat. To know him as a philosophe was to know what was radically wrong 
with him, and that was all an English poet needed to know” (56). The two authors were paired in 
the public eye: William Hazlitt's "On the Character of Rousseau" famously linked them and not 
very flatteringly. Hazlitt viewed both writers as imposing their viewpoint and ego upon the 
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reader, so that their imagination failed to spark the identification of one self with another.  At 91
least Wordsworth affected to be interested in more than himself or to be following the trajectory 
of his own memory. Rousseau was a flagrant egomaniac, refusing even to feign sympathetic 
identification:  
 Both create an interest out of nothing, or rather out of their own feelings…. But   
 Rousseau, as a prose-writer, gives only the habitual and personal impression. Mr.  
 Wordsworth, as a poet, is forced to lend the colours of imagination to impressions which  
 owe all their force to their identity with themselves,  and tries to paint what is only to be  
 felt. Rousseau, in a word, interests you in certain objects by interesting you in himself:  
 Mr. Wordsworth would persuade you that the most  insignificant objects are interesting  
 in themselves, because he is interested in them (92). !
Though Mme de Stael and others viewed Rousseau as a man of pure imagination, for Hazlitt 
Rousseau's sensibility dominated him such that his imagination and reason were stunted. Both 
Rousseau and Wordsworth were guilty of developing characters and narratives which were only 
projections of the author's temperament. The one kind thing the critic said about Rousseau was 
that he "makes us enter into his feelings as if they had been our own, and we seem to remember 
every incident and circumstance of his life as if it had happened to ourselves” (90). Having taken 
so much from Rousseau’s emphasis on sentiment and inwardness, one imagines these two 
Romantics must have felt compelled to distance themselves from his grotesque exhibitionism: 
both essentially dismissed Rousseau as a philosophe whose obsession for personal disclosure 
was disastrous if strangely transfixing. These poets worked tirelessly to transform a central 
Rousseauean principle—the reconstitution of reality as a self with no boundaries— into one 
which was limitless, which went beyond the perspective of a single individual (McFarland 60). 
 Contemporary scholars have built on Hazlitt’s essay’s pairing of Wordsworth and 
Rousseau by specifically exploring the effect of Emile on Wordsworth’s poetry. Alan Bewell sees 
the surfacing of Emile’s tenets in “We Are Seven” (Wordsworth and the Enlightenment 195-96) 
while James Chandler suggests that Book 5 of The Prelude, which considers the ideological and 
historical contexts for various educational practices, is intended to parallel the educational text 
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(112). William A. Ulmer furthers Chandler’s argument by arguing that Wordsworth directly 
engages Emile in its famous Drowned Man of Esthwaite passage, specifically in the assertion 
that the child does not fear the sight of the corpse because he has been emotionally prepared for 
it by reading literature which describes death. The narrator of Emile remarks that one of the 
marks of the child’s strong character is his lack of foresight about death: having been dissuaded 
from reading overly lively fiction, his imagination is always temperate and never anticipates 
danger (17). Wordsworth reacted strongly to Rousseau's argument that reading is "the plague of 
childhood" and spends a good amount of Book 5 recounting his own childhood joy when reading 
fairy tales, romances, and adventurous narratives. When the boy watches a corpse recovered 
from a nearby lake he is at first frightened, but the poet soon recounts that he was not 
debilitated by that fear because his "inner eye had seen / Such sights before" (5: 474-476) in the 
fairy and adventure tales of his childhood. Having been previously adorned with "ideal grace," 
"dignity," and "purest poesy" (480-820) he is prepared for the reality of death, however 
grotesque it may be (17). While Ulmer argues that Wordsworth scoffs at Rousseau's caution that 
the imagination can create a fear of death, for Wordsworth the child’s imagination is 
insufficient. Both may be a “natural” part of the world, but the child’s imaginative play isn’t 
enough to guide him toward a measured encounter with death. Instead he must be trained to 
understand it through its representation in books or art.  
 McFarland notes various commonalities between the first books of the Prelude and the 
Confessions: both include episodes of boyhood theft and subsequent moral crisis, though he 
notes the striking difference between Wordsworth’s “grave tone” and Rousseau’s “own near-
burlesque chatter” (Shapes of Culture 70). But there are significant deviations between the two 
texts. In his effort to depict the self as part of a common soul Wordsworth renders idiosyncrasies 
of temperament as quirks, personality traits that vivify the story before being overcome in the 
name of the common good. Thus Wordsworth’s “egotistical sublime” avoids the aggressively 
self-revelatory moves one finds in Rousseau, and is always mediated by decorum. In Rousseau, 
the cult of personality is arguably his first indulgence (75). Wordsworth’s Prelude also includes, 
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especially in later versions, a severe morality— so that, for example, the affair with Annette 
Vallon becomes a poem-within-a-poem, 'Vaudracour and Julia' (Romanticism and the Heritage 
of Rousseau 68). And perhaps most importantly, memory is a difficulty which Rousseau feels he 
must overcome: the potential spottiness of his recollection is an anxiety apparent in both the 
Reveries and Confessions. By contrast, Wordsworth uses the very fault lines of memory to 
manage the speaker’s self-consciousness and keep it from too obviously dominating his poetic 
frame (Weiskel 143).  
!
II. The Child’s Imagination, Play, and Games in Emile !!
For every review of Emile or the Confessions which posits Rousseau as a dangerous, infantile, 
self-obsessed fantasist is a sentence of Rousseau’s own, warning of the dangers of  the vain and 
immature imagination.  In both cases— Rousseau’s view as articulated by the narrator / 92
governor of Emile, and the view of the public about Rousseau —the adults are troubled by the 
child’s supposedly natural egocentrism and the extent to which their self-interested imagination 
compromises their moral “innocence” and / or their creative potential. Yet more so with 
Rousseau than perhaps any author in the history of Western literature one must attend to the 
obvious discrepancies in the text between what the speaker says and what he does.  “All of 
childhood is or ought to be only games and frolicsome play”: so the narrator of Emile tells us 
(Emile, 153), a prescription which the governor will act against throughout the novel. As in 
Rousseau’s other works the narrative play in Emile undercuts the severity with which he puts 
forth various maxims. Despite—or perhaps in concert with—his sense of the importance of the 
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all the vices, even worse than the “motive of gluttony,” he tells us. The latter is “an appetite of 
nature, immediately dependent on sense, while (vanity) is a work of opinion subject to the 
caprice of men and to all sorts of abuses” (152). Coleridge writes that Rousseau’s vanity turns 
him into a madman precisely because he is secular: that same energy is what brought devout 
Luther to great heights. Had he lived in the same time as Rousseau, he too “‘’would have held 
himself for a Man of Genius and original Power,’ his ideals would have shriveled into selfhood, 
and his writings would have become engines of satanic destructiveness” (Collected Works, ed. 
Rooke, 1:136. Qtd. in Duffy 60-62).
project, Rousseau expresses a cranky ambivalence about the concept of education itself, while 
constructing what is arguably the most elaborate prescriptive educational model since Plato’s 
Republic [a text which he calls “the most beautiful treatise on education ever written”(40)]. The 
overall goal of the text is to articulate the way that man may be restored to himself—how the 
proper education of a child might make it possible for an individual to preserve most of his own 
natural impulses in their best form, while still contributing in a moral way to his community and 
fellow man. The way this is accomplished is through the careful management of the child’s 
appointed governor, who chooses objects and situations for presentation (and in what order) 
based on their potential to stimulate various faculties such as the imagination, the passions, and 
reason. But the author is mixed on the details: his governor alternately decries the arts and 
celebrates them, for example, or describes the ideal man as a citizen on one page and a hermit 
on another. Sometimes the governor’s actions contradict the statements made by the narrator, a 
play that engages the reader and turns the novel into spectacle. Simultaneously the descriptions 
of Emile and the “reader’s pupil” (the figure often used in negative comparison) parallel public 
criticism of Rousseau himself— even the private self-criticism which he later articulates in the 
Confessions or Reveries. Emile is either a naive child, unaware of his own strength and 
incapable of resisting his impulses, or he is a self-interested and destructive spirit needful of 
containment [for example, the master is mistaken to believe that he is in charge because it is the 
child who governs: “He uses what you exact from him to obtain from you what pleases him; and 
he always knows how to make you pay.... At every instant pacts must be made with him. These 
treaties, which you propose in your fashion and he executes in his, always turn to the profit of 
his whims” (12)]. The “reader’s pupil,” a figure held up as the real and thus lesser child, is 
similarly akin to Rousseau as the public would come to see him: proud, perverse, manipulative, 
destructive. Riddled with internal and external tension, Emile is as elaborate a construction of 
the image of unpremeditated freedom as one can imagine—so contradictory that it approaches 
farce at times, were it not for the narrator’s earnestness. The novel offers us an emblematic case 
of Romantic play: here as elsewhere the sentiments and experiences of childhood are blank 
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placeholders upon which to write the author’s ideology, so that the “natural” education and play 
of a child is about everything except what is natural and childlike. But its legacy is well beyond 
that of education: it engages Montaigne, Locke, and Hobbes at various moments (126, 88) and  
demonstrates Rousseau’s ambivalence about personal freedom, the nature of man, and his place 
in society. As Allan Bloom notes, it is in Emile that we get the tale of the origin of amour-propre 
and where Rousseau documents how man may return to himself after his “spiritual exile... 
during which he wandered through nature and society, a return to himself which incorporates 
into his substance all the cumbersome treasures he gathered en route” (4).  
 What should we make of the fact that this return to origins, which necessitates the 
incorporation into an individual “all the cumbersome treasures he gathered en route,” is only 
possible with the oversight and management of another individual (4)? Must we presume the 
governor has successfully completed this transformation? Is it even possible to identify when the 
governor moves from watching to affecting? Does the fact that the individual cannot find his 
own way to his origin fundamentally contradict the idea of its naturalness? Even the structure of 
the novel is based on a paradox of sorts: the character who must be metaphorically led back to 
his origin is actually born at the start of the novel—  the first book is largely concerned with the 
best way to nurse. And the governor who leads the way is a highly educated and socialized adult. 
The structure of the novel is elaborate, and Rousseau details several stages of childhood in the 
novel (at what age each stage begins is rather ambiguous). The first age of childhood is leisurely 
and should be taken up most by play. The second age of childhood is quite busy, marked by 
exercise of the body and senses such that “we do not have enough time to do everything which 
would be useful” (172).  That turns out to be rather a good thing since there is a tremendous 93
inequality between the child’s strength and needs in the second age. The third stage of childhood 
“approaches adolescence without yet being that of puberty”: passion is not yet present and the 
child is subsequently at the peak of his strength yet suffers few desires (165). In this third stage 
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 It also puts forth models for three different stages of education. The first belongs to mothers, 93
and is the education of nature; the second comes from men, and is the education of the 
domestic; and the third is the education of things.
the child is ready to differentiate himself as an individual and becomes increasingly aware of 
“the necessity which attaches him to things,” his mind and his judgment (203). And when that 
“critical age” commences, youth must be offered sights which will temper their passions and 
damper their senses rather than arouse them (231). Regardless of the stage of childhood, 
Rousseau believes that a faulty education is that which robs a child from what nature has given 
him; a proper education will result in the governor able to say to himself, "At least he enjoyed 
his childhood. We did not make him lose anything that nature had given him" (162). By 
extension, the narrator assumes that the faculties given to the child may remain intact into 
adulthood if only his maturation is properly managed. Yet when his ideal governor states that he 
is simply allowing Emile to develop naturally, it is often while chronicling his manipulation: he 
constructions games, lies, and manipulates situations to function as “lessons” for the young boy. 
While the narrator will frequently state that governance must be invisible or even that effective 
governance is the absence of governance, he also emphasizes the power of the educator: “O 
tremble, you, who are going to lead him in these perilous paths and raise nature’s sacred curtain 
before his eyes” (167). At various moments the educator’s evaluation of the “naturalness” of 
Emile’s play makes his own adult subjectivity especially apparent. The child’s happiness comes 
from the exercise of their own freedom, he tells us, but that joy is limited by a natural weakness. 
Nature provides for the overcoming of those disadvantages and the natural exercise of play and 
games is always to a purpose even if it is not immediately apparent. If they jump, it is to 
strengthen their calves; if they play house, it is to practice their domestic skills. The natural play 
of children is always paideic; but certain dangers are present which require the governor to 
remain watchful. By observing the child’s play, for example, he may determine whether an 
activity “stems from nascent whim or from the need which comes only from the superabundance 
of life” (86). The impression Rousseau works to give of the governor’s disinterest and the child’s 
freedom is never very convincing: it appears from the start to be a elaborate costume masking at 
best a subjective viewpoint or at worst an oppressive panopticon, and no reader can finish the 
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novel without feeling Emile has endured an elaborate and extremely cruel experiment in 
manipulation.  94
 The contradictions in the text abound, and become particularly thorny when considering 
matters of moral education. The narrator argues that moralizing in education by men is the 
“death of all good education” (390). The solution, he explains, is an education by man inspired 
by nature’s instruction. The individual only becomes moral through a return to his origins: “We 
work in collaboration with nature, and while it forms the physical man, we try to form the moral 
man…. In going back to the principle of things we have protected him from the empire of the 
senses” (314, emphasis mine). The way toward a more wholly moral and natural self is not 
intuitively apparent to the individual born into society; Emile’s education is ultimately a 
concretizing of Rousseau’s ideas about the cultivation of the ideal citizen (51). Other than his 
prioritization of “natural education” the best social institutions are ones which denature man, 
“take his absolute existence from him in order to give him a relative one and transport the I into 
the common unity, with the result that each individual believes himself no longer one but a part 
of the unity and no longer feels except within the whole” (40). In part this is because the self-
interest of men makes them naturally destructive, even violent, though not because they are 
fundamentally wicked. The child wants to smash and break everything he sees— “He grabs a 
bird as he would grab a stone, and he strangles it without knowing what he does” — because, 
enthralled with his ability to change his environment he knows that “the action which gives 
shape is always slow and the action which destroys, being more rapid, fits his vivacity 
better” (67). Even when children exploit the vulnerabilities of those in charge of them the 
impulse does not come from immorality but rather from a natural desire to shake off the leash 
that has been slipped upon them (121). Children are violent because they are weak and wish to 
be strong, and for this reason they must never be punished or reprimanded: in fact we should be 
reassured by the child who has an idle and amoral soul, because the appearance of good in 
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 For example, at one point the governor misleads Emile to believe that Sophie has died— when 94
she is in fact very much alive. He does so in order to teach him the importance of not becoming 
too attached to any one object (442-43).
children is a dissemblance: “good is only truly such when reason enlightens it” (92-94). If left 
unchecked, however, impulsive violence in children will become in time sinful adult behavior. 
Vulgarity in the adult man is an extension of overactive “giddiness” in children (106). Violence 
on the microcosmic level moves into the macrocosmic, and the child who wants to hit will 
murder in adulthood (97-98).  
 In checking the violent impulses of the young, Rousseau emphasizes first the 
management of the imagination and its development: all that education aims to do—construct 
the citizen, create moral feeling, balance the power of the senses with the intellect— is ultimately 
a matter of taming the imagination. Because the taming of the imagination so often fails, we 
associate youth with wildness, a phenomenon caused not by temperament but the opinion of 
society and those who govern him poorly (330). The governor is the watchful guide of Emile’s 
imagination— “Do not stifle his imagination; guide it lest it engender monsters” (325)— and that 
control most often and obviously expresses itself in the management of the child’s play, 
particularly in the early stages of childhood. The governor states that the imaginative faculty 
remains “inactive” in the young child but the majority of direct references to the imagination 
describe how to slow its development and cultivate its trajectory: if he gets “fantastic notions of 
the moral world of which you speak to him,” you will never be able to recover him from them 
(161, 89). By the age of fifteen Emile has many excellent qualities —patience, courage, and 
fortitude —and this accomplishment is specifically due to the temperance of his imagination 
which “is in no way inflamed and never enlarges dangers” (208). Relatedly, in a particularly 
evocative passage the narrator explains that it is not the imagination itself which is the problem; 
rather “all the pains that make us truly unhappy” are born from the awareness of the difference 
between the limitless imagination and the limited real world (81). This is why the governor must 
make sure to keep the development of Emile’s amour propre away until he has reached the 
proper age to resist its detrimental effects: the faculty gives us the ability to make comparisons 
between ourselves and others, inflaming our desires and inciting us to manipulate others for our 
own purposes. The age of reason is linked to the dawning of amour propre, both of which form 
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and come from the ability to make comparisons: the comparison of self with things is the job of 
childhood, and later it will be the job of men and moral relations (214). But that ability to make 
comparisons depends itself on the imagination through which we projectively envision what 
others are experiencing (Shuffleton 310-11).  Here as elsewhere, the secret to wisdom and 95
happiness lies in balance: mitigating desires with reason, tempering power with will. It is only 
when all is balanced that the soul is at peace.  
 Another challenge to the management of youthful imagination is the child’s literalness. 
Rousseau’s child is incapable of the sophistication that would allow him to think in terms of 
metaphor. This is why fables should be kept from him, lest he believe animals can converse and 
reason with each other [Cowper writes a wonderfully snarky retort to this in his poem “Pairing 
Time Anticipated: A Fable,” saying that the child who interprets “by the letter / A story of a cock 
and bull / Must have a most uncommon skull” (311)]. Nor can the child conceive of God: one 
should be disturbed by the pious child for he is only an idolator or playing at devotion (here we 
again see the portrait of a dissembling child which actually occurs within a guise of innocence: 
the very conflict in public assessments of Rousseau’s own character) (256). The child’s 
imagination is amoral and one-dimensional: an activity guided not by a desire for depth but 
novelty. That desire manifests in strident, egocentric independence, a passion for literature— all 
that Rousseau claims to see as soft, sedentary, and lustful, and he warns us that it will result in 
the temperament of the poet, the lover, or the hunter. It is perilous and the governor must trick 
him, must “put his senses off the track…. by exercising his body with hard labor.” He even seeks 
to eradicate even the memory of these pleasures. It is an “art,” this education “of detaching him 
from everything... (to) distract him from himself” (320). 
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 Shuffleton, a child development scholar, adds “It is thought-provoking to compare Rousseau’s 95
ideas about the origins of both reason and vice in humanity’s ability to compare the self with 
others to the recent research on young children’s development of ‘other minds theory’ and how 
it alters their intellectual capacities and behavior” (311). She adds that the scholar of Rousseau 
who argues that philosophy should not be read as science is using a “curiously modern 
interpretation of philosophy and not one that would have made sense to pre-twentieth-century 
philosophers.” For surely “Rousseau would not have divided philosophy from anthropology and 
psychology” (316).
 Unchecked imagination allows our desires to outrun what is possible: “No longer seeing 
the country we have already crossed, we count it for nothing; what remains to cross ceaselessly 
grows and extends” (81). What we are given by nature is always good and always enough, and it 
is social life which displaces it: the more we get, the more we want. Men tear themselves apart, 
he concludes, like “ferocious animals because they do not know how to be satisfied with being 
men.” Shortly thereafter he elaborates that when young people read historical accounts only to 
aspire to “become now Cicero, now Trajan, now Alexander,” they will become “discouraged 
when they return to themselves” (243). Left to develop on its own trajectory, urged prematurely 
forward by the increasingly popular novel, the imagination of social man results in fear and 
bitterness. The difference between a productive and destructive imagination lies in the careful 
management of developmental stages, of time itself: the imagination inflamed too early causes 
many of our gravest social ills. The overeager imagination actually accelerates the development 
of reason to its detriment (316). "Nature's instruction" is “late and slow,” allowing man’s 
imagination to be awoken by the senses in a gradual and cumulative way. By contrast, education 
by men nearly always causes premature awakening of the senses, “a precocious activity which 
cannot fail to enervate and weaken individuals first and in the long run the species itself" (215). 
Much of the governor’s project, then, is devoted to determining what objects to introduce, how 
to introduce them and when. There is no spontaneous play with objects: “From the moment that 
the child begins to distinguish objects, it is important that there be selectivity in those one shows 
him... I want him habituated to seeing new objects, ugly, disgusting, peculiar animals, but little 
by little, from afar, until his accustomed to them, and... finally handles them himself” (63). 
Objects used in play are a source of power: mastery over them allows the weak child, whose 
dependence is inevitably the condition for wickedness, to dominate [“Children begin by getting 
themselves assisted; they end by getting themselves served. Thus... is subsequently born the idea 
of empire and domination” (64-66)]. Another central way that the governor slows the 
development of Emile’s imagination is by preventing his indulgence in “fantastic notions” or 
“whims.” The word appears frequently in Bloom’s translation: the French word is “fantasie,” 
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which is closely aligned to the imagination: whim is to want without need, and is the first mark 
of prejudice and opinion (68). The problem with whim is not that it results in pleasure: children 
can only learn from what is pleasurable or useful if they are not being forced to learn through 
obedience (116). In fact, their hedonism is a symbol of freedom; it allows man to avoid yoking 
others to his will (84). Rather the problem with whim is that it is impulsive and without reason, 
and so reveals the narcissism of such blindness: the word emphasizes a connection between the 
imagination and impulsive demands centered in the ego (Shuffleton 312). It is to be irritably 
preoccupied as with “countless vain projects” which we believe will gain us the favor of authority 
figures, for example (Emile 229, 341). To grant the child his whims is to offer him the illusion of 
power, and the educator should therefore never give the child what he asks for when the child 
asks in such a way to reveal it as a capricious request or one to test his powers (89). 
 The governor must also manage Emile’s artistic training and his exposure to art objects, 
and both tasks are prudently filtered through his pragmatism. The boy may sing but only to 
improve his voice: he must never sing a “bizarre,” passionate, or expressive song  (149). When 
he learns to draw it is only to develop the accuracy of his perception and dexterity; he is never 
taught to imitate other painters nor allowed to draw what he imagines, and his artwork must 
attend only to the actual object it represents (144). Having been raised for eighteen years with 
“only the preservation of a sound judgment and a healthy heart” the governor imagines Emile 
watching a play: Emile is ashamed to see the “whole of humankind its own dupe, debasing itself 
in these children’s games” (242). Elsewhere Emile is described as able to turn scenes of great 
distress and sadness into pleasure at having been spared such misfortune; and it is his lack of 
familiarity with dramatic literature that frees him from overwhelming pity. At the heart of the 
governor’s desire to control Emile’s exposure to art is the complex nature of sympathetic 
identification: will a work of art elicit in him the kind of identification with others which would 
obscure his “normal existence as (a) citizen,” as Rousseau feared of the theater? (Kelly, 
Rousseau as Author, 73). The ability of man’s art to incite the swelling of certain emotions 
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— pride, ambition, violence, envy— is a real danger: it may prematurely awaken and then 
confuse his passion, making him so narcissistic that he is disinterested in the fates of others.  
The imagination exposed too early to narrative also creates desires which do not stem from 
necessity. The governor explains that writing and reason should be a sort of spectacle: language 
should be as adorned as actors in a play, and one of the main errors of the time is the tendency 
to “neglect the language of signs that speak to the imagination.” Writing has become too weak: 
“Always to reason is the mania of small minds. Strong souls have quite another language,” and it 
is this language that persuades and drives others to action. “Clothe reason in a body if you want 
to make youth able to grasp it,” he concludes (321-23). Thus the governor makes clear that 
effective argument and rhetoric should be somewhat performative, and that the more dramatic 
the spectacle of one’s reason, the more powerful the soul behind it. Yet this is only the case in 
philosophy or political rhetoric: he denigrates the role of fiction and historical narrative in the 
child’s education, in an extensive denunciation which becomes part of the impetus for 
Wordsworth’s Book Five of The Prelude on “Books.” We might first begin with case of that 
female quixotic, Sophie. So enamored is she by the story of Telemachus that frustrates her 
parents by refusing all men. Though she knows that the story is only a fiction it makes no 
difference: none of real love’s potential pleasures can match what she holds in her mind.  The 96
account given of Sophie’s imaginative fixation is not entirely without nuance, however, just as at 
other moments the governor argues that art makes us sensitive to others. 
 The problem of Sophie’s quixotic imagination doesn’t extend to Emile’s own experience 
of love. Unlike Sophie, Emile has been kept from books. So in a sense, Sophie is Emile’s first 
aesthetic object— and she is, initially at least, a fiction created by the governor. The introduction 
of Sophie has all the markings of a game, and the young Emile is intended to practice his real 
feelings on a false or imaginary object. Of course, the rules of the game are kept from a key 
player and the governor is careful to obscure them, to more “easily prevent my young man from 
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 Rousseau himself felt that he had undergone a similar experience of being swept away by the 96
novel’s drama: as he articulates in the Confessions, he has previously seen himself as both 
Roman hero and pastoral lover [“Taking Readers as they Are,” (Kelly 92)]. 
having illusions about real objects” (329). It is yet another contradiction in the text: by 
describing an object (a woman) in a way that pleases him, the governor manufactures in Emile a 
desire for a like object. This is achieved in a manner not unlike art-making: “it is a matter of 
some skillful descriptions which clothe this imaginary object with features he can grasp with his 
senses and give it a greater air of truth” (329).  The young man will come to think that the 97
governor knows something about his future spouse which is to him as of yet unknown, and this 
only increases his desire. It is irrelevant, the narrator-governor insists, that the woman doesn’t 
actually exist. His praise of her makes Emile “disgusted”: rejecting all the real women around 
him, he prefers the one presented to him by the governor though she be but a likeness of the 
fictional character. In a fascinating rationalization the governor explains: 
  And what is true love itself if it is not chimera, lie, and illusion? We love the image we  
 make for ourselves far more the object to which we apply it…. The magic veil drops, and  
 love disappears. But, by providing the imaginary object, I am the master of comparisons,  
 and I easily prevent my young man from having illusions about real objects (329).   98
For the governor Emile the imagination is best used when the individual projects himself in a 
balanced way into the subjectivity of others. Pity is "the first relative sentiment which touches 
the human heart according to the order of nature ... no one becomes sensitive until his 
imagination is animated and begins to transport him out of himself" (222). Sophie’s “extreme 
sensitivity” may be exactly what makes her active imagination difficult to moderate, but her 
imagination does not carry away her reason, and it only makes her more attractive. As she puts 
it, “I know that he is only a fiction. I seek someone who resembles him.... Let us not think that a 
lovable and virtuous man is only a chimera. He exists, he lives; perhaps he is seeking me” (405). 
Emile will come to be for her that resemblance, just as he is the resemblance of the ideal pupil 
for the governor.  
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 Similarly, the educator must “clothe reason in forms which will make it loved... let what you 97
say always have an attraction that forces him to listen to you” (325). Manipulation in rhetoric is 
described not infrequently in terms of clothes and costumes; one is reminded of Rousseau’s 
famous, often remarked upon affection for wearing “Armenian dress” late in life.
 He later adds that it is “enthusiasm” which creates true love, and there is “no enthusiasm 98
without an object of perfection, real or chimerical, but always existing in the imagination.... In 
love everything is only illusion” (391).
Just a Game / Free Play  
!
Rousseau’s narrative play in Emile and the reception of Rousseau in England indicate opposed 
attitudes toward the freedom associated with the child’s imagination, specifically as it 
manifested in actions determined to be impulsive or frivolous. Something about the play 
impulse rests uneasily within the Romantic sensibility, requiring that depiction of it at its most 
literal (games, for example; sports, outside play) be carefully managed. The text of Emile 
exhibits play in two primary ways: first are the various depictions of play and games which 
Emile engages in and his governor orchestrates, and the second is manifest in the narrative 
framework: Rousseau plays with the role of narration and the dynamic of power between 
authoritative speaker and receptive reader. That engagement is characterized by antagonism, a 
dynamic of alternating intimacy and distance that actually allows more room for playing. The 
narrator instructs the reader / potential educator in the technique of manipulation which feels 
eerily like a description of narration itself, rendering the reader complicit: “hide yourself,” he 
writes, “so that he may seek you” (234). He frequently expresses this desire that the governor’s 
influence be invisible; he explicitly does not want him to be “an author” (248). And here we 
must address a difficulty with the text. The narrator is initially not the same entity as the 
governor, though they are sometimes collapsed. The former has created this “master of science” 
to carry out his precepts but calls him “governor” because he is supposed to instruct rather than 
be an example. Yet the governor is also positioned similarly to this narrator, this author of a 
novel in third person limited omniscient perspective, as he knows the thoughts of Emile and 
Sophie as well as his own. It is, in fact, this reality that allows the governor to easily take 
advantage of the child, along with the child’s inability to imagine the future (123).  99
 The narrator’s fantasy of the reader’s constant engagement is an important element of 
this play. Unlike a “relationship,” this “relating,” as Masud Khan would call it, is framed 
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 The text’s intended audience is similarly convoluted: at several points it appears to be parents 99
[“It is to you that I address myself, tender and foresighted mother” (37)], but Rousseau would go 
on to deny this in future work (Shuffleton 317).
consciously and doesn’t require the surrender from both parties one expects from a relationship 
(Khan 120). At one point the reader’s imagined skepticism causes a modification in the 
construction of Sophie’s character, and an admission of error on the author’s part:  
 Here someone will stop me and ask whether it is nature which prescribes our expending  
 so much effort for the repression of immoderate desires? My answer is no, but … Let us  
 resuscitate this lovable girl to give her a less lively imagination and a happier destiny. I  
 wanted to depict an ordinary woman, and by dint of elevating her soul I have disturbed  
 her reason. I went astray myself. Let us retrace our steps. Sophie has only a good nature  
 in a common soul. Every advantage she has over other women is the effect of her   
 education (405–06). !
But more often the narrator uses the construction of the reader in derogatory ways. For example 
he frequently makes reference to the “reader’s pupil,” who is used as the antithesis of Emile. 
With this fiction he demonstrates how the child raised according to present structures falls 
short: the reader’s pupil is covetous and irritable, vain, whimsical, and desirous. The reader is 
implicitly to blame: we are one of those loved ones too  “eager to serve (the pupil).” By indulging 
him and  immediately satisfying all the pleasures he seeks, we have damned him to a life of 
prideful dissatisfaction (228-29).  
 By contrast Rousseau’s governor insists that he simply follows the “easy and voluntary 
direction of the movements nature asks of children,” only “varying their play to render it more 
pleasant to them,” but his next sentence mitigates this feeling of ease: “Really, what will they 
play with that I cannot turn into an object of instruction for them?” (148) And it is difficult to see 
what is natural about the scenes of games and play, as they are nearly always presented in the 
context of how they function to educate or build characterWe are told that play is entirely for 
pleasure, that play is entirely natural: childhood is “reason’s sleep,” and one cannot say the child 
does nothing unless they believe it is nothing to be happy (107). If Rousseau’s explicit 
statements on the imagination of the child are contradictory,  perhaps an initial look at games 
and literal play will be clarifying— that is, unless play comes from some place other than the 
imagination. In Book Two the governor asserts that the child’s imagination remains “inactive” at 
the earliest stages of development and so one may rest assured that the child’s play is driven 
simply by necessity, a desire for freedom, or to exercise his body, will, or ability: 
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 Whether he is busy or playing, it is all the same to him. His games are his business, and  
 he is aware of no difference. He brings to whatever he does an interest which makes  
 people laugh and a freedom which pleases them, thereby showing at once the turn of his  
 mind and the sphere of his knowledge. Is this not the spectacle appropriate to this age,  
 the charming and sweet spectacle of seeing a pretty child with an eye that is lively and  
 gay, a manner contented and serene, a face open and laughing, doing the most serious  
 things at play or profoundly busy with the most frivolous entertainments? (161) !
In these early stages, pleasure in play is a sign of health and a “robustness of spirit”: outside 
games, races, and a good appetite keeps one healthy and free (153). One need never worry about 
the antics in this early stage, no matter how performative or deceitful the child’s actions seem. 
For the freedom and pleasure which characterize this early stage makes the child instinctually 
friendly and relaxed, at peace, ready to laugh— and incapable of real dissemblance (79).  
 Rousseau’s insistence on the dormancy of the young child’s imagination signals his 
tremendous anxiety about it, and the rest of the novel is devoted to the cultivation of Emile’s 
inevitably dawning imagination. This is supposedly accomplished through the governor’s 
elaborate concoction of various educational “games.” Two games in particular are characteristic 
of the whole. The first game in the novel is described as a “night game”: the governor’s goal is to 
rid Emile of any fear of the dark, and it involves a rather vague plan to send several children out 
into the evening together (“that not chance be taken with a single child alone”) so that Emile will 
learn to associate nighttime with amiable company. To make this point, however, the narrator 
spends some time recounting a terrifying story of being a child and on a dare crossing a 
graveyard to enter a stone, pitch-dark temple to take from the pulpit a Bible. He is too 
frightened to do it properly the first time, and so returns; but the effect of the story is not to 
show the narrator in a triumph of courage. Rather what comes across is a reminder of the 
tremendous panic that can accompany a child in the dark, making the reader disinclined from 
seeing the governor’s “game” for Emile as anything but a cruelty. Shortly thereafter is a second 
game which is similarly disturbing. “I can imagine nothing so pleasant and so useful as such 
games,” says the governor, “if one is willing to put a bit of skill into organizing them” (137). He 
goes on to describe what he believes is a delightful diversion: having created an elaborate and 
“torturous” labyrinth out of the furniture and screens in a room, he places ten or eleven boxes in 
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various hiding places. One of these boxes contains candy. The governor tells the children how to 
find the box with candy, taking care “to make finding it difficult in proportion to their skill,” and 
then sends them in: 
 Just think of a little Hercules arriving with a box in his hand, full of pride in his   
 expedition. The box is put on the table and ceremoniously opened. I can already hear the  
 bursts of laughter, the jeers of the joyous band when, instead of the candies that were  
 expected, they find, very nicely set out on moss or cotton, a June bug, a snail, a piece of  
 coal, an acorn, a turnip or some other similar foodstuff. (137) !
This is no “frolicsome game”— it’s a dirty trick. The pattern continues: the governor’s games 
involve humiliation, anxiety, physical pain, goading and mockery, and are far from free and 
enjoyable events. In fact the imposition of some games results in blistering pain, though the 
framework of play supposedly “seasons” that agony into something less bitter: they play games 
“they would never otherwise endure without shedding torrents of tears. Long fasts, blows, 
burns, fatigues of all kinds are the amusements of young savages” (131). The theme of play 
trumping pain recurs, and the freedom the governor offers his charge is always described as 
abundant recompense for the child’s many discomforts. When the governor observes a band of 
children “numb with cold, hardly able to move their fingers” while they play in the snow he does 
not call them inside. If he did so, he explains, “they would feel the rigors of constraint a hundred 
times more than they feel those of the cold” (87). The only way the reader accepts such scenes as 
“natural” is if it we believe it natural to be humiliated or experience terrible pain. The reader is 
similarly skeptical that, as the governor would have us believe, the memory of that pain is later 
absolved through his introduction of another game.  
 The reader becomes increasingly aware that the narrator’s use of the word “natural” is 
rather flexible; what’s more, the play he describes is of a specific type and seems to apply only to 
certain temperaments. Finally, the educator’s engagement in a child’s play can help shape its 
function. Because the child has not yet come upon the age of reason he is amoral, as we 
discussed earlier. But the condition is not a neutral one, and it often is accompanied by violent 
destruction: the child cannot help but want to smash, and break much of what he sees, because 
his energy is “superabundant.” He senses within himself an excess of energy and power, and it is 
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simply easier to destroy than to create (67). In the first extensive description of a scene of play, 
then, the governor describes a veritable battle of wills. He has been taking care of a child “full of 
whims” who on the first day awoke at midnight ready to play: the child leaps from his bed, takes 
his robe, and calls for the governor, who wakes and lights a candle until the child retires. Two 
days later the child repeats this act, and receives no impatient reprimand but a warning: “I said 
to him in a deliberate tone, ‘My little friend, this is all very well, but do not try it again.’” The 
child’s curiosity is piqued by this and he rises again the following night, saying he is unable to 
sleep. “‘Too bad, (the governor) replied, and kept quiet.” Suddenly and firmly refusing to give 
into the child’s nighttime wakings, the governor listens as the child “(runs) giddily around the 
room, yelling, singing, making a lot of noise, purposely bumping into the table and 
chairs” (121-122). In response the governor puts him in a room without windows and anything 
to break, and, locking the door without a word, goes back to bed. The child follows this with 
many other “similar caprices,” and the narrator’s explanation for this is that he is narcissistic 
and impulsive, thinking only of the immediate moment and believing himself to be the most 
important person on earth (123). 
 Games clearly have a socializing function as well, as is especially apparent in the 
gendered games which are made up for Emile and Sophie. One of the governor’s most important 
tasks is to monitor how Emile’s social relationships are shaped by play, specifically to keep him 
from the illusion that all social relationships are within reach. But as always the intent is hidden 
within the frivolity. Emile “trains” Sophie in matters of music, dance, and song; yet both feel 
animated not by character building but by “rollicking gaiety,” a feeling of boundless energy 
which counteracts the otherwise “timid respect of love” (425). Emile becomes Sophie’s governor 
in the process, “is permitted to be his mistress’s master.”  Earlier we have been told that if 100
young women are denied play, games, dance, and entertainment, they turn that energy inwards 
and become “sullen, shrewish, and unbearable” and bear weak sons [the convent is better than 
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 This, though later the narrator-governor will say at Emile’s conclusion that Sophie has 100
become his master. It is an indulgent sentiment and another one which we don’t quite believe. 
high society for this reason (374, 366)]. Women play more intensely than men, a sign of the 
“capriciousness and infatuation” which will later make them fickle. Thus they should be allowed 
to play their games so long as the educators “accustom them to being interrupted in the midst of 
their games and brought back to their cares without grumbling” (370). The games constructed 
for Emile and Sophie also often take the form of inciting nostalgia: the recreation of childhood 
games is to appease Sophie’s family, and Emile flatters Sophie by allowing her to win. Having 
previously been known for his speed [a quality developed from a competitive game constructed 
by the governor in previous years (141)], Emile and Sophie race. But this race must give Emile 
the sense of being a previous childhood game that he now uses for more strategic purposes, and 
so a cake is placed on the goal “in order to better imitate Emile’s former games (436). The 
governor’s intent in the earlier races was to teach Emile how to be generous: experiencing the 
loneliness of eating the cake he’d won without the companionship of his competitors, he begins 
to share his prize as he becomes more confident in his victories (142). He moves, then, form 
generosity of substance to generosity of spirit, allowing Sophie to feel that she has won though 
“Women are not made to run. When they flee, it is in order to be caught” (427). 
 Because of their social utility that games are frequently a component of adult life in 
Rousseau’s other works, though it takes varied forms. In the Confessions the game of the cup-
and-ball is an escape for the disillusioned adult speaker who seeks to escape the mindless gossip 
of others: “the only morality within the reach of the present century is the morality of the cup-
and-ball,” he writes, and so he carried a cup-and-ball in his pocket everywhere, to assist him in 
ignoring the absurdities of social life (194-95). In Emile any exclusive or solitary pleasure is the 
“death of pleasure, games and fun,” leading to bitterness, conflict, jealousy, even imprisonment. 
Games here are always democratic and inclusive: “If some country celebration brought the 
inhabitants of the place together, my companions and I would be among the first ones there...... 
I would join in the refrain of an old rustic song, and I would dance in their barn more gladly 
than at the opera ball” (352-53).  
!
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 Shuffleton argues that Rousseau felt it was not the imagination in its natural state which 
was dangerous. Rather, it was the colonized imagination that was problematic: for example, play 
with toys which are then connected to television shows, and those in turn to major corporations. 
Sophie is described as waiting to become a doll, says Shuffleton, and so do we: but “A child 
whose imagination flourishes uncolonized, on the other hand, is on a promising path to 
happiness, as a careful reader learns from the education of Emile, Rousseau’s imaginary 
friend” (321). Importantly, what really makes Emile different from other children is that in 
midst of his imaginative play he has been taught to think and reason (316). The “reader’s pupil,” 
by contrast, simply acts as a mirror to the adult world, demonstrating to civilization its many 
faults: we are naturally hedonistic, amoral, weak, incapable of metaphorical thinking, and exist 
only in the present (94, 127). Finally, the ability to dissimulate or pretend to be other than what 
one is, is the phenomenon of an adult imagination. And so we turn to the play that the narrator 
of Emile performs in the text. 
!
III. Public Spectacles, Private Entertainments: Emile and The Confessions 
   Unhappy Rousseau! whom in art alone 
   All climes have honour’d, but no clime would own.   101!
Christopher Kelly points out that if we treat Emile as a novel as he believes we should, we see 
that between 1756 and 1762 “Rousseau turned himself from a writer of academic discourses into 
a novelist” (“Taking Readers as they Are,” 86). Kelly ultimately argues that shift is due to 
Rousseau’s increasing doubt about a previously articulated philosophical position. If he is 
correct that reason is no stronger an influence upon man than his passions and if passions are 
root cause of all rational illuminations, then an argument based solely on reason is unlikely to 
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  William Carr, “Epistle II.” Poems on Various Subjects 1791: 194 (l. 1- 2).101
encourage readers to balance the two faculties.  In short, “Philosophers may require complex 102
argument and citizens clear and simple statements, but children and adults who are like them 
require stories that gratify their passions even while changing them for the better” (87 - 89). Fair 
enough. But why write a novel, rather than a play or opera, genres he was more familiar with? 
On one hand, Kelly says, Rousseau knew that a modern audience would be likely unmoved by 
the earnestness of his characters, even finding them laughable rather than honorable; though he 
was trepidatious about the way novels can sweep their readers away in fantasy, it was a better 
alternative if action and plot remained firmly rooted in reality. And Rousseau would have been 
disinclined from writing a play because of his  published critique of the theater in Lettre a 
d’Alambert, which argued that the audience of theater masks selfishness by creating the illusion 
of sociability (Kelly 92-95). "It makes very little difference to me if I have written a novel,” writes 
Rousseau. “A fair novel it is indeed, the novel of human nature. If it is to be found only in this 
writing, is that my fault? This ought to be the history of my species. You who deprave it, it is you 
who make a novel of my book" (qtd. in Kelly 96). One sees here how little distinction he makes 
between the public and private, precisely because of his own self-aggrandizement: the work 
becomes a “novel of human nature,” a “history of my species,” and the reader an intimate 
antagonist, yet one of mythological proportions. For Rousseau the boundary between speaker 
and audience is always wavering. As he puts it in the Confessions:  
 Before I go further I must present my reader with an apology... a justification, for the  
 petty details I  have just been entering into…. Since I have undertaken to reveal myself  
 absolutely to the public, nothing about me must remain hidden or obscure. I must  
 remain incessantly beneath his gaze, so that he may follow me in all the extravagances of  
 my heart and into every least corner of my life. Indeed, he must never lose sight of me for 
 a single instant, for, I am laying myself sufficiently open to human malice by telling my  
 story without rendering myself more vulnerable by any silence (65). !
This passage is not an apology but a demand: I must remain incessantly beneath your gaze, the 
gaze of all readers throughout time. Do not take your eyes off me. Read every niche of my 
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 Kelly also points out that Rousseau always anticipated this result: “In one of his last efforts at 102
a defense of the Discourse, he says, “I know very well that the trouble I am taking is useless, and 
in my exhortations I don’t have the chimerical pleasure of hoping for the reformation of 
men.” (88)
heart and examine every detail of my biography. I deserve your attention because I have 
exposed myself to you.  
 Emile’s version of play, both in the governor’s games and in the narration, emblematizes 
what Matthew Kaiser calls the rhetoric of “play as identity”: when human beings play with one 
another to “experience a primal, intersubjective sense of belonging.... This rhetoric of play 
underlies the socially cohesive logic of holiday, feast, public spectacle, and all forms of 
customary revelry” (119).  It informs the intimacy which is created between author and reader 103
and which was so central to Rousseau’s aesthetic. The governor even praises Plato’s belief that 
children should be raised by festivals, songs, and pastimes, and he describes the participation of 
women in public festivals as one of the charms of ancient life (107, 387). Traditionally occupying 
the status of “low” art, the spectacle/festival, with its Bacchanalian roots, is a social or 
communal expression of hedonism and dangerous freedom. 
  Rousseau’s praise of community festivals and celebrations work against the Romantic 
depiction of the public gathering as a sight of idleness and vulgarity at best, or violence and 
chaos at worst. As an example, I’d like to diverge for a moment in order to examine the world of 
spectacle in The Prelude. The theatrical world in that text—appearing in marionettes as well as 
satires and revenge tragedies— is usually accompanied by a crude, belligerent audience. Book 
Seven includes several such spectacles: descriptions of performances and plays in London which 
then young Wordsworth attended, and London’s most famous spectacle, St. Bartholomew Fair. 
The poet describes the latter as similar to “times when half the city shall break out / Full of one 
passion” such as it does for “executions... a street on fire, / Mobs, riots, or rejoicings” (l. 646-49). 
It is a “hell / For eyes and ears, what anarchy and din / Barbarian and infernal” (l. 661-63). 
There one can behold the “spectacle”— “A parliament of monsters,” the “blank confusion” that 
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 Kaiser’s rhetoric of the “play of identity” draws on Huizinga, who traced the appearance of 103
the root of the word “play” (pflegen) in the ceremonial realm by noting where it is used to 
denote community-oriented celebrations [for example, the Dutch word for marriage—huwelijk—
reflects the Middle Low Dutch huweleec or huweleic meaning literally "wedding-play” (41)].  
Appropriately for a study of Emile, Huizinga notes that the Greek and Roman unification of 
gruesome contests with a festival atmosphere, such as in gladiator combat, is one of the more 
peculiar confluences of meaning encompassed in the word “play” (73).
“jumbled up together" “lays...//The whole creative powers of man asleep” (l. 693-98). In a more 
measured earlier passage he links the “hubbub” of London to Chaos in Paradise Lost, with a 
lengthy detail of the pantomimic scenes, panoramas, dancing dogs, miniatures, “singers, rope-
dancers, giants and dwarfs... / Clowns, conjurors, posture-makers, harlequins” (l. 294-97). The 
“mechanic artist” that represents in exact miniatures “famous spots and things,” literally 
reducing grand architecture to small curiosities (l. 266-79). What the young Wordsworth 
expects of the city are realizations of his “fond imaginations”: infinite streets, innumerable 
churches, “wilderness of lamps,/ Your gorgeous ladies, fairy cataracts/ And pageant 
fireworks” (l. 124-35). As when he crosses the Alps his imagination proves more glorious than 
the reality. Of the plays, they are “antics and buffoonery” (l.464). These spectacles are “crude 
Nature work(ing) in untaught minds,” not quite “unamusing” or a  “mean delight” but pleasing 
only to the mind that is feminine and immature: “sportive and alert” like a “kitten when at 
play” (l.473-474). Even the memories take on a “girlish childlike gloss / Of novelty” (l. 479-80). 
While Wordsworth speaks tenderly of the entertainments of his youth there is no doubt that it is 
a time of superficial and indulgent pleasures. “Life then was new,” he tells us, indulgently: “The 
senses easily pleased” (l.440-41).   This entertainment robs man of his creativity. Even solely 104
recalling the scenes causes him to forget his own creative powers: “when I think / Of these I feel 
the imaginative power / Languish within me” (l. 500-02). The theme continues, and idleness 
and theatricality become increasingly sinister as the narrator matures. In Book Ten the French 
Revolution is disparagingly compared to cheap theatre: the sun “turned into a gewgaw, a 
machine,/ Sets like an opera phantom” (l. 939-40). In later prose works Wordsworth opposes 
the “noisy pleasure” offered by pantomime, farces, and puppet shows to the peaceful nature one 
sees along the margin of Windemere, saying wryly that “the crowd of spectators who partake of 
your enjoyment will, by their presence and acclamations, enhance it” (Prose Works 157). His 
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 Much of the play is deadened from these scenes of enjoyment because of the imposition of 104
capital: these ballads include one that in fact is “in masquerade” (disguises the goods actually for 
sale). Indeed, the business of the festival strikes from it all of its joy and spontaneity, as “the 
antic (strive) to outstrip each other” within the “fray or brawl” of spectators.
point is that this “enhanced pleasure” is false, less profound than the solitary meditation on the 
landscape.   
 Play for Wordsworth is properly part of the child’s community. It is not for the reflective 
adult. Collective adult play is in fact usually deceptive and troubling. The mind awakened by 
these public celebrations is far from the masculine depths of the poet’s adult, mature 
imagination: when not implicitly linked to chaos or exhaustive commerce, these festivals are 
superficial, feminine, and lack the quiet rigor of the poet’s intellect. What’s more, spectacle is for 
Wordsworth defined by its public nature. “Personal spectacle” may seem an oxymoronic term, 
but I use it here to distinguish it from the public spectacle, festival, or fair that I have been 
discussing. To make a spectacle of oneself is to be an object of curiosity, or contempt; to become 
a public show. It is also to be used as, or to use oneself as an instrument through which to create 
a show: it is to be an actor. The personal spectacle often involves a narrator who recounts 
personal episodes in which they are revealed in an intimate, eccentric, or compromised light, 
while directly addressing the reader as representing a generalized social body. By so doing it 
reveals how we incorporate aspects of the social and political worlds into our psyche and the 
creative underpinnings of such an act: the narrator develops elaborate and dramatic 
atmospheres within which he is the central actor, carefully and eagerly watched. In Rousseau, in 
the Gothic writers, and in the Romantics various dramatic tropes and elements of fantasy were 
used to depict a narrator “carried away” by sentiment, with the reader expected to follow suit.  
 Equally, however, the personal spectacle was used to indicate an under-developed, 
inferior, fragmented or immature sensibility: the individual ungrounded by experience rather 
than heightened by it. We especially see this in texts attributed to the “fancy” or the feminine, 
young, or otherwise compromised.  In Wordsworth one never makes a spectacle of one’s 105
private or personal life, without carefully qualifying it through the refining lens of the poetic 
imagination. There is a striking scene in The Prelude in which Wordsworth writes of having seen 
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 Confessions of an English Opium Eater is an example of personal spectacle; “Julian and 105
Maddalo: A Conversation” is another excellent example.
a child in a theater placed on the board usually used to carry refreshments for the crowd. He 
describes the child as “in face a cottage rose / Just three parts blown.” He is caressed, given 
treats, surrounded happily by slurs and the “ribaldry” of the “chance spectators, chiefly dissolute 
men / And shameless women” (l.354-360). The poet recalls this memory as vividly as if he was 
presently watching him, but in his memory the tone of the event changes substantially. There 
the child sits “Among the wretched and the falsely gay, / Like one of those who talked with hair 
unsinged / Amid the fiery furnace” (l.398-400). Ever since he first saw this child, he adds, the 
child has appeared to him in visions “as if embalmed / By Nature.” The child is unharmed by the 
“fiery furnace” but not because he triumphs over it—rather he has been offered another kind of 
death, “embalmed” in the poet’s memory and the poem by “Nature.” This is the spectacular form 
in which he may survive—as a vision for the poet to recount: “beauty is such excess / Adorned 
him in that miserable place” (l. 406-07). In Anthropology for a Pragmatic Point of View Kant 
explains why “old people prefer comedy, even burlesque” while young people love to perform 
tragic drama. Young people prefer drama for the same reason children are moved to risk danger: 
they are driven by an instinctual desire to test their powers. This certainly seems to be the case 
for the depictions of play in Books One through Three of The Prelude (1805), except that Kant 
concludes that the glee of youth leaves no room for melancholy, no matter how distressing and 
fearful the drama. Children are very easily put back into a cheerful mood whereas “with old 
people these impressions are not so easily blotted out, and they cannot bring back the cheerful 
mood in themselves so easily” (162). The cognitive dissonance between the tragedy of old age, 
and the play in comedy, burlesque, festival, and spectacle, is too distressing: it is Wordsworth’s 
“weary throng” facing the “string of dazzling wares” (l. 71-74).  
 Rousseau is by contrast the master of the personal spectacle, and his narrators are often 
a raree or peep-show of their own. It is this which will make him so susceptible to the 
accusations of vanity we considered earlier. Spectacle provided Rousseau’s narrators with a way 
to project his mind and character onto the world he created. In The Confessions Rousseau asks 
"138
the reader if we have ever been to the opera in Italy. Here as elsewhere, spectacle is for Rousseau 
inseparable from the written word. During scene changes, he writes: 
 ...wild and prolonged disorder reigns in their great theaters. The furniture is   
 higgledy-piggledy; on all sides things are being shifted and everything seems upside  
 down; it is as if they were bent on universal destruction; but little by little everything falls 
 into place, nothing is missing, and, to one’s surprise, all the long tumult is succeeded  
 by a delightful spectacle. That is almost exactly the process that takes place in my brain  
 when I want to write. If I had known in the past how to wait and then put down in all  
 their beauty the scenes that painted themselves in my imagination, few authors would  
 have surpassed me (Confessions, 113). !
In other moments he writes with great affection for what he calls the “language of signs,” of 
costumes, ovations, thrones, and crowns. The Romans got it right, he tells us: “Different 
clothing according to ages and according to stations…. Everything with them was display, show, 
ceremony, and everything made an impression on the hearts of the citizens” (322).  In Emile 106
the public spectacle offers the governor the opportunity to define and reinforce social lines in 
order to ensure a deeper civility; he is easily able to corral the public spectacle. A feast, a long 
procession, the gaiety of “rustic labors, and frolicsome games,” is a comforting event because it 
reveals how we prefer ourselves to all else. We take comfort that others feel the same, preferring 
their own selves to us: “From this cordial and moderate familiarity there would arise—without 
coarseness, without falseness, and without constraints— a playful conflict more charming than 
politeness and more likely to bind together our hearts” (352).  
 In a different way, personal affectation become spectacle when it takes on a sexual or 
corporeal form.  In Book Three of the Confessions is an extraordinary description of a deeply 107
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 My interest in this essay is considering how Rousseau handles spectacles which occur within 106
prose, and so I do not consider Lettre à d'Alembert sur les spectacles (1889). But of course 
Rousseau was famously ambivalent about the theater, and wrote many works for the stage. He 
writes of having composed an opera that “only cost me five or six weeks' work, (yet) brought me 
in almost as much money, in spite of my misfortune and stupidities, as Emile has done to this 
day, though it cost me twenty years of meditation, and three years to write” (Confessions 360). 
 As Joshua Wilner writes in Feeding on Infinity: “But beyond this familiar dialectic of self-107
reference, Rousseau's figure of inwardness also functions as an intensification of Montaigne's 
location of the writer's body as the figural center of attention. For the figure of the unveiled 
interior repeats as it inverts the body's relation to the surrounding world, from which it is 
differentiated but on which it depends for its existence, and makes of the body's surface a Janus-
like entity, one side turned inward and in communication with the encrypted self, the other 
turned outward toward the world” (8). 
exhibitionistic performance by our narrator in public: “... being unable to satisfy my desires, I 
excited them by the most extravagant behaviour. I haunted dark alleys and lonely spots where I 
could expose myself to women from afar off in the condition in which I should have liked to be 
in their company” (90). At the end of the memoir Rousseau assumes Armenian costume, 
ostensibly to help him hide his catheter, but it makes his body quite a spectacle, and one that 
was not insignificant. Questioned about it by a Parisian reporter, he replied: “I’ve thought as a 
man, I’ve written as a man and I have been called bad. Well, now I shall be called a woman.” 
Voltaire, angered by London’s warm welcome of Rousseau, later wrote: “I do not know whether 
he was chased from Paris, as the rumor has it here, or whether he left on all fours or dressed in 
his Armenian robe”  (Zaretsky and Scott 115-16). In London and elsewhere the costume becomes 
his mark; he is chased as though a “were-wolf” and crowds follow him on his daily walks, but he 
refuses to relinquish it, viewing that as a sign of cowardice. Shortly after this example, we are 
given another anecdote including an embarrassing physical detail. Having so dramatically 
pleased the public with a musical composition, Rousseau is invited to visit the king. The idea 
troubles him: he thinks only of his “frequent need to retire (urinate) which had caused me much 
suffering on that evening in the theatre, and which (would) afflict me next day when I was in the 
gallery or the King's apartment, among all those great people, waiting for His Majesty... (this 
fear) prevented me from staying in a room with ladies when the doors were closed” (354). The 
scene denigrates the King, and all those waiting for His Majesty, even as it appears a humble and 
risky disclosure of physical weakness.  
 These moments of personal spectacle allow the narrator to emphasize his physical 
presence in the reader’s imagination, to become even more aggressively present. Exhibitionism 
is about the spotlight, about the power of being in it. In the scene in which he exposes himself in 
the alleyway the narrator asserts that what the women saw “was nothing obscene, I was far from 
thinking of that; it was ridiculous. The absurd pleasure I got from laying myself before their eyes 
is quite indescribable” (90). “Laying myself before their eyes” is obviously intended to resonant 
with the entire project of the Confessions, for the text is entirely a laying oneself before the 
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reader’s eyes. In fact, this metaphorical pairing makes the reader the woman to whom Rousseau 
exposes himself to, emphasizing the sexuality of narrative spectacle. It also reminds us of 
another sexual performance, this time of submission. Rousseau describes kneeling, unseen, on 
the carpet before a woman he admired. Eventually, she sees him in the bedroom mirror. Thus 
the spectacle is tripled: in the eyes of the woman, the mirror, and the eyes of the reader. It is 
described as a performance—a “lively dumb-show—despite his violent and emotional response 
[he “trembled, cried out, and threw (him)self down”(79)]. In yet another passage conflating 
performance and spectacle with sexual receptivity, Rousseau describes the performance of one 
of his musical compositions. The female members of the audience are reportedly quite swept 
away by it: “And yet I am sure that sexual passion counted for more at that moment than the 
vanity of an author; if there had only been men present I am positive that I would not have been 
devoured, as I continuously was, by the desire to catch with my lips the delicious tears I had 
evoked” (353). It is one of many scenes of mutual intoxication: Rousseau describes creating 
something that moves his audience to great passion, and the exchange is described in an 
indubitably sexual diction. As readers we are aligned with his audience: the spectacle of his 
retelling of the musical performance is intended to elicit a similar response.  
 The Confessions ends with a dramatic scene of the narrator reading the scandalous text 
aloud to a roomful of distinguished persons. His tone is defiant:  
 I have told the truth. If anyone knows anything contrary to what I have here recorded,  
 though he prove it a thousand times, his knowledge is a lie and an imposture; and if he  
 refuses to investigate and inquire into it during my lifetime he is no lover of justice or of  
 truth.....Thus I concluded my reading, and everyone was silent. Mme d’Egmont was the  
 only person who seemed moved. She trembled visibly but quickly controlled herself, and  
 remained quiet, as did the rest of the company. Such was the advantage I derived from  
 my reading and my declaration (606). !
It is his quintessential move: a dramatic spectacle elicits from the reader the feeling that they, 
too, are in the room, under the inquisitive and searching eye of Rousseau. We feel suddenly 
under his gaze, which undermines our ability to reflect on what we’ve read. Do we believe him? 
Are we lovers of justice or of truth? Would we too “tremble visibly”? Would we remain quiet? By 
creating such a scene—one that is indeed worthy of the stage— in a context as intimate as the 
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Confessions, Rousseau dismantles and exceeds our expectations. It is like the actor’s sharp turn 
to the audience in a soliloquy, or the aside a player makes to the audience in the midst of a 
scene. He urges our sympathy, our laughter; he puts us on the spot from the very position of the 
spotlight. Rather than calling attention to the text as a construction these moments actually 
reinforce the narrator’s authority. 
 The personal spectacle as it appears in Emile is more complex than in the Confessions. 
The governor is a proxy of the narrator who is a proxy of Rousseau, and that governor 
experiences some events as a decoy for Emile. Sophie offers Emile “countless tender caresses” 
through the governor— “she would rather die,” he assures us, than “give (them) to him 
directly” (424). She even refuses to take Emile’s arm on a stroll, instead preferring the 
governor’s. Here and elsewhere the governor and Emile blend together— at another moment the  
when the narrator is tired he suppresses the feeling because Emile hardly gets weary (412). In a 
similar blurring of lines the narrator asserts his rights to Emile over Emile’s biological father. 
The father has “confid(ed) his son to me”  and in so doing “yields his place... he substitutes my 
right for his.” He concludes “I am Emile’s true father; I made him a man” (407).  
 In closing I’d like to point to a text so obviously influenced by Rousseau’s work, De 
Quincey’s Confessions of an English Opium Eater.   De Quincey’s tale takes several cues from 108
Rousseau, perhaps most obviously in his sudden direct address to the reader. In the 
introduction to his Confessions he tells the reader his disclosures are “spontaneous and extra-
judicial confessions... for any such acts of gratuitous self-humiliation from those who can be 
supposed in sympathy with the decent and self-respecting part of society, we must look to 
French literature” (1). Unlike Wordsworth, De Quincey adapts Rousseau depiction of the 
shameful or sexual confession; his memoir too includes an element of sexualizing the reader. 
There is an early discussion of self-conquest versus self-indulgence in which he asserts “Guilt, 
therefore, I do not acknowledge” (4). He includes the reader in his musings about the experience 
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of reading another person’s confessions, saying “As creating some previous interest of a personal 
sort in the confessing subject, apart from the matter of the confessions, which cannot fail to 
render the confessions themselves more interesting” (7). In a particularly Rousseauean scene De 
Quincey writes of composing the letters of two women who want to write to their loves:  
 In the midst of their confusion and blushes, whilst dictating, or rather giving me general  
 instructions, it did not require any great penetration to discover that what they wished  
 was, that their letters should be as kind as was consistent with proper maidenly pride. I  
 contrived so to temper my expressions, as to reconcile the gratification of both feelings...  
 they were astonished at my having so readily discovered them (15). !
In this narrative move De Quincey implies that he writes of the reader’s secret thoughts as well: 
we enjoy the confessions as we read them, the vicarious intoxicating philosophizing which 
accompanies the opium high; we relish his exploits and are paralleled with the women who are 
similarly excited. By demonstrating his skill in writing letters based on fantasy which 
nonetheless elicit strong emotions, he communicates to us how keenly he can sense what it is 
that a reader wants. Unlike Rousseau, however, De Quincey invites us to create the text with 
him: to rise and paint into the room in which he sits an “eternal tea-pot” (60). De Quincey 
departs from Rousseau by inviting the reader who receives his confession to consider their 
imaginative participation—the voluntary nature of reading itself. In its own way, this renders 
even more apparent the text as a construction: “Now then, reader, from 1813, where all this time 
we have been sitting down and loitering-- rise up, if you please, and walk forward about three 
years more. Now draw up the curtain, and you shall see me in a new character” (54). 
 Rousseau’s work invites the critique of vanity, and not only because he so often declares 
himself an altogether extraordinary personage, as excellent a man as ever lived. One of Burke’s 
scathing reviews pointed to the incredible irony of the author of Emile having put his children in 
the foundling home:  
 It is that new-invented virtue [vanity] which your masters canonize that led their moral  
 hero constantly to exhaust the stores of his powerful rhetoric in the expression of   
 universal benevolence, whilst his heart was incapable of harboring one spark of common  
 parental affection.… He melts with tenderness for those only who touch him by the  
 remotest relation, and then, without one natural pang, casts away, as a sort of offal and  
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 excrement, the spawn of his disgustful amours, and sends his children to the hospital of  
 foundlings. The bear loves, licks, and forms her young: but bears are not philosophers.  109!
Hazlitt’s response would be that the narcissism of Rousseau may free us by keeping us from our 
own narcissism (Duffy 77). As with the gay procession that allows us to see how we prefer 
ourselves to others and others prefer themselves to us, Rousseau’s narcissism is a comfort and 
entertainment, a demonstration of the author’s power, and a display of the reader’s sympathy at 
once. In this charitable if perverse reading, Rousseau makes of himself a spectacle in authorship 
and life, a sort of performance which liberates the reader from his own boredom and self-
interest. It worked then and works now: he controls our entertainment and education as he 
controls Emile’s, and all the while we think we are just being told a story.  
 The overlap between personal and public spectacle appears in a remarkable scene in his 
memoir Reveries of a Solitary Walker. Having simultaneously admitted regretting his decision 
to give up his children and defended it as an effort to prevent them being made into “monsters” 
by their mother and her family, Rousseau transitions into a scene of himself and his wife buying 
wafers for a passing group of young children led by a governess. They are later at La Chevrette, 
the home of Mme d’Epinay, where Rousseau leaves an elaborate festival, preferring to instead 
visit a county fair. He watches as a young man buys gingerbread and, breaking it up into pieces, 
throws it into a crowd of “yokels” who race and knock each other down for a scrap. Though 
initially he is less amused by this than the others in attendance, Rousseau eventually follows 
suit, buying a bushel of apples from a little girl and inviting her to distribute them among the 
boys. He does so not because he is gratified at having caused the children joy. Rather, he writes, 
he experienced a strange and “disinterested” enjoyment which is “independent of the part I play 
in it, for I have always been very attracted by the pleasure of seeing cheerful faces in popular 
rejoicings.” It is in other words, an aesthetic experience: “I, who shared in this joy at so little cost 
to myself,” he writes, “had the added pleasure of feeling that I was the author of it” (146). 
!
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Chapter Four !
The Ethics of Play and Silence: Lying Fallow in Shelley’s  
Julian and Maddalo  !!
   Let not high verse, mourning the memory 
   Of that which is no more, or painting’s woe 
   Or sculpture, speak in feeble imagery 
   Their own cold powers. Art and eloquence, 
   And all the shows o’ the world are frail and vain 
   To weep a loss that turns their lights to shade.  110!
 If words be not ... an incarnation of the thought, but only a clothing for it,  
 then surely will they prove an ill gift; such a one as those possessed vestments,  
 read of in the stories of superstitious times, which had power to consume and  
 to alienate from his right mind the victim who put them on. Language, if it do  
 not uphold, and feed, and leave in quiet, like the power of gravitation or the air  
 we breathe, is a counter-spirit, unremittingly and noiselessly at work, to subvert,  
 to lay waste, to vitiate, and to dissolve.   111!
“Eloquence is heard; poetry is overheard”: so states Mill in “Poetry and its Varieties.” Eloquence 
assumes an audience, he tells us; it works to influence them, move them to action or “(court) 
their sympathy.” The strange thing about poetry, by contrast, is that the poet composes with no 
awareness of a listener: “Poetry is feeling confessing itself to itself in moments of solitude, and 
embodying itself in symbols which are the nearest possible representations of the feeling in the 
exact shape in which it exists in the poet's mind” (71). This unconsciousness is not entirely 
beneficial, however. According to Plato it can lead to deception, lawlessness, and chaos. 
Enthralled with his ability to imitate the poet feels that “nothing (is) beneath him”: he mimics 
animals, musical instruments, mechanical operations, thunderstorms, and subjectivities without 
discernment (86).  The trepidation about poetry’s power is rooted in a fear that the power of 112
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 Keats embraces this aspect of the poet’s character of the poet, delighting as it does in 112
conjuring both “light and shade...high or low...mean or elevated.” He adds, “What shocks the 
Virtuous Philosopher, delights the camelion poet” (Keats’s Letters, Letter to Richard 
Woodhouse, October 27, 1818).
mimesis obscures the apprehension of truth (at best) or corrupts its listener (at worst). The 
imitation of “thunder, the din of wind and hail” is apparent in Shelley’s Julian and Maddalo: A 
Conversation, both literally as setting and metaphorically in the Maniac’s “mad” speech. The 
poem engages several central themes in Shelley’s work, including the primacy of the role of 
sympathy and feeling in ethics, and it is often characterized as an unusually pessimistic tale. 
While this may be true I do not believe it is because (as so often asserted) the philosophical 
argument remains unresolved and the Maniac’s end is so tragic. Rather the poem presents its 
reader with two modes of creative expression: the expression of the self in words and the idle, 
silent play of a child, and what we find to our surprise is that the poetic faculty does not enable 
but rather obfuscates sympathetic intersubjectivity. The very loquaciousness of Julian, Maddalo, 
and the Maniac is symptomatic of an exhausting need to be understood, to persuade; yet 
overwhelmed by their own rapid speech, they ironically fail to realize how language actually 
confounds that desire. Thus poetry is sharply and unfavorably contrasted with the silent, 
directionless play of the girl, which enables her capacity for sympathy and dissolution into her 
environment. This chapter traces the poem’s complex framework of temporality, creativity, and 
failed intersubjective exchange, working to uncover the moral implications of each character’s 
mode of expression as it manifests in an individual’s experience of time. In this poem, to be 
caught up in linguistic expression means to be out of sync with time—to be breathless and 
oblivious within one’s temporal experience. By contrast, the girl is naturally integrated in her 
temporal experience; her play with Julian marks not only a welcome suspension in speech but a 
concomitant slowing of the experience of time.  
 The 617 line poem was likely written in Este where Shelley rented a villa lent to him by 
Byron, with a last revision in 1819. Originally Shelley intended it to appear in Leigh Hunt’s The 
Examiner; later he decided on publication by Charles Ollier. Enclosing the poem in a letter to 
Hunt, Shelley expressed his desire that the poem be published anonymously and he made a 
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similar insistence to Ollier.  The poem, however, did not appear in print during his lifetime; it 113
was first published in Posthumous Poems, a collection edited by his wife Mary, in 1824. The 
titular characters are introduced to us in a preface written in the first person which briefly 
describes the history and characteristics of each. About the Maniac the speaker “can give no 
information” though he does offer general conjectures: the man was very “cultivated and 
amiable” when in his right mind and his madness is clearly due to his heartbreak (121). 
At the poem’s start we see the two friends riding horses on the banks of the Lido. A lively debate 
energizes them as they ride: Julian, an atheist, argues that man is capable of controlling his 
destiny if only he could become master of his own will and mind. Maddalo sees the world in 
colder terms, with man subject to the whims of the universe; he points to an asylum on their way 
to support his point. They part, the argument unresolved. Early the next morning Julian visits 
Maddalo’s home in the interest of resuming the conversation. While he waits for Maddalo to rise 
Julian sits on the floor with his daughter, and together they playfully “(roll) billiard balls about.” 
Julian fondly praises the infant, who he had first met some six months ago. When Maddalo 
awakens Julian immediately returns to the terms of the debate, using the daughter’s simple 
happiness in play as an example of the ideal state man is capable of. In response Maddalo says 
he “talks Utopia”; he reminds him of a man who also had lofty ideals and was similarly 
distraught at humankind’s failure to achieve its potential. He asks Julian if he would like to join 
him to visit the man in the asylum where he now resides.  Just a few months before this man 114
was functionally sane, known in Venice and to Maddalo; his madness seems something of a 
mystery. Julian agrees and they take their gondolas to the island.  
 Upon embanking they hear the terrible sounds of the lunatics around them as well as 
some musical sounds coming from the Maniac’s apartment which lift their spirits. Unbeknownst 
to the Maniac, Julian and Maddalo sneak into his apartment; it is outfitted with books, artwork, 
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 The asylum which Julian and Maddalo visit was likely based on San Servolo, which was 114
originally a monastery, but was converted into the Central Mental Hospital for the area in 1804.
and instruments such as he would have enjoyed in his previous more lucid state; Maddalo’s 
generosity is the reason for his comfort. The apartment is so close to the seashore that the 
Maniac, who has left his windows open, is sprayed with the saltwater. Unobserved, the two men 
listen to the Maniac’s extensive and fragmented lament about a lover who scorned him.  115
Finally exhausted by his speech and sobs, he collapses into a deep slumber; Julian and Maddalo 
weep silently in sympathy, never having been observed. They exit the apartment having 
forgotten the original debate entirely. When they return to Maddalo’s they eat a fine meal and 
talk until dawn, speculating about the Maniac’s lot. So engaged in each other are they, in fact, 
that Julian doesn’t realize the evening has passed. Julian then assures the reader that he wishes 
he could have stayed to help take care of the Maniac but because of duties elsewhere he is 
obligated to leave Venice; the subsequent lines make clear he is actually quite at liberty. When 
Julian returns to Venice some years later, his friend Maddalo is gone but his daughter is there. 
She is graceful and hospitable and again lavishly praised by Julian. He inquires about the 
Maniac and the daughter tells him that the woman who was the source of his original dismay 
returned to him only to leave once again. The single detail she recalls is being a girl and playing 
with the lady’s shawl. Yet again Julian asks about the parting [“How did it end?” (l.608)]; 
Maddalo’s daughter asks him why what she has told him is not enough. He repeats his inquiry, 
“Child, is there no more?” (l.609). She asks that he let her be as silent as the years which mark 
their memory and “the marble where their corpses lie” (l.615). Having learned that the Maniac 
and the lady are dead, Julian is yet unsatisfied: still he questions her. Finally she tells him what 
he most wants to know: “how / All happened” (l.617). Julian closes the poem without sharing 
this information, saying only “the cold world shall not know” (l.616). 
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 Critics are divided as to whether the object of the Maniac’s affection is singular, double, or 115
even three figures, separating his references to the “spirit’s mate” (l.338); “Death’s dedicated 
bride,” (l.384), and the “child” (l.484), as potentially discrete individuals, rather than varying 
perspectives on the same individual. Still others see the Maniac’s love object as an ideal 
projection, like the spirit Alastor pursues (Wasserman 77; Hirsch 27). Because of the final scene 
in which the woman tells Julian of the Maniac’s end, identifying the return of a single lover, I am 
inclined to disagree with readings that argue for more than one love object.
 One thinks of the Maniac’s metric, heightened speech and Julian and Maddalo who 
overhear him in Mill’s assertion that poetry is “feeling confessing itself to itself, in moments of 
solitude.” But the Maniac hallucinates figures to address, fantastic audiences to receive his 
words (“death’s dedicated bride,” the child). His vacillation between content-based speech 
(about the lover and her scorn) and speech about writing itself—the spoken and written word—
underlines his consciousness of an audience and even reader. His speech has the pleading tone 
of one hoping to “court sympathy” or move to passion, even if the listener is a figment of his 
imagination. Julian and Maddalo’s conversation is likewise a contest to influence the other’s 
(and by extension the reader’s) belief. Even the narrator of the Preface assumes an audience: 
specifically a reader who will be engrossed enough to offer judgment as to Julian’s character. 
The speech of these characters is not emotion confessed in solitude; rather it is feeling openly 
expressed in the effort to judge, condemn, or persuade. Only the girl has the “utter 
unconsciousness of a listener” and the symbols which accompany her appearances— the billiard 
balls, a reference to Hume’s first principle, and the woman’s shawl, a redemptive lifting of the 
veil, as frequently used in the Defence to emblematize the virtues of the poetic spirit —
emphasize her importance, and are potential representations of the poet’s feeling in the “exact 
shape in which it exists in the poet’s mind.”   116
 Unlike Julian and Maddalo, the reader rarely feels that our presence as audience is 
unnoticed. Our readerly attention is often called to the poem’s construction, either directly or 
indirectly, and our suspension of disbelief is frequently destabilized due to Shelley’s deployment 
of literary allusions, biographical parallels, and liberal use of the pathetic fallacy.  Attempting 117
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 The poem incorporates a number of allusions to King Lear (“what may tame the heart / must 117
leave the understanding free” and “when the mind is free, the body is delicate”) as well as to 
Milton’s Paradise Lost, Coleridge’s Rime of the Ancient Mariner, and Dante’s The Inferno.
to make meaning of the philosophical question which ostensibly drives the poem, we are 
similarly tripped up by ambiguous articulations, shifts of point of view and verb tense, and 
sentences fragmented by asteriks. Our assessment is further stymied by the overlapping 
characterization of Julian, Maddalo, and the Maniac, who blend into the sort of composite figure 
we might more properly expect of dreams—sometimes discrete, sometimes collapsed, and 
always talking.  Because speech is conflated in the text with writing and poetry [the Maniac 118
references writes as he speaks; Maddalo says he is a wretched man “cradled into poetry by 
wrong, / They learn in suffering what they teach in song”(l.544-45)] the reader becomes 
increasingly suspicious of the written and spoken word. The effect of these writerly sleights of 
hand is that we cannot help but wonder whether, as Plato argued, there is something troubling 
or even deceptive about the poetic faculty. 
 The shared idle play in the scene between Julian and Maddalo’s daughter is posited as 
antidote to this overwhelming web of words. Radically contrasted with the performative quality 
of the Maniac’s hyperbolic speech and the intellectual shrewdness of Julian and Maddalo, her 
quiet appearance offers the briefest of glimpses of a creativity which is contingent on the 
acknowledgement that we cannot apprehend the consciousness, much less the temporally 
unstable will, of another human being, even through their own articulation—nor can we 
articulate our own. The girl’s play with Julian, her memory of playing with the Maniac’s lover’s 
shawl (which offers nothing to further the plot, and thus reifies her status as outsider), and her 
reluctance to tell Julian of the Maniac’s end symbolize the beauty of a shared creativity which 
has no purpose. Her later appearance at the poem’s conclusion reinforces a reading that this 
play— so obviously antithetical to the directed and self-interested speech of the three main 
figures —is the only mode of creative expression which enables empathetic, moral 
understanding.  
!
I. “Ever-shifting sand”: The characters and their readers 
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I’d first like to briefly survey the existing criticism which surrounds this poem. Doing so allows 
us to see how and in what ways the critical web is preoccupied with identifying the characters 
and their supposed analogues in real and literary life. For perhaps more than any other of 
Shelley’s major works, one is tempted to go sleuthing for the real world clues to Julian and 
Maddalo. There is no dearth of evidence linking Shelley’s life and social circle to the cast of the 
otherwise fantastical poem. The poet was circumspect to his editors about the date and 
circumstances of its composition. In a letter to Leigh Hunt Shelley makes a flippant yet 
melancholy comment about the enclosed poem, saying “I would not put my name to it. I leave 
you to judge whether it is best to throw it into the fire, or to publish it. So much for self—self, 
that burr will stick to one.” The accepted critical view is that Julian, an atheist, represents 
Shelley and Maddalo is the proud, vain, and cynical Byron. To support the assertion that Julian 
is Shelley readers have paired the opening of the poem, with its ecstatic yet unsettling 
description of the ride of the “barren” Lido, to a letter to Mary on August 23, 1818 in which 
Shelley describes a gondola ride to a “long sandy island” and a horse ride with Byron (though 
the conversation was more personal and less lofty than that which launches the poem, 
consisting “in histories of his wounded feelings... and great professions of friendship and 
regard”).  To support their assertion that Shelley is Julian many readers have also pointed to 119
“Athanese: A Fragment,” a poem composed within a year of Julian and Maddalo that Shelley 
wished to appear alongside it (also anonymously).   120
 The lyrical quality of his fragmentary rant, the music with which he is associated, and his 
excess sensitivity has led to the Maniac being frequently read as a generalized poet, the poet 
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by Mary Shelley, 1840. Letter IX to Mrs. Shelley, (Bagni di Lucca). Shelley reports returning to 
Byron’s palace, but the letter is torn where he presumably describes what occurred there. The 
second quote is also from Volume 2. Letter XXI to Leigh Hunt, Esq. Livorno, August 15th, 1819. 
 The poem was first published in Shelley’s Posthumous Poems with Mary’s retitle “Prince 120
Athanase.” There are parallels between the two texts: among others, the poem includes the 
debate of Athanase’s friends over the unknown cause of the young man’s sorrows.  
Tasso, the pale visionary who appears in so much of Shelley’s work, or Shelley himself.  Critics 121
also point to the folded leaf of paper which the Maniac scribbles upon and the fact that the 
soliloquy is given to us in metric speech to support this reading.  Readings which interpret 122
Julian and the Maniac (or Shelley/Julian and the Maniac) as in fact parallel figures also focus on 
image motifs which unite the two: the imagery of the Lido which Julian finds so enchanting is 
echoed in the description of the madhouse: the “bare strand,” “matted” weeds, “salt ooze,” and 
“uninhabitable” seaside resonate with “oozy stairs,” “woods on a wrecked palace,” “tangled 
locks,” and so on (cite). Additionally, both Maniac and Julian work to separate feeling from 
intellect, though the Maniac fails where Julian succeeds because Julian does not attempt to 
subject his idealism to real-world problems. If the Maniac is intended to be the figure of the 
poet, however, then his speech is easily read as indicative of the dangers of poetic inspiration 
rather than its ultimate failure; I will argue the latter reading is more persuasive. 
  When the Maniac is read through the lens of Shelley’s biography his “uncommunicable 
woe” (l.343) is considered a reflection of the poet’s grief over the loss of his daughter and marital 
estrangement from Mary (who blamed him for the loss), or as a voicing of distress over his 
divorce from Harriet and her subsequent suicide. These same critics have assumed that Shelley’s 
desire to have the poem printed anonymously stems from his anxiety that Mary would recognize 
his voice in the passages in which the Maniac laments (and attacks) his estranged lover—a 
reading loosely supported by Mary’s apparent ignorance about the poem’s existence (Bieri 145). 
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Pennsylvania UP, 1996. Byron wrote “Lament of Tasso.” In November 1818, Shelley sent 
Peacock a letter, enclosing a splinter from the door of Tasso’s prison cell; he intended to write “a 
tragedy on the subject of Tasso’s madness” through 1819 (Letter XII, Nov 8, 1818). Two 
fragments remain: “Scene from ‘Tasso’ and “Song of ‘Tasso.” Though beyond the scope of this 
essay, it is also interesting to note that Tasso’s most famous work is Discourse on the Art of the 
Dialogue, which Shelley surely read (Wasserman 77, Hirsch 28).
 Interestingly Shelley’s asserted that in this poem he especially worked to keep the language 122
“conversational” if not “vulgar”: “I have employed a certain familiar style of language to express 
the actual way in which people talk with each other whom education and a certain refinement of 
sentiment have placed above the use of vulgar idioms... (including) the vulgarity of rank and 
fashion (as well as poverty)”(letter to Leigh Hunt). Yet the lyric in which the conversation is 
translated is obviously— both translated and verse—and heightened for dramatic effect, and, 
well, written.
In his excellent treatment of these questions Reiman asks whether portions of Shelley’s letter to 
Hunt about the poem’s composition on August 15th, 1819 “might not also be premeditated set-
pieces rather than fully candid commentary”; he does so in service of an argument that Shelley’s 
identification with the Maniac would have been so apparent to those around him that he felt it 
necessary to distance himself as the author and preempt a biographical reading. In the same 
letter Shelley describes the Maniac as “in some degree pointing from nature, but with respect to 
time and place, ideal,” which Reiman reads as “much like the modern novelist claiming that 
resemblance to particular persons living or dead is purely coincidental” (859).  Ultimately he 123
returns to “Athanese: A Fragment” and Julian and Maddalo to argue that Athanese, Julian, and 
the Maniac form a complete self-portrait at the poet in a state of extreme melancholy in the 
latter half of 1819, specifically representing two stages of his adjustment to his estrangement 
from Mary. Though titled A Conversation he reads the poem as an unforgiving, mocking, and 
self-critical dramatic monologue on the part of Shelley, with the Maniac and Maddalo 
functioning as dramatic foils to lay bare Julian / Shelley’s narcissism and naiveté and the selfish 
implications of his idealism (318-22). The Maniac’s speech is a portrait of the “inner side of 
Shelley” whereas the portrait of Athanese is the outer, depicting his isolation from Mary, the 
Hunts, Charles Ollier, Peacock and Godwin (320-22). Hirsch makes a similar argument that 
Shelley, not the poem, is “the text to be read and understood” (14).   124
 The “who’s who” of the text, then, is a level of engagement which critics eagerly 
participate in. Like a matryoshka, the text offers us glimpses of figures within figures, tempting 
us to attempt to trace each parallel, potential origin, or poetic / allusive equivalent. One might 
say that the critical response has attempted to grapple with the lack of resolution in the poem, 
both the unfinished tale of the Maniac and Julian and Maddalo’s abandonment of their debate, 
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“Have you seen my poem, Julian and Maddalo? ... I mean to write three other poems... the 
subjects of which will be all drawn from dreadful or beautiful realities, as that of this 
was” (Letter to Charles Ollier, Letter II, December 1819, 164, 539).
 Here he consciously references and offers a counterpoint to Wasserman’s influential reading 124
that “we, the readers, then, are in the end the text to be read and understood” (92).
by identifying new puzzles: the tripartite projection of Shelley, the doubling or tripling of 
imagery and characters, the reflection of the reader as the answer to the philosophical question, 
or the correlation of griefs between poet and madman. In so doing I believe it overlooks the 
extent to which the poem’s cast of characters are dancing a narrative waltz in a veritable hall of 
mirrors. It is a poem full of epistemological dead-ends, dizzying speed and rapid shifts of events,  
so that what the  poem fundamentally represents is the failure of speech to be coherent. To be 
sure, when its object of study includes a lengthy monologue delivered by an insane man any 
literary criticism relying on biography (even in part) is bound to be laden with reaches and 
contradictions. And so we get arguments that Julian is “Shelley’s avatar” or incarnation, that the 
Maniac is a dissociated self-portrait of Shelley, and that the poem is a monologue of a madman 
written by a madman (Matthews 64).  Hirsch notes that the Maniac’s visage calls to mind 125
Shelley’s own face— pale skin “in hue too beautiful for health,” a “sad meek face and eyes 
lustrous and glazed” (l.285)— and Shelley’s personality generally; yet he then acquiesces that the 
image of the Maniac are common to Shelley’s depiction of any poet or visionary (23-4). Reiman 
assures us rather over-confidently that the poem’s central theme is “the mid-life crisis 
(characteristic of ambitious people in their mid-thirties), which struck (Shelley) early” (320-22). 
The poem engages us on so many fronts that the willingness to move between biographical, 
material, and textual criticism, despite its sometimes contradictory yield, is understandable. 
Still, as O’Neill wryly states,“No amount of spadework about Shelley’s and Mary’s marital 
problems is going, I think, to uncover the decisive clue to understanding the Maniac’s 
monologue” (138).  
 The blurring of lines between the characters of Julian and Maddalo presents a more 
troubling problem for the critic who works to solve the debate which ostensibly propels the plot: 
whether man could be in charge of his own destiny if he would only harness the power of his will 
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 In his study of Shelley’s draft Matthews excitedly details how the Maniac’s soliloquy is written 125
in a “gross and chaotic” hand, its text “literally disjointed, scribbled in unarticulated bits and 
pieces, so that the curious arrangement of dots and asteriks...reflects faithfully the broken way 
in which the Soliloquy was composed” (Matthews 64). What he seems to be positing here is not 
that the Maniac is Shelley, but that Shelley may be, in fact, the Maniac.
and mind. A passage in Shelley’s essay “On Life,” also written late in 1819, is extremely helpful in 
parsing out Shelley’s intention in overlapping their character to such an extent, despite their 
philosophical disagreement. In that essay he insists on a view of life which is characterized by 
“unity,” arguing passionately that the concept of distinct individual minds is a “delusion”: 
 The words I, you, they are not signs of any actual difference subsisting between the  
 assemblages of thoughts thus indicated, but are merely marks employed to denote the  
 different modifications of the one mind....The words I, and you and they are   
 grammatical devices invented simply for he arrangement and totally devoid of the  
 intense and exclusive sense usually attached to him. It is difficult to find terms   
 adequately to express  so subtle a conception as that to which the intellectual philosophy  
 has conducted us. We  are on that verge where words abandon us, and what wonder if  
 we grow dizzy to look down the dark abyss of—how little we know. (508, emphasis  
 mine) 
   !
There is an eerie overlap between this passage and a passage from Kant’s Anthropology from a 
Pragmatic Point of View; so similar, in fact, that it has the ring of a conscious reference. 
Published in 1798, the text deals in part with the issue of mental illness in that text and it is very 
possibly part of Shelley’s inspiration for the Maniac and Julian and Maddalo’s observation of 
him. In the passage which this excerpt from “On Life” most echoes, Kant writes:  “Deception due 
to the strength of the human power of imagination often goes so far that a person believes he 
sees and feels outside himself that which he has only in his mind”; he goes on to describe this as 
“dizziness” one experiences at looking down the “abyss.” Mentally ill individuals  “have a strange 
fear that, seized by an inner impulse, they will spontaneously hurl themselves down” (71).  
 That the Anthropology may be an inspiration for the poem itself is certainly logistically 
possible. The collected lectures were published in German twenty-one years before the 
composition of Shelley’s poem. Leland R. Phelps has successfully argued that by 1809 Shelley 
was producing rudimentary translations of German; by the end of his life, by all accounts, he 
was fluent.   Mary says he was reading the German works by fifteen years of age, and that 126
though he loved wild and fantastical literature “he had not fostered those tastes at their genuine 
sources — the romances and chivalry of the middle ages; but in the perusal of such German 
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 In his biography, Holmes concluded that Phelps is correct.126
works as were current in those day.” Finally, and most important, we know that Shelley had 
eagerly read Kant: lamenting that the Gisbornes had failed to buy the books he had requested, 
he writes to a friend before leaving Venice, “they knew how very much I wished to receive these 
books by the same conveyance as the filtering-stone. Dare I ask you to do me the favour to buy 
them? A complete edition of the works of Calderon, and the French translation of Kant, a 
German Faust, and to add the Nympholept?”  127
  There are other remarkable similarities: Kant twice warns that in social conversation, 
jumping off from one topic to another in a way “contrary to the natural relationship of ideas” 
interrupts and destroys intersubjectivity: “for then the company breaks up in a state of mental 
distraction, since everything is mixed together and the unity of the conversation is entirely 
missing. Thus the mind finds itself confused and in need of a new distraction in order to be rid 
of that one” (101). The madhouse is described as a place where men must be kept, as the Maniac 
“despite the maturity and strength of their age...“orderly through someone else’s reason” “with 
regard to the smallest matters of life” (97); we can read “someone else’s reason” as Maddalo’s 
generosity to him. “Talkativeness” is directly related to derangement and can land you in the 
lunatic asylum: “the lively power of imagination inserts so much into what they are relating that 
no one grasps what they actually wanted to say.” Dementia involves the “falsely inventive power 
of the imagination” where “self-made representations are regarded as perceptions,” much like 
the Maniac’s hallucination of listeners. Finally, poetry and madness are decidedly linked: 
“Dementia accompanied by affect is madness, whose fits, though involuntary, can often be 
original and which then, like poetic rapture (furor poeticus), border on genius” (97); but the 
mind can be held dangerously in suspense 
 by means of analogies that are confused with concepts of similar things, and thus the  
 power of imagination, in a play resembling understanding,  conjures up the connection of 
 disparate things as universal.... (those mad in this way) write insipid poetry... The lunatic 
 of this sort is not curable because, like poetry in general, he is creative and  
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 Reiman concurs that he was reading German by 1812 if not before. As for his interest in Kant, 127
De Quincey writes that he misses Shelley while visiting Dove Cottage, and that his own library, 
“being rich in the wickedest of German speculations, would naturally have been more to 
Shelley’s taste than the Spanish library of Southey” (MacCarthy 126).
entertaining by means of diversity. This third kind of derangement is indeed  methodical, 
but only fragmentary (109, emphasis in original). !
Madness equates to a sort of “nonsense in form” a fragmentation akin to the Maniac’s own 
speech: “The irregular, roaming power of imagination so confuses the mind, through the 
succession of ideas that are not tied to anything objective, that he who leaves a gathering of this 
kind feels as though he has been dreaming” (70). 
 Because of their talkativeness, the way in which they are seduced by their conversation’s 
leap from topic to topic, the Maniac’s hallucinations and the fickleness with which Julian and 
Maddalo attend to their debate, characteristics of the three characters which are merged. This 
unification is ironically a way for Shelley to demonstrate the tragedy of man’s conviction that he 
is separate: Julian because he believes he can discern his own will; Maddalo because he believes 
he can know that the universe is chaos; and the Maniac, because he has grown “dizzy” looking at 
the dark abyss of how little we know (he thinks, of another, but in fact of the universe entirely). 
What the three men fail to recognize the unity which their reality insists upon. In his attempt to 
express his concept of unity Shelley bemoans the limitations of language, and that same 
awareness is woven throughout Julian and Maddalo. For example, though Julian and Maddalo 
are opposed characters they frequently overlap in their worldview. Both scoff at things holy 
[Maddalo draws a “wicked pleasure” (121) in encouraging Julian’s taunts]; when describing to 
Julian how the Maniac despaired over the “absurd deceits” man falls for (presumably religion) 
Maddalo says that he thinks with him “In some respects” (l. 240). Yet both of their attitudes are 
described in terms which rest on faith. Julian describes his attitude as “another faith,” (l.166), as 
one which exists outside of the realm of the provable, and Maddalo’s position is similarly 
construed: “My judgement will not bend, though I think you might make such a system 
refutation tight as far as words go” (in this statement Maddalo also points to the ultimate 
incapacity of even the most elegant, rhetorically exact speech to affect a strong will) (l.194-95). 
Emphasizing the peripherality of their philosophical argument, the blending of their traits are 
often linked with a confusion of events or tenses, making it impossible to discern cause and 
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effect. This moves their philosophical debate even further on the periphery of the poem’s 
concerns. This sentence, for example, both shifts point of view to collapse Julian and Maddalo, 
while simultaneously confusing causality: “While we to such sick thoughts subjected are / As 
came on you last night - it is our will” (l.169-70). Are they subjected, or is it their will? Does it 
matter?  
 The sudden abandonment of this debate following that visit—presumably because of 
their emotional sympathy with the Maniac’s tale—feels terribly abrupt, but shouldn’t. It is 
indicative of the superficiality of the debate and is, after all, far from the only narrative fragment 
in the poem: the text is characterized by unfinished business. The narrator of the preface, as 
Silke-Maria Weineck argues, “opens a frame which is never closed; Julian who tells the story of 
his visit and his return to Venice but leaves the years in between blank; Maddalo’s daughter who 
tells the story of the maniac to Julian but not to the reader; the maniac whose own story keeps 
emerging in his soliloquy only to submerge again and again in rows of asteriks.” Weineck’s 
overall interpretation is that the poem’s real subject is the limits of narrative and the dangerous 
violence lurking within the poetic faculty. That violence is cognitive and linguistic, and it results 
in madness. Julian’s wish to help the Maniac is indicative not of his sympathy, then, but rather 
his desire to restore the integrity of narrative and save it (and himself) from the madness of pure 
poetry. In Weineck’s view, the Maniac’s emotive outbursts are offered in exchange for causality 
itself (91-92), a reading which somewhat dispenses of a serious consideration of what the 
question of causality is doing, if anything, in the poem. It is posited as key to their philosophical 
disagreement and needs attending, but perhaps not in the way we think.  
 Loosely put, if man’s habit of mind is capable of predicting events before they occur he is 
more able to determine his fate. If there is truly no such thing as cause and effect, or no such 
thing discernable by us, then we will be eternally “baffled” (l.130); in this case, the notion of 
human will is simply “All that vain men imagine or believe / Or hope can paint” (l.44-5 ). The 
billiard balls which Julian and Maddalo’s daughter roll about serve as a reference to Hume’s first 
principle. Hume famously used them in a metaphor to help explain that there is nothing in an 
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object itself, nor of our observation of the frequent conjunction of objects, from which we may 
draw any conclusion.   When observing a billiard ball rolling towards another it would be 128
impossible “to infer motion in the second ball from the motion and impulse of the 
first” (Enquiry 4.1). It is through the association of ideas, or induction, that the mind learns to 
expect regularity; the habit is so powerful that we create what we begin to think of as the 
“necessary connection.” Hume’s conclusion is that all knowledge, such as it is, is based on each 
person’s individual habit of thought, leaving an impossible logical gap. While Kant agrees with 
Hume that causation has no logical explanation he disputes the idea that causation is entirely a 
habit of our minds, developing his central concepts of judgement of experience and judgement 
of perception in response to the problem of cause. Ultimately Kant will use this argument in 
establishing that knowledge shapes experience, which is roughly translated into Julian’s 
position (more discussion on Kant’s influence on the text, albeit in another direction, follows).   
 Shelley was deeply influenced by Hume and no doubt familiar with the famous passage 
[Godwin reiterates it in “Of Free Will and Necessity” in Political Justice, a passage to which 
Shelley directly responds in Queen Mab (subtitled “A Philosophical Poem with Notes”)].   129
Despite the tidiness of this framework—Julian and Maddalo’s intellectual sparring clearly 
detailed in their “conversation” and a paralleling image motif—because of the poem’s insistence 
on the inability of language to signify, we are invited to remain skeptical of the terms of the 
debate and the seriousness with which Shelley intends us to consider it. One might even say that 
the authenticity of the debate is questioned even before the story begins: the title is a misnomer, 
because though called A Conversation it is (as Reiman noted) a dramatic monologue. Shelley’s 
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 The trope of colliding billiard balls which has been part of philosophical discussions about 128
causation since Newton (133, Dev of Cognition, Affect, and Social Relations Vol 13, The 
Minnesota).
 “When a ball upon a billiard board is struck by a person playing, and afterwards impinges 129
upon a second ball, the which was first in motion is said to act upon the second, though it 
operate in the strictest conformity to the impression it received, and the motion it 
communicates be precisely determined by the circumstances of the case. Exactly similar to this, 
upon the principles {307} already explained, are the actions of the human mind.” Free Will and 
Necessity
decision to write the preface in the voice of an unnamed first person observer then move to 
Julian’s voice similarly demonstrates to the reader the centrality of imagination’s role in the 
narration of personal history; it also reminds us of our own requisite complicity as listener in the 
suspension of disbelief. Before the poem begins an especially equivocating tone highlights the 
instability of the narrator: the first line of the final paragraph is: “Of the Maniac I can give no 
information” and the sentence repeatedly marks the ambiguity inherent in any characterization 
of another [“He seems,” “he was evidently,” “might be like many other stories,” “will perhaps be 
found” (121)]. Wasserman’s widely influential reading of the poem insists the resolution of 
Julian and Maddalo’s debate is left up to the hands of the reader, whose response to the lack of 
explanation for the Maniac’s woe will be indicative of their own condition. The poem is “a gloss 
in aid of interpreting ourselves. We all suffer the human state... whatever we sympathize with or 
are adverse to in the Maniac’s cries will be our personal explanation of that state” (61).  
 But ultimately what Shelley expects from his reader is not a temporary suspension of 
disbelief followed by a reflective return to ourselves. He too obviously directs the reader’s  
critical eye to the implausibility of the scene at the asylum and the red herring of Julian and 
Maddalo’s debate. In this it is characteristic of his work generally: De Man notes how in The 
Triumph of Life, as with Alastor, Epipscyhidion, Adonais, and other poems, the original 
“articulation in terms of the questions is displaced by a very differently structured process that 
pervades all levels of the narrative...to replace it by something quite different for which we have 
no name readily available in the familiar props of literary history” (99). A careful reading 
convinces us that the crux of the poem’s crisis lies not in meliorism versus skepticism, but 
somewhere else. To the extent that the debate is a lens through which events are read, it 
distracts both reader and characters from the interpersonal ethical questions which trouble the 
poem. That we allow ourselves to be distracted ironically demonstrates the point: at any time a 
member of the party—speaker, poet, listener, overhearer, reader— may be suddenly capricious 
in speech, veracity, or attention. This, combined with the arbitrary and inevitable play of the 
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signifier, significantly impedes the extent to which language facilitates intersubjective 
understanding. 
!
II. “...many a bare broad word, / ... I heard / And can forget not” !
The real question the poem poses is not whether we may control his destiny through our will but 
rather if and how we can control our fate if we cannot express it: either because our articulation 
is unintelligible to the other, is obscured from ourselves, or because in the course of identifying 
and expressing our desires time acts upon us and we change. This is especially true in the face of 
another’s will which is similarly shifting and porous, subject to influence, and inadequately 
expressed. In this world we never learn what—or all— that we think we’ve learned from another 
through their speech, no matter with what care or how sympathetically we listen. One of the 
central difficulties of speech is this inevitable incompleteness: as Christopher Bollas writes, “we 
speak, but only ever partly, and the unspoken is as intrinsic an utterance as the 
enunciated” (48).  
 Earlier I described the three men as forming a composite figure. By using “composite” I 
purposely allude to the condensed figure of Freud’s Dream Work who expresses in the 
dreamer’s subconscious the features of two or more individuals (Freud 135-46).   Such a 130
reading is appropriate as the trip to the asylum begins and ends in sleep: Maddalo is asleep with 
Julian comes to his home and the Maniac falls asleep at the end of his lament. The asylum and 
Maniac’s speech have decidedly dreamlike quality and the depiction and experience of time in 
the poem is quite surreal.  Richard Holmes is right in saying that “rather than a real character 131
or person, (the Maniac) is part of a person, the part which lies below the threshold of 
consciousness. It is symbolic that he is both found and left asleep by his visitors” (Holmes pp). 
This is not to say, of course, that we should conclude the three figures form a composite of 
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 The condensation of the figure also functions to represent a displaced common feature, or to 130
symbolize a desired quality which is missing.
 Yet it is not the quality of dreaming which Freud links most explicitly to creative writing, but 131
rather the play of children, which is something I’ll return to, as with the assertion about time. 
Shelley’s subconscious (though it has been done). Rather it is to point out how maintaining a 
hypnagogic atmosphere of shared traits prevents the reader from forming a sympathetic 
attachment to any of the three figures. The poem’s genius lies in its ability to dramatize the 
illusion of an intersubjective connection and seduce the reader with a tremendous overflow of 
speech, in order to demonstrate the extent to which language in service of narrative can cause us 
to evade a state of true sympathy. It accomplishes this using a wild aesthetic that circles around 
three metaphors: speed, the rising and setting of the sun, and language itself.  
 To begin with the latter: in this poem, speech fails both character and reader on a 
number of fronts. It necessarily results in contradiction: to talk is to wade into 
misrepresentations and paradoxes, to paradoxically declare your silence. When the Maniac 
laments that “(his) secret groans must be unheard by thee ... Thy lost friend’s incommunicable 
woe” (l.341) the reader— hidden as it were behind the same curtain as Julian and Maddalo—
cannot help but note the irony; for of course his groans are neither secret nor unheard. At 
another moment the Maniac expresses skepticism at the idea of truth shortly before he affirms it 
(l.345). Then there is the issue of audience: our words might be heard but by the wrong person, 
as none of us are the Maniac’s addressed listener, and his intended audience is a fabrication. Or 
our words are uncomfortably altered for the sake of the listener: the Maniac’s first lines have not 
to do with a broken heart but the feeling of being compelled to put a false face on for others (l. 
308 - 12). Because the pain is actually “incommunicable” its expression creates more agony 
while failing to further understanding or sympathy, and when we are most in need of 
understanding we become overwhelmed by all that cannot be named: “deed too dreadful for a 
name” (l.456) and later, “How vain / Are words! I thought never to speak again, / Not even in 
secret, - not to my own heart” (l. 472-74). The listener for his part is concomitantly troubled. 
One never knows when one is listening the extent of the speaker’s sincerity or revelation. 
Indeed, sometimes the speaker himself does not know: the Maniac announces halfway through 
his speech, “I must remove / A veil from my pent mind. ‘Tis torn aside!” (l. 382-83).  
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 The interpretive stakes (as it were) are considerably raised when the poem begins to 
conflate speech and the written word. And this—more than its expression of heartbreak, 
isolation, indifference, or exile—may be what makes some critics characterize it as a deeply 
cynical poem.  Shelley calls our attention to the writing of the poem at various moments, 132
heightening our awareness of the overlap between composition and recorded speech. Critics 
often observe the expressly literary quality of the Maniac’s articulation. He speaks “sometimes 
as one who wrote, and thought / His words might move some heart” (l.286-87). He writes as he 
talks, furthering our image of him as a sort of poet: he cries to his imagined lover “If this sad 
writing thou shouldst ever see” (l.340); pressing his lips to a letter he has written he describes 
how “from my pen the words flow as I write, / ... to see that charactered in vain / On this 
unfeeling leaf” (l.476-79). The present tense in this statement (“the words flow as I write”) 
implies that, impossibly (which is to say symbolically or metaphorically) the Maniac is writing 
as he speaks. Both speech and writing have the potential to create suffering, largely through 
their ability to obscure meaning or thrive in ambiguity, as in the “unfeeling” leaf of paper which 
“burns the brain / And eats into it... blotting all things fair / And wise and good” (l.479-81). 
When the Maniac’s lover is imagined as saying “that when I speak / My lip is tortured with the 
wrongs which break / The spirit it expresses” (l.409-10) we wonder whether the words express 
the spirit or the wrongs and whether “express” here means to “get rid of” or “to 
communicate.”  In Weineck’s view, the ambiguities of speech are a radicalization of Shelley’s 133
idea in the Defence of Poetry that pure poetry is “characterized by the absolute absence of 
narrative; however, a purely poetic, i.e purely non-narrative poetry would render poetic speech 
indistinguishable from mad speech” (89). But the pains of speech are more far-reaching and 
intimate than the simple absence of narrative: there is no rest for a calm and pure mind, the 
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 Shelley did say in a note which enclosed this poem with several others, that the letter 132
contained all my saddest poems raked into one heap” (Holmes).
 as de Man writes, again of The Triumph of Life, “Whenever this self-receding scene occurs, 133
the syntax and the imagery of the poem tie themselves into a knot which arrests the process of 
understanding. The resistance of these passages is such that the reader soon forgets the 
dramatic situation and is left with only these unsolved riddles to haunt him....” (98-99)
Maniac tells us, because the awful, suppressed thoughts were by the lover “sealedst... with many 
a bare broad word / And seal’dst my memory o’er them, — for I heard / And can forget not.” The 
Maniac wishes those “curses” could be mixed in a cup like poison, to make the blessing of death 
(l.432-36). If what is true in speech is true of writing then both written and spoken language 
fails to promote intersubjective understanding, even obscuring the other from us, an 
impediment to intimacy. Even the most benevolent speech can unknowingly harms us or the 
other.  
 To return to that “unfeeling leaf”: how were those “fair / And wise and good” things 
which the Maniac mentions originally written? They were written, he tells us, by time itself. Yet 
the temporal experiences of the men appear as spotty and unpredictable as the narrative: the 
poem begins with a memory [“I rode one evening with Count Maddalo” (l.1)] but we are never 
told how much time has passed between this memory and his current day. While most of the 
poem feels as though it were written shortly after the event (if we are to believe that the Julian’s 
memory of the Maniac’s soliloquy is in fact “exact”) we learn at the poem’s end that “many years 
and many changes” have passed. The Maniac’s transition from sane to mad happens on short 
order, within less than a year [“some months ago” (l.197)]. Julian and Maddalo are invigorated 
by the rapidity of their rhetoric, characterized by its ethereal quality: their “swift thought” is too 
quick for melancholy. Taking flight on their laughter it “(lingers) not / But flew brain to brain, - 
such glee was ours - / Charged with light memories of remembered hours” (l.29-31). The pairing 
of swift time with similarly speedy rhetoric enables the illusion of perfectly harmonious 
intersubjectivity which transcends speech (“flew brain to brain”); yet the use of the word “light” 
with “memories” implies that those vaguely referenced “remembered hours” are inconsequential 
or easily forgotten. Preoccupied by their activities, Julian and Maddalo’s days pass swiftly and 
we have the feeling of a kind of manic dislocation in time. Our sense that something is “out of 
sync” is compounded by frequent shifts in tense, inversions of syntax, and otherwise puzzlingly 
constructed sentences that obfuscate our sense of time: for example, “What we behold / Shall be 
the madhouse and its belfry tower” (l.106-07). The dreamlike, eerie feeling that the characters 
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are oblivious to the passing of each day is bolstered by its concert with the images of nature: 
gondolas arrive as soon as they are wanted (l.61-62, l.211), sailing through the “fast-falling rain 
and high-wrought sea.” The storm that rages throughout the Maniac’s speech adds to this feeling 
of the world as a stage, so that when the Maniac states “I know / that to myself I do not wholly 
owe / What now I suffer” (l.320 - 22), we are on one hand inclined to believe him, as nature 
seems itself his enemy; yet due to the poet’s heavy reliance on the pathetic fallacy we are so 
aware of the poem’s construction that we cannot help but be skeptical of his denial of 
responsibility.  
 If one examines the glimpses of sun that appear throughout the poem one sees that 
sunlight is also used to manipulate the reader’s experience of day and evening, further calling 
attention to the poem as a written artifact.   Often complementing the actions of our central 134
characters, the sinking of the sun corresponds with increasingly serious speech (l. 35); it defies 
physics by pausing, as though waiting, like the gondoliers, for Julian and Maddalo; and it ceases 
its descent in companionship with them when they pause as in the midst of a “pleasant 
pilgrimage” (l.64). In the end of the first day, precisely as the sun sets, Maddalo describes death 
as a “sunset” which “severeth / Our memory from itself” [a statement that marks the end of 
speech for the day (l.127-29)]. It can also be punishing: the sun’s marking of time in shadow is 
central to an agonizing metaphor presented by the Maniac, in which he describes feeling like a 
worm which, stepped on, writhes and watches the light making shadows on the grass. The 
sunlight and shadow mark the “eternal periods” which encompass his state of “living death” (l.
415-19). Finally, in an oft analyzed passage, Julian criticizes Maddalo as having struck “his eagle 
spirit blind / By gazing on its own exceeding light” (l.51-52) before himself offering a lengthy 
description of the sunset. Most critics read the irony here as located in the idea that the idealistic 
Julian is the blind one. But the eagle is also used by Shelley in “Adonais” as having 
extraordinarily sharp sight which could be renewed by flying toward the sun (l.148-49). An 
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 De Man points out that it is in the motif of light that Shelley is “extraordinarily systematic”: 134
“Shelley's treatment of the birth of light reveals all that is invested in the emblem of the rainbow. 
It represents the very possibility of cognition” (111). In Adonais, poets are “sons of light” (l. 36). 
alternate reading offers a more nuanced irony: perhaps it is not that Julian is in some way blind 
because of his idealism but rather that, in ascribing the eagle’s characteristics to Maddalo as a 
negative trait, Julian has in fact misused the symbol itself. This latter reading is more persuasive 
when linked to the myriad of other ways Shelley calls our attention to the failures of figurative 
language and the potential for the poet to misuse them.  
  That the poem’s central characters are often interrupted emphasizes the fact that we 
only ever truly speak in fragments, an inevitable reflection of our subjugation to the 
inconveniences of passing time. We are interrupted by the impatience of others to speak, as 
Julian is interrupted by Maddalo: “I was about to speak, when—” (l.3) and the Maniac is 
interrupted by “the din / Of madmen, shriek on shriek again begin” (l.266-67). We are 
sometimes interrupted by ourselves, our own change of subject, as the Maniac’s speech is 
interrupted by asterisks. Sometimes we’re interrupted by corporeal needs, as the Maniac is 
interrupted by his sleep (l.514) and later by death. Yet another kind of interruption signifies 
more obviously a failure of our ability to know our mind: we fail to finish our story because we 
are interrupted by our own forgetting or our own self-interest. We forget what is said (or we say 
that we forgot what was said, even if it we did not). When Julian says he remembers exactly 
what the Maniac said (l.288-89) it contrasts sharply with his earlier admittance that, though he 
recalls the “sense of what (Maddalo) said” he “(mars) the force of his expressions” (l.130-32).  
His inability to recall the exact argument of Maddalo again underlines the flimsiness of the 
poem’s frame.  
 After the Maniac finishes his soliloquy Julian and Maddalo return to Maddalo’s to dine, 
and their relinquishing of the argument is a coldly efficient transition which highlights the 
voyeuristic element of their eavesdropping. The scene of suffering has energized them: after 
dinner they ironically converse about his “unspeakable” ill until daybreak. Julian’s 
preoccupation with the “secret” of that dreadful ill will continue to the poem’s conclusion and 
further our view of him as an entirely unsympathetic figure. When they return to Maddalo’s 
Julian dreamily expands to say that he could sit with his witty friend throughout the night: 
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  And subtle talk would cheer the winter night  
  And make me know myself, and the firelight  
  Would flash upon our faces, till the day  
  Might dawn and make me wonder at my stay (l. 560-64).  !
Their conversation once again causes Julian to misapprehend time: winter seems full of “cheer”  
until dawn arrives, leaving Julian astounded at the sudden presence of dawn. This significantly 
contradicts his assertion that the talk makes him “know (him)self”; indeed, he still “wonders” at 
his own actions. The deceptive speech enables the illusion both that we can know ourselves or 
our will, and know another and their will; it reinforces the fantasy that causality in human 
relationships—why we are who we are, why she did what she did—are discernible and 
predictable. It gives us a false sense of mastery in the world. The tragedy of madness is the 
suspension of reason, yet the poem attempts to offer us an explicable cause for the Maniac’s 
madness (Weineck 100) and when the Maniac tells us what caused his madness, he does so in so 
eloquent a way that we wonder not at the source of his insanity but rather the relationship 
between madness and language itself. By linking speech with a chaotic experience of time 
Shelley demonstrates how mistaken we are to believe expression in language will fulfill our 
quest for intersubjective understanding; for the reality is that we actually become disoriented 
within our own speech and our own place in the world. If Julian cannot “know himself” he 
cannot experience harmonious sympathy with another. 
!
III. “Graceful without design, and unforeseeing” 
The poem encourages our interrogation of what he has laid before us yet too often we fail to 
follow the lead. To return to the metaphor of the matryoshka, because we are distracted by this 
chaotic, swift world of fragmented speech and shifting subjectivities we overlook the solid 
innermost object: Maddalo’s daughter, the one figure who remains silent and who offers a 
moment of brief clarity in the poem’s sense of time. Though she speaks just seventeen lines she 
has been of central interest to critics, yet no one is exactly sure what to do with her. Her 
appearance in the middle of the poem has the feeling of being a metaphorical crux, her centrality  
only bolstered by her participation in the final scene; but it is again difficult to determine what 
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she represents. Ascribing meaning to her in the context of the debate is particularly fraught, 
though this hasn’t stopped critics from trying: she is often read as a factor in favor of Julian’s 
idealism, or as a generally positive symbol.  Others argue she is a sort of zero-sum equalizer 135
rendering both perspectives moot: as Holmes writes, “Shelley places (the child) here carefully in 
the thematic development of the work, as a kind of hostage both against fortune and against the 
purely intellectual side of Julian and Maddalo’s argument” (Holmes 57). Still others see Julian’s 
response to Maddalo’s daughter as an example of the fallacy of his idealism at best; at worst an 
example of his ability to reduce people to what they represent for him (Hirsch 20). These 
readings fail to notice the singularity of the girl and the way she clearly exists outside of the 
philosophical context we’ve been given. Her graceful silence and brevity allows her to be 
incorporated whole into the text rather than being reflected or reflecting the characteristics of 
those around her. Ultimately her speech and actions can only be identified as admirable and 
representative of sympathy and wisdom (in the first scene she is described as “graceful without 
design;” in the second, as having a “manner beyond courtesy”).   
 Of the two scenes in which she appears the first is when she and Julian “(roll) billiard 
balls about” (l. 157) as he waits for Maddalo to arise. We know that the girl is quite young, 
perhaps even pre-language. Julian has come in hopes of continuing his conversation with 
Maddalo; when they do, he incorporates his idealism of the girl in support of his position (that 
she is called a “toy” highlights both the importance of play, and that she will soon be used by 
Julian for his argument). Holmes writes that “his recourse to the child is a very superficial kind 
of Wordsworthian platitude” (qtd. in Hirsch, 21), to which Maddalo retorts, simply, “You talk 
Utopia.” Shortly thereafter, the men leave for the asylum. With the context of Hume’s first 
principle in mind, the casualness with which the girl and Julian play with the billiard balls has 
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 James L. Hill, for example, who sees Julian as the clear winner in the debate with Maddalo, 135
argues that ‘Julian’s powers of insight are revealed in his rapid estimate of Maddalo’s little 
daughter,’ and that his ‘ability to penetrate beneath the outward appearances of things... (is).... 
demonstrated in his estimate of the child” (Hill, “Dramatic Structure in Julian and Maddalo” 
ELH, 35, 1968, 87 - 89). See also “Optimism and Anti Climax in Julian and Maddalo” by Julia 
Tejblum (26). 
the tongue-in-cheek feel of an inside joke, especially because any attempt to discern causal 
relationships in the poem is willfully confused. But the use of the symbol makes clear that in 
some way she holds the key to the poem’s meaning. In this moment of play, the sit in silence, 
language and time suspended:  
  And whilst I waited, with his child I played; 
  A lovelier toy sweet Nature never made,  
  A serious, subtle, wild, yet gentle being,  
  Graceful without design and unforeseeing, 
  With eyes - oh speak not of her eyes! - which seem 
  Twin mirrors of Italian Heaven, yet gleam 
  With such deep meaning, as we never see 
  But in the human countenance... 
    ...she yet seemed to know 
  On second sight her antient playfellow. 
  Less changed that she was by six months or so;  
  For after her first shyness was worn out 
  We sate there, rolling billiard balls about. (l. 144 - 57) !!
This demonstration of creative activity is characterized by passivity and lack of purpose or 
direction; its goal is not to communicate, but to act without forethought, casually observe, and 
enjoy the result: “She spends a happy time with little care / While (Julian and Maddalo) to such 
sick thoughts subjected are” (l.168 - 69). Here, as elsewhere in Romantic poetry, play offers a 
way for the poet to rupture the experience of time which we have come to expect, presenting an 
idle state outside of the wild searches for meaning which preoccupy others. At the same time, it 
signifies the potential erasure of the productivity, artistic and otherwise, which is the side effect 
of such preoccupation. Though tempting we would be mistaken to read her creative play as a 
stage, form, or metaphor for fancy; it does not function, as James Beattie argues, “harmoniously 
with the Imagination as a kind of servant or ‘lady-in-waiting’ providing ‘raw materials’” which 
the poet then shapes into an original creation (qtd. in Duff, 58-59), nor does it occupy the more 
conflicted role of “‘rambling and sportive’ Fancy,” the volatile, hurried, superficial or incomplete 
accessory to the imagination (Duff 58-59). It is certainly not “hurried”: because the child’s 
experience of time is natural and in sequence it is actually quite remarkable in the context of this 
dizzying poem. Her physical aging is commented on by Julian both times he sees her [l.155, 
588-89], and gone are the syntactical inversions, sunlight imagery (the morning is rainy and 
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“dim”), composite figures, shifting of tenses and pronouns and emphasis on excessive speech. In 
both appearances she is oriented within the calm quietude of Maddalo’s home where “spirits 
(are) tame.” Emphasizing this anachronistic righting of time and place are two temporal 
paradoxes which bracket off their play. The passage opens with “Ere Maddalo arose, I called on 
him” (l.142 - 43). While the literal meaning is apparent–he arrived before Maddalo had risen—
the phrasing is purposefully strained as if to say, I called on someone who was not yet present. 
The reversals resume after the scene of play is over: “When the Count entered - salutations past” 
(l. 158 - 59). In this phrasing Maddalo seems to simultaneously enter before and after the 
salutations, emphasizing the extent to which time is subject to the whim of memory. 
  For her part, the girl has little expectation or care about the future: she is 
“unforeseeing,” a quality matched with her lack of “design.” The word carries tremendous 
weight when we consider the centrality of “design” to the other characters’ speech: Julian, 
Maddalo, and the Maniac are unable to speak without the goal to persuade. Because her lack of 
forethought is linked to her disinterestedness and we know it is not a failure of her “mind’s 
habit” [her memory functions in accordance with her will, both as a girl and later (l.153-55, 
604-05)] her indifference to causality must be read as in some way indicative of her sympathetic 
nature. While causality is important to the poem, it is not, again, in the way that Julian and 
Maddalo pose it: the question is intimate and linguistic, rather than philosophical. 
 In the first sustained psychoanalytic treatment of the relationship between play and 
creative writing, “Creative Writers and Day Dreaming,” Freud states that any creative text is “a 
continuation of, and a substitute for, what was once the play of childhood” (442).   Yet he 136
writes that if a day-dreamer were to confess his intimate fantasies to a listener, the listener may 
feel indifferent or even repulsed by the disclosures. The same fantasy presented in writing, 
however, enables the reader to experience pleasure.  The writer’s skill in making this shift is 
ultimately unfathomable: “(it is) his innermost secret; the essential ars poetica lies in the 
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 The English translation seems to elide the meaning of the title, which emphasizes the 136
importance of child’s play to creative writing. 
technique of overcoming the feeling of repulsion in us which is undoubtedly connected with the 
barriers that rise between each single ego and the others” (443). Julian and Maddalo presents 
its reader with both forms: the fantasy presented in speech and writing detailed by Freud, and 
the fantasy expressed in child’s play as detailed by Christopher Bollas, D.W. Winnicott, and 
others. Yet in this case it is the expression into language that repels us. The Maniac’s speech is 
more akin to the adult day-dreamer who, in confessing fantasies both unreal (for example, a 
world which correlates to one’s inner state) and terrifying (madness), alienates us; het he does 
so in the context of poetry. By contrast the child’s silent play offers us enjoyment; a moment of 
respite in a sea of debate and speech. As Winnicott states, art relieves us from the strain of 
relating inner and outer reality, and the a process that has its origin in child’s play: “on the basis 
of playing is built the whole of man's experiential existence....We experience life... in an area that 
is intermediate between the inner reality of the individual and the shared reality of the world 
that is external to individuals (86).  
 What Freud left unexplored is the exact way that the transition to from child’s play to the 
written word alters the imagination itself, if at all. While we often think of how various artistic 
forms affect the viewer, reader, or audience, Bollas points out that different forms actually 
“process (the creator) very differently”: 
 Is it possible that this ending of a person’s idiom as a self, and new beginning as  
 a different form, is part of the pleasure of creativity? ....  If I paint my ideas rather  
 than put them to musical sound I not only select a different form, I also find a different  
 unconscious aesthetic. My ideas will materialise, transformed according to the  
 characteristics of the representation form’s unconscious structure.... different forms  
 process us very differently. (175) !
The characters in Shelley’s poem are processed by alternate modes of creativity: for certainly to 
roll balls about on the floor is not the same as to write a poem in heroic couplets or paint a 
seascape. The excess of speech and the written word in this poem corroborates a dizzying, 
destabilized position in time. Yet the play of the child holds her in quiet passivity and in a realm 
safe from speech, relieved from the strain of relating inner and outer reality. If, as Winnicott 
argues, our experience of our existence is located within an intermediate space between the 
intimate and the public, then language, a central tool of communication with another, is a pillar 
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of the shared world. The girl’s play marks a type of creativity which is passive, receptive, silent, 
and yet sociable, and it enables her to navigate that interweave; thus it is a form of creativity 
privileged over speech, and puts her squarely in the intermediate space in which we may 
properly observe our own, and another’s, experience. She also evinces what Masud Khan 
describes as the “fallow state.” A capacity of the ego to be suspended within a transient, 
unintegrated, receptive and labile mood, it is kinaesethic in expression, without conflict, 
intellectually uncritical, and noninstinctual. The capacity to lie fallow enables the adult to 
express “the creative potential of the madness” created by those experiences of the infant which 
s/he was unable to psychically process (every adult, Khan continues, is “mad and in a very 
private way, and also alone”); it also requires a toleration of silence and suspension of 
interaction with one’s environment. Our creative adult actualization of this madness occurs in  
“art and literature; through sharing unexcited mutuality with the other; and through mystic 
states of being, like the Persian sufis or the Zen priests” (181-88).  Lying fallow is frequently 137
paired with poetic reverie: Bollas describes it as having more to do with “the poetic and the 
sensory” than with abstract thought or the intellect, and says that as a state characterized by a 
regression to dependence it has to do with the “the physical properties of objects (including the 
self) and with concreteness of the world” (271) (Khan similarly describes it as an “image-based” 
mood). The fallow state is nicely compatible with Gadamer’s description of play as a form of 
“self-movement” without purpose or goal. As Samuel Gill describes it, “Play does not allow the 
player or the spectator to act toward it as if it were an object. It cannot be understood as a kind 
of activity, nor can it be subjectively determined” (9).  The characteristics of play—the absence of 
subjective and objective contingency, the lack of outward and inward necessity, the to-and-fro 
movement that is itself life—are to Gadamer clues to the ontology of art. Play is at once the 
metaphor for art, and a description of its structure. (12). Yet though the fallow state may be 
shared we are (tragically) more often blocked by another’s benevolent but misguided desire to 
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 Though Bollas builds on Khan’s ideas, he does not link the fallow state to madness, writing 137
“This state of mind means that the picturing inside the mind of some person or event has the 
integrity of memory rather than the fracture of hallucination” (Bollas 271).
interpret our play, to put it into their own “conceptual vocabulary” or identify its necessity. In 
trying to create a narrative out of the fragments of “nonsense” which characterize the artifacts of 
some of our experiences, either by tracing the past or its hallucinations, we destroy the creative 
potential of madness: it falls into oblivion so that we are “no longer mad or alone, but merely 
lonely and lost!” (Khan 182).  
 In her recent essay “Romanticism, Psychoanalysis, and the Interpretation of Silence,” 
Nancy Yousef focuses her attention on a similar scene in which companionable silence is part 
and parcel of the freedom to play: the description of the babe and his “curious toys” created by 
“idle thought” in “Frost at Midnight.” The nearness of infant and poet, their speechless 
interchange, leaves room for both the play of the infant and the creative solitude of the speaker 
(223-25). She rightly asserts that our tendency to strictly partition off the social and solitary 
experience occludes the relational elements which actually sustain the private meditation, 
writing that “the peculiar grace of such intimacy is that the other need not be a preoccupation, 
even though his or her presence is what allows for the spiritual ‘loitering’ of silent 
musing” (226). Far from loitering, the three men in the poem are as archeologists in the face of 
narrative: attempting to establish causality, they leave themselves and the other forlorn and 
disintegrated (even Maddalo by the end has lost his dog).  The Maniac is no different; though his 
fragmented language has the madness of poeisis, it ultimately fails to express poetry because in 
his hallucinations he works to cohere a narrative from his own chaotic interiority. The 
foundational prerequisite of creative expression for Khan is a “capacity to lie fallow in a 
quiescent aloneness with the other”; it is this state which allows us to truly relate and be 
actualized.  The girl enables Julian to experience what Winnicott would describe as the “capacity 
to be alone,” a “sacred” noncommunicative state which requires the presence or steady 
awareness of another [a mother figure (31)]; but his quick transcription of the experience into a 
metaphor for his philosophical position (its “objective contingency,” in Gadamer’s terms) 
reveals his failure to independently remain in the state. Rather than truly relating he has 
“replaced effort with labour, and lying fallow with... leisure” (185-88).  
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 In the girl we see Keats’s identification of the central faculty of poetic genius as the 
ability to diffuse one’s identity and extend oneself into the lives and emotions of others. If we 
return to Shelley’s On Life we see that he admires the ability of children to intuit the unity of 
their existence and dissolve into their surroundings: 
 Let us recollect our sensations as children. What a distinct and intense apprehension  
 had we of the world and of ourselves....We less habitually distinguished all that we saw  
 and felt from ourselves. They seemed as it were to constitute one mass. There are some  
 persons who in this respect are always children. Those who are subject to the state called  
 reverie fell as if their nature were dissolved into the surrounding universe, or as if the  
 surrounding universe were absorbed into their being. They are conscious of no   
 distinction.... As men grow up, this power commonly decays, and they become   
 mechanical and habitual agents (507-8). !
If we construe the activity of the imagination as an oscillation between the self and the other or a 
diffusion of the self into various subjectivities, then the poet must maintain a discrete sense of 
his own subjectivity in order to differentiate it and then return for the purposes of poetic 
composition. Schlutz describes the paradox this way: “The subject can only become conscious of 
itself as the subject if it distinguishes itself from an outside, the object.... the absolute subject 
thus simultaneously posits and delimits itself, for the possibility of unity can only be perceived 
consciously, once a distinction has been made, from which unity becomes observable” (152). The 
child, however, is capable of experiencing a complete dissipation into the universe, and so 
oblivious to any distinction; it is in this context that she is idealized. We would be right to ask 
how this silence, this “capacity to be alone,” should be understood in the example of Keats’s 
poet, who transcends the limitations of his idiom while also expressing the universal desire to 
create and extend imaginatively into the lives of others. The shared aspect of that desire is what 
opens the creative act from one which is displacement into one which is, ultimately, temporally 
transcendent. Robert Pack links this to Freud’s description of the “wish to be father to oneself,” 
a restating of Wordsworth’s “the child is father to the man.” But Pack points out that 
 unlike the dreamer and the madman, the artist must return his readers to the actuality of 
 their mortal singularity and to their own lives. It follows that an effective poem must be a 
 dream – a convincing illusion – and a waking return, as Keats says, to “one’s sole self.”  
 In this return, the poem becomes an act of celebration  of the mind’s fecund power of  
 identification with others, and, finally, a celebration of the finite and the limited self  
 from which imaginative art may spring. (27) !
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An—if not the—ethical end of poetry is to vault readers into compassionate identification with 
another, then shepherd them back into their own moment in time and their own idiom. What 
this initial and momentary pause of the individual consciousness entails is nothing less than a 
move outside of time, making the ethical and temporal profoundly linked in the context of the 
creative act.  This is what Schlegel means when he says that Romantic poetry, which is alone 
“infinite,” “can also, more than any other form, hover at the midpoint between the portrayed 
and the portrayer, free of all real and ideal self-interest, on the wings of poetic reflection... 
multiplied it in an endless succession of mirrors“ (31).   
 This process necessitates an abeyance of the self and so disinterestedness is central to 
poetic transcendence. It is something the girl is along capable of. The preoccupation with the 
self is painfully revealed in one of the most tragic aspects of the Maniac’s condition: the 
involuntariness of this speech. He desires never to speak or even think again, but is compelled to 
do so. Hyperbole erupts from him without mediation, demonstrating his failure to suspend 
subjectivity in the midst of imaginative speech: “that thou on me / Shouldst rain these plagues 
of blistering agony” (l.453) or “I had torn out  / The nerves of manhood y their bleeding root / 
With mine own quivering fingers” (l.424-26). Some argue that the Maniac’s hyperbole is the 
indication of his poetic sensitivity, and perhaps this is so; but in lines that call upon the images 
in that famous passage in the Defence that “the mind in creation is as a fading coal” (531) we see 
the extent to which his words destroy him: “I do but hide / Under these words like embers, every 
spark / Of that which has consumed me” (l. 503-05).  
 Compulsive speech plagues Julian and Maddalo as well. Though Maddalo sees 
sacredness and joy in “A heaven of sacred silence,” (l.261), and Julian describes Venice as a 
“delight” when the “town is silent,” (l.551), that joy is ironically experienced in terms of words: 
one may write or read book or admire statues “which were twin-born with poetry” (l.556). What 
their involuntariness of speech signifies most of all is uncontrolled self-interest, the unchecked 
consumption of the experience of others in order to bolster one’s argument. It is also to be mad, 
so enraptured with your narrative that you hallucinate listeners to attend to your laments while 
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failing to notice the two real people eavesdropping in your bedroom.  The conversation itself is 
what keeps the Maniac in a state of madness and Julian and Maddalo’s dialogue itself is a state 
of madness. It is ongoing, without resolution, fragmentary, and it operates under the 
fundamentally mad assumptions regarding causality and the nature of the human will.  
 By contrast, the woman delivers Julian back to himself, changed by his experience: a 
“waking return... to one’s sole self,” as Keats puts it (cite). The activity of a disinterested 
imagination is, as Jacques Khalip demonstrates so precisely, an expression of an “aversion to the 
self” which “leads to an extra-individual concern for ethics, politics, and alterity. Disinterest 
evokes a profoundly renunciatory force in the face of a colonizing desire to approximate the 
other” (885). By being “without design,” the daughter contrasts sharply with the others: in her 
fallow state, pre-speech and pre-language, she does not use others to support an intellectual 
position; rather, she is idle and creative within a backdrop of intersubjective limitations. Her 
second appearance corresponds with Julian’s return to Venice. Maddalo is absent, and so he 
stays with his daughter at his villa. The woman is as praiseworthy now as when she was a girl: 
Julian describes her as a “a wonder of this earth / Where there is little of  transcendent worth / 
As with one of Shakespeare’s women” (l .590 - 52). Julian inquires after the Maniac and the 
woman recalls the lover returned to him briefly only to leave again. The one specific detail she 
offers of the lover is impressionistic, outside the narrative and philosophical frame, and again 
rooted in play: it is a memory of playing with the woman’s shawl. Julian asks her to tell him 
“why they parted, how they met” (l.610).   The woman requests he cease his inquiry, saying: 138
 Yet if thine aged eyes disdain to wet  
 Those wrinkled cheeks with youth’s remembered tears, 
 Ask me no more, but let the silent years  
 Be closed and ceared over their memory  
 As yon mute marble where their corpses lie (l.611-14).  !
He presses, and she finally reveals his end. Crucially, however, Julian then refuses to tell the 
reader, saying in the poem’s final line that “The cold world shall not know” (l.617).  
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 These questions reappear in “The Triumph of Life”: see Julia Tejblum.138
 Her plea for Julian to allow for the cessation of the Maniac’s sad tale is described as a 
posthumous antidote to his torture: the phrase “closed and ceared over their memory” echoes 
the Maniac’s own earlier description of his despair: “Thou sealedst them with many a bare broad 
word/And cearedst my memory oer them” (l. 432-33). The foundation for the woman’s reticence 
to speak is laid in the first scene; her silence there expresses the profundity of play, not only as a 
welcome relief from the poem’s dizzying rhetoric and speed, but as a contrast to Julian, 
Maddalo, and (soon ) the Maniac’s desire to make use or persuade the other, and their ultimate 
failure to translate their sympathy into any effective relief for themselves or each other. After the 
Maniac collapses, exhausted, on his couch, Julian and Maddalo “(weep) without shame in his 
society” (l.516), urging the reader to wonder whether shame should in fact have a place in this 
experience after all. They do not weep in his conscious society, where he might be comforted by 
their sharing of the sorrow. In fact the Maniac never sees them at all—his speech becomes 
fodder for an evening of lively conversation, yet they elide the responsibility true sympathy 
might entail. Despite their proclaimed distress, immediately thereafter—quite speedily in fact—
they dine at Maddalo’s where Julian is cheered by the fire and Maddalo’s “wit” (l.559). The lines 
“Then we lingered not, / Although our argument was quite forgot” (l.519-20, emphasis mine) is 
a reminder of the utilitarian perspective with which the two men have observed the Maniac. It 
also prepares us to be skeptical of Julian’s claim that he is not an “unconnected man” and thus 
cannot stay to help Maniac (in l. 550 - 67 it becomes clear he is, in fact, exactly that; he leaves for 
London to visit friends and the “chief attraction” is that it takes him far from the “deep 
tenderness” the Maniac evokes in him). For his part, that Maddalo helps the Maniac by 
attempting to outfit him with the trappings of high society actually exiles him from both 
societies: that of the asylum and of Venetian society (Weineck 100). Julian describes how he 
wishes to study the Maniac “as men study some stubborn art / For their own good” (l.571-72), 
and the use of the word “art” there reminds us of the vital connection in the poem between 
language and using the other.  
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 The reaction of both men to the Maniac at the poem’s close is insensitive and brutish: 
Maddalo praises his speech as a kind of poetry: “they learn in suffering what they teach in 
song” (l.546), a line with more elegance than revelation, and Julian’s insistence at learning the 
Maniac’s fate despite the woman’s reticence is another example of his voyeurism. Ultimately the 
evasion of the resolution of Julian and Maddalo’s debate —their argument is, Julian tells us, 
“quite forgot”—comes not as an exchange for something more profound; for example the 
education that sympathy might provide. Rather, speech retards sympathy. The ending of the 
poem is a doubled cessation: the ending of the poem, the blankness which follows the line, 
underlines the termination of Julian’s speech, the woman’s knowledge, and the Maniac’s life. 
Initially one has the feeling of devastation in this end— “the cold world” feels like a falling gavel, 
a pursed lip—but what we are invited to contemplate is the grace and ethics of silence in the face 
of the other. That the woman does finally tell Julian of the Maniac’s end must not be read as a 
retraction of her position as the poem’s a silent and creative ideal. To maintain the fallow 
position she must stay in a place of receptivity, as with the knocked billiard ball. And crucially 
she has succeeded in gently transposing her ethics to Julian, as he refuses to pass along the story 
to his listener / reader. Perhaps it is an inevitable part of the maturation process, to move from a 
silent fallow state to  passivity; yet she maintains the integrity of the unspoken by calling for an 
end to the Maniac’s tale. In urging her silence upon him the woman protects the reader from 
occupying a stage of similar unsympathetic voyeurism and is responsible for the return of the 
reader back to their own moment in time and idiom. She is the one who delivers us, and him,  
back to our own existential position. Her awareness is that the intimacy we experience between 
ourselves and another is based not on disclosure or narrative, but rather “out of (our) failure to 
reach one another.” For ultimately “intimate relatedness can, and at times ought, to be imagined 
as the forbearance of distance, dissonance, estrangement. Unviolated privacy is not, after all, 
inviolable privacy” (Yousef 11). 
  There is something of the Shelley’s neo-Platonic epipsyche in the figure of the girl. In 
“On Love,”  Shelley describes the epipsyche thus:  
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 We dimly see within our intellectual nature a miniature as it were of our entire self, 
 yet deprived of all that we condemn or despise, the ideal prototype of every thing   
 excellent or lovely that we are capable of conceiving as belonging to the nature of 
 man.... a mirror whose surface reflects the forms of purity and  brightness; 
 soul within our soul that describes a circle around its proper Paradise which pain, and  
 evil, and sorrow dare not overleap. (504) !
One might imagine the girl on the floor rolling billiard balls about as the “soul within our soul 
that describes a circle,” who demonstrates in her silence “there is eloquence in the tongueless 
wind” (504). The girl’s eyes are described as “Twin mirrors of heaven” a reminder of the mimetic 
function of art which makes it suspect for Plato who sees it as leading to "a corruption of the 
mind of all listeners who do not possess as an antidote a knowledge of its real nature" (Republic 
595b). Yet that is also what makes it redemptive for Gadamer, who locates the mimetic function 
in the imitation of human nature rather than of the material world. An artwork is incomplete 
without the participation of the reader, viewer, audience; yet simultaneously we are transformed 
by seeing ourselves through its “mirror” or interlocutor. This is a “serious play”: the context of 
our own values and subjectivities is made apparent by the work, and it is this melding of 




 Finally we are led to the question of whether the silent creativity which the girl’s play 
marks is fundamentally inaccessible to the poet. In the action of iterating selves which “being a 
character” entails, Bollas tells us, the creative writer paradoxically preserves the integrity of the 
figure while destroying it. Thus “what is gained in freedom of expression is lost in terms of 
personal security”; the various forms into which, and through which, we shift and speak our 
being becomes our consolation (180). Yet Gadamer’s argument is that the aesthetic experience is 
characterized by a movement from individuating to participatory: what happens to the integrity 
of the figure of the artist, or the audience, in the play of art which “destroys the figure”? 
 The story-within-a-story quality of Julian and Maddalo, with its strained depiction of 
hallucinated listeners and over-hearers, is an active invitation to the reader to consider their 
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own participation in the construction of meaning-making. We might remember the Preface’s 
narrator’s invitation to us: “Julian... is conjectured by his friends to possess some good qualities. 
How far this is possible, the pious reader will determine” (121). The sentence cannot be taken to 
mean exactly what it seems; Shelley has left a small rent in the portion of the curtain. For while 
the typical interpretation is that the reader can decide how accurate the friends are in 
determining that Julian has good qualities, this inverted, complex sentence is in fact structurally 
ambiguous. The sentence equally states that the reader can decide to what extent it is even 
possible to make such a judgement at all. Gadamer’s assertion is that the viewer’s construal or 
misconstrual is constitutive of the work itself; this then alters our way of viewing the world. 
Relatedly, in her response to De Man’s reading of Triumph of Life Rajan argues that “‘the 
supplement of reading’ is a process in which the positive essence of the work must be grasped 
across the barrier of the text’s negativity, and in which the reading does not simply complete the 
creative process but compensates for the destructive momentum of the latter” (352). By arguing 
that the active response of the reader, rather than their spectatorship, enables the creation of 
meaning as a response against the text’s own self-erasure, she positions herself nearer to 
Gadamer than De Man. As with the dream element of The Triumph of Life, which Rajan points 
out “suggests an incomplete attempt at mastery,” so the fragmentation of the Maniac’s speech 
and Julian and Maddalo’s too-ready willingness to abandon their argument in favor of 
sympathetic voyeurism suggest an incomplete mastery of narrative and rhetoric. And as with the 
“temporal repetition of Rousseau’s life in the form of retrospective narration” (Rajan 355), so 
the repetition of the Maniac’s story in the form of retrospective narration, alongside the Julian’s 
repetition of it (verbatim, if we are to believe his account), invites the reader to consider the 
element of fiction which is inherent in all intersubjective exchange, if only because the very word 
itself requires a suspension of disbelief where both individuals pretend that they share the same 
idea of what “love” means, for example (or “subtle talk” or “zeal” or “patience”).”  
 It is difficult to access the reader’s redemptive role in the text when speech itself is so 
condemned, and our ability to assess another so centrally in question. But by focusing our 
"180
attention on the girl, and resisting the distraction of speech, we realized that her silence is part 
and parcel of her creativity, an idleness which is integral to a profoundly ethical position which 
accepts the unknowability of another’s sorrow.  The poem’s ultimate tragedy is that any speech, 
even creative speech, prevents ethical behavior because it fosters the illusion of knowing the 
other. Thus it is not only the madman who drowns in the text: it is also his hidden audience of 
the two men and the doubly hidden audience of ourselves as readers. Shelley’s call is for the 
cessation of speech; the death the Maniac seeks “is partly the death of the desire to write, 
paradoxically communicated through writing” (O’Neill 140). Something in Maddalo recognizes 
this,too: “Poetry for Maddalo has its origins in some kind of wrong; ‘song’ requires 
‘suffering’” (140). Ultimately the text forces us to apprehend what is at stake when the 
conversation stops, when Julian and the poet cease their speech, when the composite figures 
become separate: of the other, “I can give no information” (121). Yet much of the poem’s 
criticism, by focusing on the debate and adding voices and biographies and figures to the text, 
ironically replicates the problem of doubled and redoubled, circular speech.  
 We are reminded that Plato’s apprehension about the centrality of mimesis to poetry is 
rooted in the potential lack in interpretive skill on the part of the audience. By presenting us 
with two modes of creativity, that of poetry and that of silent play Shelley also engages two 
forms of mimesis. Julian, Maddalo, and the Maniac seem to come from and themselves 
represent the poet Plato warned us of: who represents shifting subjectivities, and in the 
excitement of that mimesis, fails to act ethically or recall the larger questions at hand. The child 
is more of Gadamer’s sort: Shelley’s poiesis-epipsyche, a work of art within a work of art, silently 
reflecting back to the individual his or her mode of being. Her presence causes Julian to reflect 
upon his own commitments to narrative completion and the result is that he refrains from 
speech at the end.  “The ‘final product’ of this most serious of all playful activity is not merely 139
the work of art, but the human being whom we have chosen to imitate, and in whose 
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 “the structure of the ego is the self’s shadow, a silent speech that is unheard by the subject 139
until he enters the echo chamber of psychoanalysis” (72)
characteristic modes of being we have thereby chosen to participate”; thus “At the very heart of 
the aesthetic object we find the subject who concretizes it, and who, by virtue of the self-
reflection made available by the work of art, becomes conscious both of who he is and who he 
might want to become” (Mittscherling 158, 161). The figure of the girl saves us from having to 
make an ethical choice between speech and response, between the experience of being properly 
within time or vaulting through it, because she transposes her own ethical value of silence onto 
Julian. Which is of course a way of saying that Shelley saves us.  
 Cavell discusses that “habit” of mind which Hume speaks of in identifying how we learn 
to expect one billiard ball will move another and concludes that what anticipation means is that 
we are always wrong. Even when what we expect to happen actually happens the coincidence of 
events fools us, “for we imagine that we knew this would happen, and take it either as an 
occasion for congratulations or for punishments, of ourselves or others. Instead of acting as we 
can and remaining equal to the consequences” (322). He continues that in acknowledging that 
skepticism says we cannot definitively know that the world exists, we erroneously think perhaps 
there isn’t one at all. What we fail to comprehend, by being fixated on the acquisition of more 
knowledge, is that we actually have to give up knowing entirely. For what skepticism really says 
is that the existence of the world is not, cannot be, a function of knowing: “The world is to be 
accepted; as the presentness of other minds is not to be known, but acknowledged” (324). 
Julian and Maddalo, in their efforts to use the Maniac in their argument, operate on the 
assumption that another mind can be known and that a narrative can be effectively parsed 
through cause and effect. The Maniac’s story is “one of these ‘catalogues of detached facts’ which 
Shelley dismisses in the Defence—negligible not because it does not reveal a general causality 
but precisely because it does” (Weineck 92). The fallacy of their thinking is indicative of their 
failure to acknowledge the unknowability of the other, and their experience of sympathy, such as 
it is, is predicated on a problematic reliance on coherent narrative.  
 In Julian’s final lines he repeatedly asks Maddalo’s daughter “how” the Maniac’s story 
ended: “how did it end,” (l.607) “why they parted, how they met” (l.610),  “how it / All 
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happened,” (l.616-17). Julian’s preoccupation is not with the Maniac, for the woman does tell us 
what happened to the Maniac: he dies (l.615).  His assertion that he is finally told “how” all  
happened at the end is striking, because it shows he has failed to recognize the death as the end 
of the Maniac’s narrative. Perhaps because there is no end to his own curiosity. I’d like to close 
with a brief look at the poem’s epigraph: 
 The meadows with fresh streams, the bees with thyme, 
 The goats with the green leaves of budding spring,  
 Are saturated not-- nor Love with tears. !
A translation of Virgil’s Tenth Eclogue, the casual reader understands the last line as a reference 
to the tears of the Maniac, a reading supported by the original context: the words are spoken by 
Pan in his attempt to calm the “immod’rate grief” of Gallus due to an unsuccessful wooing in 
which he was passed on in favor of another man.  The tears wept by the Maniac are the 140
physical manifestation of his expressive, uncontrollable outpouring of grief and function as the 
physical expression of his speech. While love may never be saturated with tears, perhaps cause 
and effect is confused here as in so many other places in this poem.  
 But there is something off about Shelley’s translation; more often the translation depicts 
Pan unambiguously emphasizing the cruelty of Love: ““Will there be no end?” he cried. “Love 
recks naught of this: neither is cruel Love sated with tears, nor the grass with the rills, nor bees 
with the clover, nor goats with leaves.”   By linking love with cruelty so explicitly, and cruelty 141
with language in the poem, we wonder if perhaps the tears themselves are actually what cause 
the spoiling of Love, or what prevents us from love. The meadow can be, after all, flooded with 
streams; the goats may eat all the leaves which yield the buds of spring and keep the bush from 
bloom. The lines complement the woman’s lines in the poem’s conclusion, when she asks him to 
"183
 Lines from the poem also serve as the epigraph to Adonais: “Young Naiades, in what far 140
woodlands wild / Wandered ye, when unworthy love possessed / Our Gallus?” (l. 9 - 10, 
Shelley’s translation). For more on the significance of the Tenth Eclogue to Shelley’s works, see 
Michael Vicario, III. “Virgil’s Tenth Eclogue and Shelley’s Adonais,” Keats-Shelley Journal 
161-83. 
 Virgil. Eclogues, Georgics, Aeneid. Translated by H.R. Fairclough. Loeb Classical Library 141
Volumes 63 & 64. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1916.
let her keep her silence over the Maniac’s fate: “If thine aged eyes disdain to wet / Those 
wrinkled cheeks with youth’s remembered tears” (l.611-12). The juxtaposition of “aged” and 
“youth’s remembered” is another temporal contradiction of sorts - and, in another syntactical 
collapse of subjectivity, it begs the question of whose tears are being remembered (the Maniac’s? 
Julian’s?). Returning us to the state of shifting tenses and collapsed figuration which 
characterizes so much of the poem, we confront again the hazard of conversation as a distraction 
from our orientation within time. Ultimately Julian and Maddalo fail to calm the grief of the 
Maniac. Like the “lone fisher” in the poem’s opening who “when his nets are dried” abandons 
the waste of the “uninhabitable sea-side” and its earthly “embrace” of “salt ooze,” (l.6-8) so they 
abandon the waste of the Maniac’s speech and his tears after their own hunger is satisfied. The 
matter is not so much whether the excess of madness makes poetry impossible but how the 
production of speech is the production of a text which drowns us. And in this narrative poem— a 
monologue purporting to be a dialogue with the feel of a drama— the importance of an unsung 
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